FOR THE RECORD: Brzezinski on Ukraine and the world (06/13/04)

FOR THE RECORD: Brzezinski on Ukraine and the world

Following is the text of the speech delivered by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy in Kyiv on May 14. As noted in opening remarks by Dr. Viacheslav Briukhovetsky, president of the university, in 2000 Dr. Brzezinski was given the title of honorary professor of NUKMA "in recognition of his outstanding achievements." While in Kyiv, Dr. Brzezinski, national security advisor in the administration of President Jimmy Carter and currently a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, met with President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, as well as National Deputies Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksander Moroz. His schedule also included meetings with representatives of parliamentary factions, think-tanks and NGOs. (See The Weekly, May for the news story about Dr. Brzezinski's visit to Kyiv.)

Distinguished rector, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen and also some personal friends whom I recognize in the audience and whom I'm delighted to see again. First of all, let me say how very honored I am to receive today a doctorate of this renowned, internationally recognized and important institution.

I am familiar with its history and the role it has played in the intellectual life and in the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people. Founded many centuries ago, much earlier than most institutions in America - suppressed 202 years later and then reborn some 175 years later. This institution is also a testimonial, a testimonial to the desire of the Ukrainian people to shape their own destiny, to define their identity and to contribute to the common European heritage of which Ukraine is so very much an integral part.

Anyone even remotely familiar with the history of Europe knows that this city here, a thousand years ago, was already then a center of European culture, a center of learning, of thought and also of searching for something beyond human existence, of searching for some definition of the meaning of life. So you are a part of an important tradition and your renewal and vitality is a triumph of the spirit, as well as a source of satisfaction to your friends. I consider myself one of your friends.

Today I plan to speak to you about a very big subject: Ukraine and the world. And, of course, all of you here know much more about that subject than I do, since the first word in the subject is Ukraine. So I want to add a qualification, namely that I will speak of Ukraine and the world as seen from the outside, as seen from far away, by someone who is interested in the condition of the world and who is interested in the place of Ukraine in that world.

I consider Ukraine's independence to be truly a major historical event of great international significance. This was not appreciated at first, particularly in the West and specifically in the United States. Even now, in my view, there is not sufficient international appreciation of the international significance of Ukraine. It has to be emphasized over and over again that an independent Ukraine has redefined the frontiers of Europe and an independent Ukraine is transforming Russia into a national state. These are extraordinarily important developments.

It is now a decade and a half since the turbulent days of the rebirth of your national independence. It is appropriate, therefore, to ask what has been accomplished in those 15 years, and a great deal has been accomplished.

First of all, Ukrainian independence has been consolidated internationally. Secondly, its territorial integrity has been preserved; I need only mention Crimea or Tuzla. Thirdly, Ukraine has carried out very effective and internationally positive nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, Ukraine has had a remarkably impressive presidential transition, and I speak particularly of the elections which led from President Kravchuk to President Kuchma. Next, Ukraine's economic growth today, after some years, is now most impressive; indeed, it is among the highest in Europe. And Ukraine, last but not least, is participating in peacekeeping in the Balkans and now in Iraq, and these are important contributions and, thus, this is an impressive record.

But we have to recognize that global conditions, as well as Ukraine's own internal affairs, are still quite fluid, and let us take, therefore, a closer look at both global affairs and internal Ukrainian issues and consider their possible implications.

If basic, currently ongoing political economic and military trends continue for another 25 or 30 years we are likely to see a world in which the global hierarchy of power, the global hierarchy of influential states, is likely to be as follows. At the top there will still be the United States. Secondly, probably the most influential power would be the European Union, by then including both Turkey and Ukraine. Thirdly it will be China. Fourth it will be Japan, and fifth it will be India.

Notice the significant shift of global gravity, of the center of global gravity to Asia. In that setting the democratic core of the world, the Atlantic community, will still be the principal impulse for innovation, the critical source of stability, and the point of origin of the radiating appeal of democracy. However only, only, if present trends continue, and they could be reversed or even derailed and there are already some symptoms of mounting global disorder and some signs of basic misjudgments that give cause for prudent, cautious concern.

Let me note first of all - and it is not a criticism but a statement of fact - that today America is more isolated, more mistrusted and in some places even more hated than ever before. America could even become bogged down in a huge portion of Eurasia, in an area from Suez to Xinjiang, from southern Russia to the Arabian Sea, an area that I call the global Balkans, especially if its engagement in that part of the world remains largely solitary.

It is also not a prediction but a real possibility that Europe's unification will continue to be largely socioeconomic with Europe remaining politically diffused and inward-oriented without a defined strategic vision of the larger world and without the political will and the military means to genuinely influence the developments in the world, and without defining jointly with the U.S. common strategic goals. In that context the engagement of Russia in a closer association with Europe might be diverted towards traditions of imperial goals to the detriment of both democracy in Russia and national independence of Russia's recently emancipated but still vulnerable neighbors.

One has to note also that it is far from certain that the wide gap between the trajectories of China's socioeconomic transformation, which do produce more pluralism, and of its much slower political transformation, may not cause major political upheavals, which will be detrimental to the stability of the Far East.

And last but not least, the growing access not only by states but by terrorist or criminal organizations to weapons of mass destruction in the setting of percolating global turmoil and intense political resentments that cannot be understood merely by the repetitive invocation of the word terrorism host the risk of the progressive degradation of global order, as well as the growing vulnerability of democratic societies.

The cumulative effect of these negative tendencies could be escalating global chaos detrimental particularly to weaker states.

In that context, a closer connection between America and an expanding Europe is clearly needed. In essence, we need to promote the further expansion both of the European Union and of NATO. Neither political geography nor geostrategy is a static concept. They evolve, and the recent expansions of both organizations place now on the agenda the future status of Ukraine, of Turkey, and of the newly independent states of the Caucasus. Their eventual association will then facilitate the constructive engagement of Russia with its imperial option altogether then foreclosed.

However, such a large Atlantic community that includes Ukraine is not possible without Ukrainian efforts. Ukrainians themselves must overcome, and they must overcome themselves, the twin burdens inflicted upon them by the negative historical legacies of prolonged foreign domination and of destructive communism.

Both have hindered the emergence of a pervasive Ukrainian patriotic civic consciousness, which is essential to democracy and independence. Both, I mean foreign domination and communism, have created the tradition of state control over national resources, which in the new conditions of market economy have generated enormous opportunities for avarice by only a few self-enriching people. Both precluded and established supremacy of law over politics as well as over the disposition of national resources, thereby facilitating corruption. Last but not least, both have favored the habitual tendencies of bureaucrats and those in power to control freedom of information, to stifle criticism and to manipulate elections.

The persistence of these negative tendencies is damaging Ukraine's good name in the world, and they are being exploited by outsiders to penetrate, manipulate and weaken Ukraine's independence.

When Ukrainians make a judgment about these domestic developments, they should not measure themselves by what has been happening in Russia, and they should not take refuge that conditions in Russia in some respects are worse. They should measure themselves by what has been happening in the Baltic republics or in Poland. If these negative trends within Ukraine were to intersect with some negative global trends that I have mentioned, Ukraine could become very similar to the Poland of the 18th century. That is to say, like the Polish magnates, some sectors of the newly powerful and the newly rich could become seduced by Ukraine's more powerful neighbor, which could then exploit international instability, including the failure of America and Europe to work together, and exploit Ukraine's relatively still weak national consciousness to turn Ukraine into its satellite even if not again into just its province.

It follows, therefore, that we in the West must strive for a vital European-American partnership and build deliberately an Atlantic community that redefines the geography of Europe. And let us not forget that the Central Europe of today was the Eastern Europe of just yesterday. We must build an Atlantic community open to the new Eastern Europe, and not an Atlantic community that is closed and self-centered.

The time is now right for the Atlantic community to focus with a sense of strategic purpose on the third phase of the Atlantic community's enlargement. The first phase, which we might call the Warsaw round, enlarged NATO to parts of Central Europe including Ukraine's immediate neighbor, Poland. The second phase, which we might call the Vilnius round, resulted in the rest of Central Europe being included in both NATO and the EU. The next phase, which I'd like to call the Kyiv round, should look further east.

June will provide such opportunities, especially the Istanbul-NATO summit. And one desirable outcome in the not too distant future, if not in June, should be a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. In doing so, we in the West must recognize and respect Ukraine's accomplishments but also be alert to its shortcomings.

To make that possible, the Ukrainians must also on their own vigilantly consolidate a genuinely constitutional state in which there is no room for politically expedient constitutional manipulation. They must hold genuinely free presidential elections, thereby setting a contrasting example with recent experiences in Russia. That these elections be free, that they be absolutely legitimate, is more important than who wins them. And the world will watch closely and will draw its own conclusions.

Ukrainians must also foster a civic society based on a deep social awareness of ancient Ukrainian traditions, which as I said earlier, made Kyiv at one point one of Europe's cultural and religious centers. Historically rooted patriotic pride can reinforce a self-confident civic society. Ukrainians in that context should increasingly see themselves as Central Europeans and as part of a Central Europe with which Ukrainians have much culturally in common, and with Russia now the Eastern Europe of Europe.

Ukrainians, last but not least, must protect freedom of the press and subordinate political life to the rule of law, both of which are essential components of democratic society, and in so doing strive to meet the objective criteria for membership in the European Union and NATO. All of that requires time and deliberate effort.

I hope you'll not be offended by my speaking so frankly, but I feel I have the right to do so because I have been a friend of your country for years and I have been dedicated to your independence.

I believe that your success will not only redefine Ukraine as one of Europe's leading nations, it will also set an important example for Russia, facilitating Russia's own road to Europe, and thus further redefining both Europe as well as Russia, and that, in turn, will further enhance the prospects for a genuinely better world. What you do in the near future and how you do it is, therefore, important to all of us who wish you well. Thank you.

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