ANALYSIS: Russian and Ukrainian authorities resort to inter-ethnic violence to block Yushchenko (07/04/04)

ANALYSIS

Russian and Ukrainian authorities resort to inter-ethnic violence to block Yushchenko

by Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor

A November 2003 document prepared by Russian "political technologists" working for Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration, has been leaked to Ukrainska Pravda (June 25). The report outlines how President Leonid Kuchma could win a third term by discrediting his main opponent as a "nationalist" and an inciter of inter-ethnic conflict. Interestingly, one month after the strategy was produced, the Constitutional Court ruled that Mr. Kuchma could stand for a third term, arguing that his first term (1994-1999) did not count because it began before the 1996 Constitution.

The third-term strategy was prepared six months before pro-presidential forces tapped Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate in April. This decision came one week after the Parliament voted against constitutional changes that would have transferred some executive powers to the prime minister.

The opposition has repeatedly warned that the authorities may attempt to incite conflict in two ways. In November 2003 Our Ukraine deputy Mykola Tomenko publicly discussed temnyky (secret instructions from the presidential administration) that outlined plans for inciting instability and then imposing a state of emergency (Ukrainska Pravda, November 7, 2003). Plans to incite western versus eastern Ukraine were widely discussed by opposition circles in November 2003, the same month the strategy was prepared (Ukrainska Pravda, November 3, 12, 24, 2003). Another secret plan for a state of emergency, this one put forward by Mr. Medvedchuk's Social Democrats (SDPU), was leaked to a Luhansk newspaper and then discussed in Ukraina Moloda (November 6, 2003).

The first plan would be a state of emergency leading to an indefinite postponement of the elections. Such a scenario would be a desperate measure taken because Mr. Yushchenko was leading in the polls and likely to win elections and thereby inherit President Kuchma's powers (as constitutional changes had failed). The crisis during the April mayoral elections in Mukachiv (the authorities used skinheads to intimidate and incite violence, committed election fraud, destroyed voter slips and encouraged Internal Affairs Ministry personnel to turn a blind eye on such violations) provides a glimpse of possible actions.

The second plan would be to depict Mr. Yushchenko as somebody who would lead to instability if he were elected. Mr. Kuchma (or another centrist, such as Prime Minister Yanukovych) would then be proposed as a source of "stability" - better the status quo than instability. This scenario was tested in October 2003 when Mr. Yushchenko held a congress in Donetsk. The city was plastered with billboards depicting him giving a Nazi salute. Mr. Yushchenko was also shown on television accompanied by anti-terrorist Alpha forces from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) during organized anti-Yushchenko demonstrations. The message sent to Ukrainian voters was that Donetsk did not like Mr. Yushchenko and to be wary of him as he creates instability.

The November 2003 strategy says openly, "Our aim is to destabilize the situation in the regions (through political intrigues, not by harming the economy), to drag Yushchenko into these processes, and through the media severely point out that responsibility for dealing with this situation rests upon the Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament" (Ukrainska Pravda, June 25).

The document outlines how conflict would be provoked between Tatars and Russian or Ukrainian groups in Crimea. "Pro-Russian" forces would complain that Ukraine is unable to defend the interests of Slavs in the Crimea and would seek the intervention of Russia. In March inter-ethnic conflict in the Crimea was deliberately provoked during a visit by philanthropist George Soros (Itar-Tass, March 26). The opposition leaked details to Ukrainska Pravda (March 26 and May 17) of government plans to declare a state of emergency in Crimea following ethnic conflict. Media sources controlled by Mr. Medvedchuk gave the Crimean conflict extensive airtime and depicted Mr. Soros as attempting to repeat the 2003 Georgian revolution in Ukraine. Serhii Markov, director of the Moscow-based Institute of Political Research and also a close ally of President Vladimir Putin, accused Crimean Tatars - who usually vote for Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine - of training to storm official buildings on election night (Ukrainska Pravda, June 28).

Two other proposals were laid out in the strategy for inciting discord in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Possible approaches would be to escalate the dispute over cemeteries of soldiers in Lviv or fan Ukrainian-Russian religious conflicts. In the latter case, the aim would be to identify Mr. Yushchenko as being completely aligned with the "anti-Russian" Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarch.

Mr. Yushchenko asked the SBU to halt such "inter-ethnic provocations" intended to discredit the opposition (Ukrainska Pravda, May 27). Oleksander Zinchenko, the head of Mr. Yushchenko's election campaign, warned that more "provocations" could be undertaken against Mr. Yushchenko. These "provocations," according to Mr. Zinchenko, who was formerly deputy head of the SDPU, are being planned in the presidential administration (Ukrainska Pravda, June 26).

As with the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, the Ukrainian authorities control four extreme nationalist groups: the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine (OUNvU), Rukh for Unity (RukhzY) and Bratstvo (Brotherhood). Nationalist groups, such as CUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) in Our Ukraine and another wing of UNA, which adds the abbreviation UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defense Forces) in the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, are bona fide members of the opposition.

The four pro-Kuchma nationalist groups (UNA, OUNvU, RukhzY, Bratstvo) are believed to be funded by either the SDPU or the presidential administration. They certainly have close ties to the president's allies. Dmytro Korchynsky, head of Bratstvo, is a commentator on Mr. Medvedchuk's 1+1 television channel. Andrii Chornovil, head of OUNvU, is a member of the SDPU Social Justice faction in the Lviv Oblast Council, and the Lviv faction is headed by Serhii Medvedchuk, Viktor's brother.

In March 2001 Tryzub paramilitaries from RukhzY were used to provoke violent clashes in Kyiv. The blame for the violence was placed upon members of the opposition UNA-UNSO who were arrested and imprisoned.

In the March 2002 elections pro-presidential nationalist groups backed Mr. Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc. OUNvU was one of the first parties to announce its support for Prime Minister Yanukovych's presidential bid (Ukrainska Pravda, December 9, 2003).

Only one of the four nationalist groups controlled by the authorities - the Ukrainian National Assembly - has declared its support for Mr. Yushchenko. Our Ukraine immediately denounced the assembly's support as aimed at discrediting Mr. Yushchenko. Three hundred assembly members wearing SS-style black uniforms and carrying flags with SS-style inscriptions, accompanied by anti-Semitic speeches, announced their support for the "right-wing presidential candidate Yushchenko" at a Kyiv demonstration. Three television channels controlled by Mr. Medvedchuk repeatedly aired the demonstration, highlighting the Ukrainian National Assembly as Mr. Yushchenko supporters (UT-1, 1+1, Inter, June 26).

The Kuchma camp's resort to these tactics is a sign of desperation. They are dangerous and could easily backfire. The involvement of Russian "political technologists" close to President Putin is another cause for concern.

Taras Kuzio is visiting professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The article above, which originally appeared in The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, is reprinted here with permission from the foundation (www.jamestown.org).

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