INTERVIEW: Scholars discuss whether Ukraine is at a critical crossroads (08/22/04)

INTERVIEW: Scholars discuss whether Ukraine is at a critical crossroads

by Peter Steciuk and Andrew Nynka

On the occasion of Ukraine's 13th anniversary and the coming presidential election scheduled for October 31, The Ukrainian Weekly asked four noted Ukrainian scholars to comment on developments surrounding the elections in Ukraine. More specifically, we wanted to know how important they thought this election will be for Ukraine and whether they see this time as a defining period in the country's history.

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Dr. Dominique Arel is chair of Ukrainian studies and associate professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa in Canada.

Q: A number of diplomats and political figures have called this presidential election in Ukraine pivotal. Is it? As Ukraine nears its 13th anniversary, is this election a defining moment for the country?

A: The election is indeed pivotal, not only for Ukraine, but for the CIS region as a whole. Competitively fought elections have disappeared from the landscape and the latest presidential "plebiscite" in Russia was another step in the wrong direction. There was Georgia, of course, where a combination of street protests and elite division forced [Eduard] Shevanardze out. The follow-up election of [Mikhail] Saakashvili, however, was once again fought without opposition. Ukraine is the one country where a political opposition has a genuine chance of defeating the incumbent, despite the open attempts by the authorities to rig the process. The election could be a generational watershed. Younger people in Ukraine want to be taken seriously by Europe and are embarrassed by the "integrationist" rhetoric of the powers-that-be that is so often blatantly at odds with their behavior. While it is incorrect to believe that Yushchenko's election would be a shoo-in under a fair electoral process, as there are profound regional cleavages in Ukraine that could prove more resilient than the rising cleavage over democratization, were international observers to call the election outcome questionable, this would seriously tarnish Ukraine's reputation, with long-term consequences.

Q: With regard to the general profile of a candidate and a political campaign, have there been any significant changes since 1991? Is it fair to say that voters are being offered a better choice in terms of candidates?

A: A better benchmark is 1994. In 1991, the election was hardly contested, since the Communist Party had been banned, the oligarchs did not exist and there was no way that Eastern Ukraine would support Rukh, even in an independent Ukraine. No one doubted [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kravchuk's election. In 1994, [President Leonid] Kuchma was a strong contender, even though his election took everyone by surprise. In retrospect, the electoral process was remarkably fair. Kravchuk did not "own" the airwaves, there was no attempt to shut down newspapers, and the governmental bureaucracy was not mobilized to support the incumbent. This is the big change with 2004 (or with 1999). On that score, there is little doubt that Ukraine has regressed. It is clear to all that the 2004 election will not be fair, since [Viktor] Yushchenko will be shut out from central TV, but there is still a difference between unfairness and outright fraud. The other big change, of course, is the rise of a "moneyed" class, the so-called oligarchs. In 1994, Kuchma offered the East - always the key battleground in Ukraine's electoral arithmetic - an alternative to Communism and Rukh, but after a few promising years, he turned out to be a Soviet neo-apparatchik contemptuous of pluralism. The oligarchs have the potential to offer a liberal alternative (in the sense of respect for property rights and pluralism) to an Eastern electorate suspicious of politicians from Western Ukraine. This could happen soon, with some implicit backing of Yushchenko, or later down the road, if the electoral has not been irredeemably vitiated. The hopeful sign is that, contrary to Russia, the executive branch is unable to keep the oligarchs in line. Elites in Ukraine remain divided among themselves and the divide over language and region has a lot to do with it. Who would have thought that the language cleavage could potentially be good for democracy?

Q: Have Ukrainians changed, in terms of their participation in the democratic process? (e.g. voting, campaigning, debating, etc.)

A: The NGO sector is far more developed than it was ten years ago, let alone in 1991. In fact, there wasn't much of a campaign in 1991. With the Communists in a state of shock, the political elite was united for independence (since the referendum took place at the same time as the presidential election) and, outside of Galicia, there was little campaigning as such. Things heated up in 1994. "Committees of Voters" sprung up, the International Federation of Electoral Systems set up shop in Kyiv and real debates were broadcast on UT-1 (debates where Kuchma fared very poorly, by the way, and not only because he couldn't finish a sentence in Ukrainian). In 2004, the number of electoral watchdogs, local and international, is astonishing, and there seems to be an infinite number of web sites out there devoted to the election. But getting to the voters is harder. I would reiterate the point, however, that electoral violation is not the only thing preventing Yushchenko from winning. There are fundamental voting patterns in Ukraine that have proved resilient. In all elections since 1990, voters from Eastern Ukraine reject candidates or parties that are deemed "nationalist." The real question is whether politicians will be successful in painting an opponent as a nationalist. Yushchenko is vulnerable to this charge since his electoral base has thus far been concentrated in Central and Western Ukraine and he has deputies from Rukh and KUN in his coalition. The challenge is to convince a critically significant segment of Eastern voters - those fed up with Kuchma and who have no patience for Communists - that he is, first and foremost, a reformer.

Dr. David Marples is a professor in the department of history and classics at the University of Alberta in Canada.

A: All elections are pivotal. This election may be more important than previous ones as a result of several circumstances. First, there is a clearly defined government-backed candidate (Viktor Yanukovych) and a leading opposition candidate (Viktor Yushchenko) who enjoys national popularity. The former is identified, in the minds of a certain sector of the electorate, with the flaws and corruption of the Kuchma administration and the incumbent president himself. Second, these two leading candidates, the only ones conceivably capable of winning the election, are "perceived" to have diametrically opposed views on the future of Ukraine. Let me suggest that the two candidates are closer in outlook than their images may indicate.

Yushchenko, for example, devotes considerable space in his election manifesto to developing harmonious relations with Russia. Yanukovych would not ignore the West and the EU generally if elected. There are, however, substantial differences in background, even though both candidates have been or are currently part of the ruling hierarchy, and there is a considerable gap in what might be termed the "morality factor," i.e. the image of Yushchenko is not tarnished, as is that of his opponent through both personal and government misdeeds of the past. Ukraine could well elect as its third president a convicted criminal. The third point is the interest and role of Russia in the Ukrainian election. Putin's Russia represents a state in which, after 13 years, the interests of the government and parliament have finally coalesced, and are directed principally at integration with neighboring states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. Russia is backing Yanukovych far more firmly than it backed Kuchma in 1994. One could go further and say that for Russia, the result of the election in Ukraine is seen almost as a contest between a pro-Russian candidate and one favored by the EU and the United States, and who is regarded as purely Western-oriented. Lastly the election has been rendered more complex because Kuchma declared upon winning in 1999 that he would move toward Europe and away from Russia, but latterly this policy has been reversed.

A: The situation can hardly be compared with that of 1991. Thirteen years ago the election occurred in a mood of euphoria, following the declaration of independence and the need to distance Ukraine from a new Russian government coming to power in Moscow. At that time also, the candidates were, aside from Kravchuk, not well known to the electorate. In addition, Kravchuk was identified with the move to independence, and embraced that same cause. In that way, he presented the electorate with a clear choice for the road ahead and offered it a candidate with a firm foothold in the ruling structure.

That there are 26 candidates shows that political ambition is not dead in Ukraine - there were 13 in 1999, and then too only two emerged as major contenders. I agree with Taras Kuzio that the vast majority of platforms are not serious and have no hope of success. However, the ultimate choice of the left politicians - particularly Moroz but also to some extent [Communist party leader Petro] Symonenko - may well determine the result of the election in the run-off. Moroz's decision to run independently rather than join the Yushchenko camp may reflect an inflated sense of his own significance or a lack of faith in a Yushchenko victory.

However, if one compares the candidates of the three elections, then yes, I think this time voters have a better choice, though they do not always get to hear the Yushchenko platform and may be influenced by government propaganda against it.

Q: Have Ukrainians changed, in terms of their participation in the democratic process? (e.g. voting, campaigning, debating, etc.)

A: Opinion polls over the past few years indicate only the ambivalent and to some extent regional outlook of Ukrainians. Having visited all "regions" of Ukraine over the past 2 years, it still seems a truism that they have little in common: take, for example, the two areas Yaroslaw Hrytsak contrasted in a recent paper, Donetsk and Lviv. That is why, despite considerable progress toward nation building, it remains difficult to assess what is encapsulated by the word "Ukrainians." Though I am sometimes skeptical about abiding by opinion polls, they do illustrate with poignant clarity that most residents of Ukraine (a better term, I think, than "Ukrainians") are preoccupied with daily subsistence, rising prices, health care, and employment - a visit to the Donbas town of Horlivka confirmed this tendency. A cynic might therefore comment that most voters have lost interest in elections. One can describe this group as "passive voters," who have, frankly, better things with which to occupy their time.

On the other hand, the politically active have been galvanized by the present campaign - this sector consists of members of the political opposition, intellectuals, those concerned with the reexamination of Ukrainian history and development of Ukrainian culture, pro-Europeans, pro-market forces and the like (it is broader than the term often used, "national elite"). For this group, which may comprise anything from 15 to 35 percent of the electorate, the election is a defining moment, one in which it is possible, belatedly, to combat the existing structure, oligarchs of various types, and the disgraced but resilient Kuchma administration in particular. Though there have been the occasional outrageous statements, essentially from fringe elements (leading to charges of extremism in the Yushchenko camp), the debate has generally been engaging and serious among people who have at heart the best interests of Ukraine as a central European state, and one that has ignored consistently the promises made since 1991 to eliminate corruption, crime, attacks on the media, harassment of the opposition, etc. This is a healthy sign. What is paradoxical and lamentable is that Ukraine's economic recovery, while rapid, has yet to be translated into an all-embracing rise of living standards. That is why, in spite of heightened voter interest, Yushchenko's task is so difficult and why the activists have yet to convince most voters of the urgency and significance of the 2004 campaign.

Dr. Yaroslaw Hrytsak is a professor of history at Lviv National University and dean of humanities at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

A: Yes, it is a defining moment. Especially for a young country like Ukraine. Look at where the United States was in 1789, or where the French republic was in 1802, or, by that token, Germany and Poland in 1932 - each of these countries on their 13th anniversary was still making pivotal choices.

And for some of them these choices, unfortunately, proved to be very fatal.

In the Ukrainian case, what is at stake in 2004 is very different from what was at stake in 1991, or even in 1994. Then the crucial issue was the birth or death of a newly emerged state. Now there is no doubt that Ukraine is here to stay for a long time. The question is, however, what kind of a Ukraine will it be? Will it be a country with a rule of law, strong economy and, possibly, a member of the European Union? Or, will it be the country notorious for corruption of power and poor standards of living. Or, will it be a kind of a peculiar mixture of political corruption with a relatively blooming economy?

A: It is not an issue of a better or worse choice. It is that the choice and the setting are different. Under the given circumstances, I would prefer to compare the 2004 elections with those of 1994. Then Ukraine managed to do what most of the post-Soviet states (Russia included) failed to do and that it is to succeed with a peaceful and unmanipulated shift of power from one group of political elites to another. And this was definite proof that democracy in Ukraine has indigenous and stabile roots. In this respect, the 1999 elections were an obvious regress, Kuchma could not win his second term without political manipulations. So now in 2004 Ukraine has to follow either the 1994 or the 1999 scenario. So far, I would judge, the election campaign has developed according to the 1999 pattern, but the 1994-style outcome is still very much possible. And this is probably the most optimistic feature of the current situation.

Q: Have Ukrainians changed, in terms of their participation in the democratic process? (e.g. voting, campaigning, debating, etc.)

A: Both yes and no. As a major change, I would highlight the character of the parties that each candidate represents. In 1991 it was a showdown between the party of power and the opposition. In 1994 there was a rivalry between two parties of power, each having its roots and support in different parts of Ukraine, i.e., in East and West. Now it is a rivalry of two parties of power (note that most of the Yushchenko entourage, including himself, have been in power once), but each party has support throughout all of Ukraine, and regional differences are much less pronounced. Another significant difference between the 1990s and 2004 is the disappearance of a communist party as a viable political actor.

Both factors combined open a window of opportunity to build a bi-party system that would be based on political preferences, rather than ethnic or linguistic differences in Ukrainian society. But then again, whether this opportunity will be realized depends on what will happen during these presidential elections.

Dr. Michael McFaul is a professor of political science at Stanford University in California and a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution.

A: It is absolutely pivotal. I think this will determine Ukraine's trajectory for the next decade or so and the choice is very clear. If there is a relatively free and fair election then Ukraine joins the other post communist states to its west in becoming part of the democratic community of states. And, if the elections are tainted and not free and fair than Ukraine looks a lot more like its eastern neighbors where there is not much democracy.

The contrasts between democracy and dictatorship to the west and to the east are a lot greater today than they were just five years ago. In Russia back then you still had some optimism, at least I did, that that was a competitive election in 1999. Whereas there were certain democracies, I'm thinking of Slovakia in particular, that were not consolidated in East-Central Europe. Now I think it's really clear, right? There's fully consolidated democracies in almost all of what we used to call Eastern Europe. It's still struggling in the Balkans but there's no going back. Nobody thinks that Poland or any country in the region will go back. Whereas in Russia and points eastward I think the consensus among experts is that you're seeing growing authoritarian rule there. And now the pull in two different directions, if you will, has become more polarized. I think this election will determine if we should think of Ukraine more like the Russian model or should we think of it more like the Polish model.

However, if the electoral process is tainted in any way, Ukraine will have to be considered as yet another failed democratic transition in the post-Soviet world.

A: Yes, there are 23 or whatever candidates, but there are only two real candidates. This choice is a more democratic kind of election in that you have a very clear candidate who is affiliated with the incumbency, the status quo. And you have a very clear candidate with an alternative message from the opposition. This gives voters a very stark choice. Do they want to continue with the status quo, or do they want change? It's not ambiguous, unlike in other kinds of elections in other countries where it's a communist reformer running against the incumbent, so that kind of muddies the water. Here I think it's very clear.

Q: Have Ukrainians changed, in terms of their participation in the democratic process? (e.g. voting, campaigning, debating, etc.)

A: That's a difficult question for me to answer. The campaign, obviously is much more sophisticated this time around than any other time. I would say that both the state and Yushchenko and those running his campaign will have more resources - both state and private financial resources will be involved in this - than at any other time.

My sense of the Ukrainian electorate is that it is a lot more sophisticated than, say, their neighbors in Russia. The kind of electoral tricks that work in Russia do not work in Ukraine. With regard to the use of the state to manipulate voters and "manage" democracy, as in Russia, Ukrainian voters seem like they're immune to those kinds of manipulations.

The state is devoting more resources to this election to help the prime minister. The opposition also has a much more sophisticated campaign organized for the fall compared to previous presidential races. We will only know if these increased efforts influence voting behavior and participation after the vote.

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