ANALYSIS: The EU's response to turmoil in Ukraine (01/09/05)

ANALYSIS

The EU's response to turmoil in Ukraine

by Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk

As Ukraine became embroiled in the Orange Revolution, the European Union once again denied the prospect of EU membership to Ukraine.

This is hardly surprising. Since outgoing President Leonid Kuchma first proclaimed his desire for EU membership for Ukraine in 1996, the EU has shown little inclination to examine this ambition in a favorable light. On the contrary, the institution rebuffed any initiatives on the part of Kyiv that might have helped turn this ambition into a reality. As a result, Ukraine's desire to "return to Europe" took on a hollow ring, and the authorities were able to reject the need for political and economic reforms (as insisted on by the EU) on the grounds that "nobody wants us in Europe."

This somewhat dismissive stance of Europe undoubtedly emboldened Ukraine's authorities to falsify the November presidential election results to the extent that they did.

The history of relations between Ukraine and the European Union is instructive. Although Ukraine has continuously failed to introduce much of the necessary political and economic reform, it did institute a series of measures designed to promote its chances of EU membership. For example, in 1998, Borys Tarasyuk, a pro-Western career diplomat, was appointed to the post of foreign affairs minister to boost Ukraine's membership prospects.

However, any illusions Kyiv had about its chances of joining were dispelled at the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki, when no offer of the much-vaunted "prospect" was forthcoming from EU leaders. Instead, the EU's relations with Ukraine were to be strengthened by the "Common Strategy," a symbolic document that failed to add a new impetus to relations. Mr. Tarasyuk's sacking followed soon thereafter.

Relations limped on, despite the efforts of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry to imbue them with more substance, in the hope that "Europe" would be become a stimulant to reform in the country. However, not only did these efforts fail, but EU enlargement in May 2004, as a result of which Ukraine became a direct neighbor, deepened its disillusionment with the EU.

This is because relations with new neighbors were to be based on the EU's European Neighborhood Policy' (ENP). And while the ENP has the worthy and ambitious objective of "promoting prosperity and stability" among the neighbors along the EU's newly enlarged borders, in practice, it fuelled the sense of exclusion from Europe.

From the Ukrainian point of view, the ENP suffered from a number of flaws.

First, the policy covered all EU neighbors, whether European or not (e.g. Morocco). All "neighbors" had been lumped into one general category, with no differentiation between them. Worse was the fact that no distinction was made between aspirant states such as Ukraine, and non-aspirants such as Russia.

Second, the ENP added little that was new and relied instead on the existing agreement to guide relations - the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) - which had long exhausted its potential for moving relations forward.

Third, the ENP offered few real motivating incentives, at least in the short term. The offer of extending the EU's "four freedoms" (of movement of people, capital, goods and labor) to neighbors was generous but unrealistic. This is because it failed to take into account Ukraine's impoverishment, making them an enticing but elusive prospect. In addition, the EU refused to make even relatively minor trade concessions to the neighbors, even though economic incentives represent the linchpin of the ENP.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, the document made no reference to any possibility of Ukraine eventually joining the EU. The prospect of membership was effectively excluded.

Up to a point, the stance adopted by Brussels was understandable. Too often Ukraine has paid scant attention to the EU's insistence on the need to implement reform. In addition, the union had been concerned about the Kuchma regime for some time. There were real question marks over the validity of his re-election in 1999 and his increasingly authoritarian undertones. These concerns reached their peak when President Kuchma was implicated in the murder of a journalist critical of his regime in late 2000 - and have scarcely declined since.

At the same time, the big EU member-states put a premium on relations with Russia, which perceives the former Soviet Union as its own backyard. So relations with Ukraine were played down for the sake of better relations with the Kremlin. In light of these problems, it is hardly surprising that the EU has not been eager to enhance ties with Ukraine.

However, by failing to build stronger ties, the EU deprived itself of an important lever to influence developments in Kyiv and to empower the pro-reform forces there. Worse, it bolstered Viktor Yanukovych, the authorities' candidate, who could justify his decision to abandon EU membership ambitions (and with them the need to implement reform) and instead promote closer ties with Russia.

The recent visits of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to Ukraine to mediate was a welcome sign of the EU's belated interest in Ukraine, but it simultaneously exposed the vacuousness of Brussels' policy toward that country. Ironically, had Ukraine experienced the type of conflict that plagued the Western Balkans, and which the West is now trying to help prevent, Ukraine would have been higher up on the EU's agenda a lot earlier.

However, it is not too late for the EU to exert influence in Ukraine without actually committing itself to offering membership.

Above all, it could formally recognize Ukraine's European aspirations without explicitly ruling membership out or in. Second, the EU could make greater trade concessions to Ukraine - an issue that has long hindered relations. In particular, the bloc has not allowed Ukrainian goods to compete openly with its agriculture and steel sectors. Third, the EU could ease its stance on the visa regime with Ukraine. Owing to enlargement, travel to the Schengen area has become an even more expensive and time-consuming undertaking for impoverished Ukrainians. This has not only resulted in a sense of alienation among them but has caused real hardship for those in border regions.

The recent decision by the EU to once again deny the prospect of membership but approve its Action Plan for Ukraine (finalized in 2004) does not augur well for future relations. The Action Plan, far from leading to membership, merely delineates a series of political and economic criteria according to which relations are expected to develop; Ukrainians are deeply dissatisfied with it. Negotiated before the "Orange Revolution," the plan relies on "old solutions" to a new situation and, thus, hardly brings a new lease on life to relations. The EU is in danger of once more failing to support Ukraine's population, which has already demonstrated that it is willing to bear the sacrifices of democratizing and Europeanizing itself.

If the EU is to achieve its long-term goal of having a stable and prosperous neighbor on its Eastern border, as outlined in the ENP, it will need to develop a vision and ambition for Ukraine it has thus far lacked. At the same time, it will need to offer reformists the tools they need to create a society imbued with European standards and values.

Brussels must deprive the authorities of their argument that "nobody wants us in Europe." Only in this way might Ukraine implement the political and economic reforms to realize its pro-European ambitions - and the EU might just end up with the prosperous and stable neighbor it wants and needs.

Kataryna Wolczuk is senior lecturer in East European Politics at the University of Birmingham. Roman Wolczuk is a research fellow at the University of Wolverhampton, U.K.

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