ANALYSIS

President puts checks and balances on Tymoshenko's Cabinet of Ministers


by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Newsline

The approval of Yulia Tymoshenko as independent Ukraine's 13th prime minister in the Verkhovna Rada on February 4 was a remarkable political show because of several big surprises for political analysts and commentators - as well as for Ms. Tymoshenko herself.

The first surprise was the level of support Ms. Tymoshenko in particular and her Cabinet in general obtained among the parliamentarians. Her nomination was endorsed by 373 votes, that is, by virtually all parliamentary factions aside from the Communist Party. The Cabinet's program was approved by the equally astonishing number of 357 deputies. Nobody had predicted that a Tymoshenko-led government would obtain such an enthusiastic backing.

Most notably, Ms. Tymoshenko was even supported by national deputies from the parliamentary caucus of the Party of Regions headed by former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, President Viktor Yushchenko's embittered rival from the presidential race. What has become of Mr. Yanukovych's post-election pledge to switch to a "tough opposition" under the Yushchenko presidency?

Yosyp Vinskyi - a leader of the Socialist Party, which joined the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko ruling coalition after reportedly tense, last-minute negotiations - told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service on February 4 that the parliamentary support by erstwhile adherents of Mr. Yanukovych for the Ms. Tymoshenko Cabinet testifies to their "complete moral downfall." Mr. Vinskyi suggested that this happened primarily because they represent in the legislature not so much the political programs or ideologies of their parties as the business interests of their leaders and sponsors.

"Business will not be in opposition, business will seek contacts with the new authorities, because our business sphere has been built on theft of state property and money," Mr. Vinskyi opined. "Evidently, they [dishonest businessmen] are now seeking contacts [with the new Cabinet] in order to preserve [their possessions]." According to Mr. Vinskyi, the "disappearance" of the parliamentary opposition to the government, as evidenced by the February 4 approval vote, is a serious threat to the government itself, because such a situation weakens the public control over what the government does.

The second surprise was the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. Taken as a whole, the Cabinet is undoubtedly pro-reform and psychologically prepared to tackle the enormous task of revamping the authoritarian power system left by the 10-year rule of President Leonid Kuchma and reducing its endemic corruption. But some of Mr. Yushchenko's choices for the new Cabinet have raised many eyebrows.

To start with, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the staunchest political ally of Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, seems to be underrepresented in the Cabinet. Apart from Ms. Tymoshenko, the Cabinet includes only one other politician from her party: Oleksander Turchynov as head of the Security Service of Ukraine. Under a political deal signed between Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko in July on their cooperation in the 2004 presidential campaign, the Tymoshenko Bloc was to obtain 23 percent of the posts in the executive branch. Even given that the political weight of the prime minister's post may be equal to several ministerial portfolios, the assignment of just two posts to the Tymoshenko Bloc out of some two dozen major Cabinet jobs seems to be quite unfair.

On the other hand, the Socialist Party, which threw its support behind Mr. Yushchenko's presidential bid only following the first round of the presidential election on October 31, 2004, was rewarded by President Yushchenko with three Cabinet prizes: Oleksander Baranivskyi will head the Ministry for Agrarian Policy, Yurii Lutsenko the Internal Affairs Ministry, and Stanislav Nikolayenko the Education Ministry. Valentyna Semeniuk from the Socialist Party is reportedly expecting Mr. Yushchenko's nomination to head the extremely important State Property Fund, a body responsible for privatizations. Such lavish rewards have been promised even though the Socialists criticized Mr. Yushchenko's program as "liberal" and publicly asserted that the program is at grave variance with their programmatic goal of building a "socialist" Ukraine.

Why has President Yushchenko apparently favored the Socialist Party, whose support was not crucial for the approval of a new Cabinet (the Socialists have just 22 deputies in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada), and seemingly slighted his closest political ally, whose potential success or failure in the post of prime minister is expected to have an enormous influence on the public perception of his presidency? One possible answer is that President Yushchenko is afraid that the charismatic, strong-willed, and vigorous Prime Minister Tymoshenko could assume too much authority in the executive branch and begin playing a political game of her own.

For the time being, that is at least until the 2006 parliamentary elections, such a development appears to be purely speculation. But it is already clear that Prime Minister Tymoshenko will have problems in making a single-minded and unanimous team of partners out of her current deputies and ministers. An apparently big surprise, and a nasty one for her, was the last-minute nomination of Roman Bezsmertnyi as vice prime minister for administrative reform. In presenting the list of new ministers to the Parliament, Ms. Tymoshenko said this post would remain vacant for some time. But President Yushchenko, who was simultaneously signing decrees on Cabinet appointments, appointed Mr. Bezsmertnyi at the end of this ceremony, thus provoking a startled and somewhat distressed shudder from Ms. Tymoshenko.

Mr. Bezsmertnyi, once a staunch supporter of President Kuchma, switched to the Yushchenko camp in 2001 and was given much credit for managing Mr. Yushchenko's parliamentary campaign in 2002 and presidential campaign in 2004. He surely deserved a political prize from Mr. Yushchenko, but his appointment to the current Cabinet seems to be an ill-advised choice. Following the designation of Ms. Tymoshenko as prime minister last month, Mr. Bezsmertnyi reportedly opined that Ms. Tymoshenko is a "political blackmailer" and said he will not join her Cabinet even if asked by President Yushchenko.

Simultaneously, Mr. Bezsmertnyi publicly suggested that Ms. Tymoshenko may "surrender" Mr. Yushchenko - as she "surrendered," he added, his erstwhile political ally, former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko - either before the 2006 parliamentary election or the 2009 presidential election in order to make her own presidential bid. "Ms. Tymoshenko should realize that there should always be people beside her who will not leave her in peace," the Ukrainska Pravda website quoted Mr. Bezsmertnyi as saying. Could this be the task President Yushchenko has given Mr. Bezsmertnyi in the new Cabinet?

However, in the short term it should be expected that the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko alliance will remain strong and mutually loyal. As President Yushchenko said in his address to the Verkhovna Rada on February 4, the public expectations as regards the performance of the new government are "colossal." Meeting some of these expectations will be a hard test for political survival not only for President Yushchenko but also for Prime Minister Tymoshenko, irrespective of whether she intends to sail in the same boat with Mr. Yushchenko beyond the 2006 parliamentary election or take an independent course in order to try her luck as a candidate in the 2009 presidential race.


Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus and Ukraine specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, March 6, 2005, No. 10, Vol. LXXIII


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