ANALYSIS: Kyiv's plan for Transdniester elicits a mixed reception (06/12/05)

ANALYSIS

Kyiv's plan for Transdniester elicits a mixed reception

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Report

A Ukrainian plan for the settlement of the conflict between Moldova and its separatist region of Transdniester, which was revealed to the public on May 20, has received quite a wide spectrum of opinions and assessments - from moderately optimistic to overtly skeptical and pessimistic. However, even though the resolution of the conflict seems to be no less far away than it was before Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko first mentioned Kyiv's plan at a GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) summit in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on April 22, the plan has already produced some positive results.

First, Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to resume their talks on the 13-year-old conflict, which were suspended last summer, and sent their representatives to discuss the plan in the Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia on May 16-17.

Second, Chisinau and Tiraspol reportedly concurred that their negotiations, which were earlier conducted in a five-party format involving Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), should now include additional mediators from the United States and the European Union. Both Washington and Brussels have already confirmed their interest in taking part in the Transdniester conflict settlement.

The Ukrainian plan sets its main objective as peaceful and democratic reintegration of Moldova within the borders of the Moldovan SSR as of January 1, 1990, and under the constitutional system of the Republic of Moldova, with a "special status" being granted to Transdniester. The plan does not use the words "federation" or "confederation" for outlining future relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

The plan, within its time frame of 18 months, essentially provides for passage of a law by the Moldovan Parliament by August to define Transdniester's special status as an autonomous entity within the Republic of Moldova; holding early and democratic elections to the Transdniestrian legislature under international monitoring by November; and subsequently delineating the spheres of competence of authority between central and autonomous government bodies.

The plan includes a number of important specific provisions. Thus, Transdniester may have its own Constitution that should be in compliance with the Moldovan Constitution. Transdniester may also have its own symbols - flag, coat of arms, anthem - to be used together with the symbols of the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, Tiraspol has the right to participate in making foreign-policy decisions by Chisinau in matters that affect Transdniester's interests (the scope of these interests is to be defined in advance by both sides).

And, the plan stipulates that Transdniester should have the right to secede from Moldova if the latter joins another state and/or ceases to be a subject of international law (this provision obviously addresses the fear of Transdniester residents that Moldova may reunite with Romania in the future).

The plan's final provisions envisage that if Chisinau and/or Tiraspol, having signed the plan, fail to comply with some of its provisions, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE reserve the right to take measures allowed by international law against the signatories. Notably, the Ukrainian plan explicitly does not mention the pullout of Russian troops from Transdniester.

Initially, both Chisinau and Tiraspol were reportedly favorably disposed toward the plan. At least, such an impression could be obtained from media reports on the Vinnytsia talks and some statements voiced shortly after that meeting. For instance, Moldovan Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova said on May 20 that the plan is "an important [move] from theoretical discussions to practical steps."

"We are embarking on an absolute new stage of the Transdniester conflict settlement, and all the chances to solve the problem exist with a due respect for the just interests of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniester residents," Mr. Sova asserted.

But on May 24 in Chisinau, in a rare show of unanimity, leaders of Moldova's six major parties - the Communist Party, the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD), the Democratic Party, the Our Moldova Alliance, the Social Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party - held a news conference at which, according to Moldovan news agencies, they concurred that the Ukrainian plan contains both pluses and minuses. Lurie Rosca, the Parliament's deputy leader of the PPCD spoke for many when he pointed out that the minuses include Ukraine's failure to mention the pullout of Russian troops from Transdniester or Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation in establishing joint border checkpoints on the Transdniestrian stretch of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

"We have been waiting for years for concrete actions from Kyiv [to set up] joint customs checkpoints on the eastern portion of the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier," Mr. Rosca said. "The withdrawal of Russian troops and armaments [from Transdniester] and the establishment of the said customs checkpoints jointly with Ukraine are two major issues for the Republic of Moldova. All the remaining problems can be resolved with our own forces."

Some Russian-language newspapers in Moldova suggested "Washington's hand" in this modification of Chisinau's perception of the plan, reporting that the news conference was held shortly after those leaders returned from a Washington trip sponsored by the U.S.-based International Republican Institute.

Bucharest's view of the Ukrainian plan is even more critical. Romanian President Traian Basescu stressed that any international regulation of the Transdniester problem should obligatorily include the pullout of Russian troops from the region and tightening the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier in order to prevent smuggling that, according to Mr. Basescu, is the main source of sustenance for the unrecognized Transdniester authorities.

Romanian Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu signaled another objection when he suggested that the internationally monitored elections in Transdniester could only legitimize the Tiraspol regime and strengthen separatist tendencies in the region.

The Foreign Policy Association, a Moldovan non-governmental organization that summarized "minuses" of the Ukrainian plan earlier this week, noted that one of the plan's main drawbacks is that Kyiv proposes only two international guarantors of the Transdniester settlement - Ukraine and Russia - while assigning a role of mere observers to the European Union and the United States. Russia, the Foreign Policy Association argues, echoing the views of many Moldovan and Romanian commentators, cannot be a guarantor of the plan because it is involved militarily in the Transdniester conflict and effectively "rules" the breakaway region.

Does the criticism of the Ukrainian plan mean that the plan will be discarded, just as the so-called Kozak Memorandum of 2003, a Russia-sponsored settlement deal calling for a "federal" Moldova? Not necessarily. Some political analysts suggest that Chisinau may modify the Ukrainian proposal by removing some of its most controversial points (for instance, about giving Tiraspol a say in reintegrated Moldova's foreign policy) or adding some provisions (for instance, about the Russian pullout).

Of course, such potential innovations to the plan will require acceptance from Tiraspol and Moscow. Given Russia's lukewarm attitude to the plan and reluctance to accept the United States and the EU as mediators in the Transdniester settlement, such acceptance may be hard to attain. But some Moldovan politicians are aware that their options are not many.

"Isn't it strange that Moldova demands Russia and Ukraine prepare proposals on the Transdniester conflict settlement and then declines them?" Democratic Party leader Dumitru Diacov asked participants in the May 24 press conference in Chisinau. "If we keep on acting like this, one day we may remain alone in facing the Transdniester problem."

Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.

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