Kuzio delivers Palij memorial lecture at University of
Kansas
by Jennie Dienes
LAWRENCE, Kan. - Prof. Taras Kuzio, visiting professor at George Washington
University's Elliot School of International Affairs, discussed "Ukraine's
Orange Revolution: Causes and Consequences, Implications for the Future"
on April 28 at the University of Kansas. This lecture was supported by the
Maria Palij Memorial Fund.
As a multi-disciplinary scholar of Ukraine, Prof. Kuzio has followed
closely the events surrounding Ukraine's recent presidential election. He
has been a foreign observer during several of these elections. Prior to
his lecture, he showed video clips of Ukraine's new president, Viktor Yushchenko.
In addition, he interspersed his lecture with serious and humorous anecdotes
from the presidential campaigns.
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian studies have gained
momentum. In his prescient 1997 article, Prof. Alexander Motyl noted that
Ukraine appeared to come out badly during the 1990s when compared to Russia.
Scholars such as Adrian Karatnycky, Lucan Way, Dominique Arel, Lowell Barrington
and Mykola Riabchuk, among others, have examined Ukraine's road towards
democracy, and more specifically the Orange Revolution, through somewhat
single-issue factors such as civic mobilization, semi-authoritarian government,
nationalism, regional circumstance or political policy. Each viewpoint adds
to the entire picture, but a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary analysis
would definitely provide a more rounded out representation of what occurred.
The Orange Revolution was a complex and confusing time, and, as Dr. Kuzio
reminded his audience, occurred only four months ago. He said he sees two
particular problems in the interpretations and analyses of the Orange Revolution:
1) as already noted, scholars concentrating on only one factor and 2) looking
at it through a particular discipline to the exclusion of others without
any attempt to mesh observations from several disciplines. There is a strong
need for scholars to share their ideas with each other, blending and analyzing
events from a variety of perspectives.
Dr. Kuzio identified eight necessary and four contributing factors which
came together to enable the Orange Revolution to occur, and succeed, as
it did.
- 1. Semi-authoritaran governments: Ukraine was in the same "camp"
as Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan in that it was not as fully an autocratic
regime as Belarus and Russia. Ukraine still had some independent media,
and half of its Parliament represented opposition to the administration
of Leonid Kuchma.
- 2. Various past political crises: During the two years prior to the
November 2004 elections a variety of political crises (Kuchmagate, the
murder of journalist Heorhii Gongadze, etc.) brought about an awakening
of the people - especially younger people - which diminished the legitimacy
of the Kuchma government. The younger generation came to the realization
that the authorities had no intention of having free and fair elections.
Russian money and machinations were readily evident.
- 3. The need for a charismatic leader: Ukraine needed a very charismatic
person with high moral standards. The two politicians who fit this description
were Mr. Yushchenko and Oleksander Moroz. Viktor Yanukovych had two criminal
convictions and was involved in corrupt activities. In September 2004 Mr.
Yushchenko was poisoned and survived by intensive medical treatment in
Vienna. He became a hero standing up to a corrupt and discredited government;
he represented a new type of leader - there was no psychological barrier
between himself and his public.
Young people used humor to satirize and capitalize on situations
to promote Mr. Yushchenko for president. Students would dress up as prisoners
and "campaign" for Mr. Yanukovych, even standing beside the Yanukovych
bus. In Halychyna, when Mr. Yanukovych was hit by an egg, he collapsed.
This event spawned many egg posters and egg TV ads. Mr. Yanukovych's wife
accused the opposition of being drugged by oranges laced with LSD. To poke
fun at this accusation, students set up an exchange area, "Punkt Obminu,"
where these oranges could be exchanged for felt boots "from the United
States" to keep them warm during the freezing December temperatures.
- 4. Kyiv's mayor and a sympathetic response: Mr. Yushchenko and his
supporters had the sympathy of the capital city. Kyiv's mayor, Oleksander
Omelchenko, tried to keep the oligarchs and corrupt element at bay. He
contributed by collecting refuse, providing portable toilets, setting up
soup kitchens and supplying firewood for the demonstrators living in tents
on the maidan - Independence Square.
- 5. Disunity as a factor worked against Mr. Yanukovych: There were many
in the Kuchma camp who could not tolerate Mr. Yanukovych as their candidate
and did not give their full support. This disunity worked against him,
especially after the Parliament refused to recognize the results of the
second round of elections declaring him as victor.
- 6. United opposition. Mr. Yushchenko benefited from a united opposition.
Although the Communist Party in Ukraine is strong and hostile to Mr. Yushchenko,
a coalition of Yushchenko-Tymoshenko-Moroz presented a strong front. Also,
the pro-Yushchenko, pro-democracy demonstrators of the Orange Revolution
came voluntarily, whereas Mr. Yanukovych had to pay and coerce people to
demonstrate.
- 7. A new generation: An entirely new and important generation, the
20-somethings, arose. This generation of young people - born during the
Gorbachev years of perestroika and glasnost - became crucial contributors
to the electoral events. They had a non-Soviet upbringing, and the revolution
would not have happened without them. A civil activism was awakened. These
young activists plan to keep a close watch on both the new and old authorities.
- 8. The role of civic nationalism and patriotism: Mr. Yushchenko's party,
Our Ukraine, symbolized the people's actions to take back a country seized
by an oligarchic class seemingly controlled by a foreign country - Russia.
In eastern Ukraine, Mr. Yanukovych and the oligarchs promoted a kind of
managed democracy (à la Putin), a model that weakens civil society.
Mr. Yanukovych also kept bringing up his position that Russian should be
the second official language of Ukraine.
The four contributing factors included:
- 1. Economic issues: The economic issues in Ukraine differed from Serbia
and Georgia. The revolution happened when Ukraine was experiencing the
highest economic growth rate in Europe. The reason it was doing so badly
economically was because the government was stealing left, right and center.
Ukraine had small and medium businessmen who supported Mr. Yushchenko.
Most of the money for the Revolution came from these domestic sources.
- 2. The mood of the electorate: At the beginning of July, the mood of
the electorate began to change. In April, a very dirty mayoral election
in Mukachiv took place in which the Yushchenko-backed candidate won the
election but the corrupt leaders installed their candidate. Then, after
the first round of the presidential election, the authorities waited 10
days before releasing the vote figures because they were "massaging"
Mr. Yushchenko's votes down (but still "allowing" him to win
by a small amount) and Mr. Yanukovych's votes up. This small win for Mr.
Yushchenko was enough to make people believe that he could win. The change
in mood continued to accelerate between the first and second rounds. When
asked why they were demonstrating, some people answered: "I'm here
because I don't want my child living in a criminalized state," "We
cannot sit on the sidelines," and "If the country goes to the
dogs, and Mr. Yanukovych wins, we have only ourselves to blame."
- 3. Modern communications and the Internet: The people running the Yushchenko
campaign understood how to use massive poster campaigns and the foreign
press to their advantage. Young people used their cellphones and the Internet
to communicate with each other and with supporters, as well as to send
photographs informing others of happenings as they occurred. Mr. Yushchenko
kept the foreign press well informed as events unfolded.
- 4. The role of the security forces (police, military, etc.): The security
forces either defected to Mr. Yushchenko's side or remained neutral. Government
authorities were not prepared for the revolution; they thought that Ukrainians
were passive and would simply accept what was handed to them. Consequently,
they were totally cut off from reality. Since 1994 Ukraine held military
maneuvers with NATO in Partnership for Peace activities, thus providing
the military with new influences and views. After the second round of the
election, Mr. Kuchma ordered 10,000 troops to Kyiv to put down the Revolution.
However, as the troops were on their way to Kyiv, the commander of the
ground forces intervened. Under his command, the troops were to protect
the revolution.
In conclusion, Dr. Kuzio stressed that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,
as well as the revolutions in Serbia and Georgia, were very complicated
events and that interdisciplinary study is essential to understand them.
He said that he anticipates there will be many more conferences, articles
and books written that will discuss and analyze what happened, how and why.
He also pointed out that Ukraine has become an example for Kyrgyzstan and
Lebanon.
Dr. Kuzio then fielded numerous questions.
Asked if religious activities or Churches in Ukraine had played a significant
role in the elections, Dr. Kuzio noted that the only Church that took an
active role in the Revolution was the Russian Orthodox Church, which is
officially called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate. All
other Churches kept their distance and did not really get involved. The
Russian Orthodox Church was actually caught on audiotape and videotape being
paid to agitate in church and to give sermons in support of Mr. Yanukovych,
ascribing saint-like status to him.
To a question about the roles of foreign and domestic policies in the
elections, Dr. Kuzio responded that the election was based on domestic concerns,
as opposed to foreign policy issues. However, Russia intervened to a far
greater extent than in any previous election anywhere in the CIS, except
maybe in Belarus. Dr. Kuzio shared clips of posters, obviously influenced
by Russia, that presented anti-American messages throughout the campaign.
One of the posters showed Taras Shevchenko saying, "Yankee go home."
During the campaign the Bush administration was very cautious until the
second round, but then the U.S. was holding its own elections in November,
Dr. Kuzio pointed out. Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Mr.
Yanukovych even before the official count was announced. Probably the hero
of the occasion was Secretary of State Colin Powell because, three days
after the second round, he issued a statement that he would not recognize
the official results released that day which declared Mr. Yanukovych as
president. Canada and the European Union followed suit. Those who were sitting
on the fence switched sides and moved to the Yushchenko camp.
In regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections, Dr. Kuzio said he
thinks that the Yushchenko team will have a better chance next year, even
in oblasts that voted largely for Mr. Yanukovych, because there will be
different people in government administration, and a more independent media
in those areas. Former ruling elites under the Kuchma regime have become
discredited because of corruption charges, election fraud and the poisoning
of Mr. Yushchenko, thus, they do not present themselves as a credible opposition.
Ms. Tymoshenko's government is promoting the kinds of policies that will
benefit all parts of the country, not just the western portion: rule of
law, clamping down on the oligarchs, fighting corruption, social policies
to help the needy, etc.
* * *
Prof. Kuzio has posted his lecture in its entirety on the Internet at
UKL, The Ukraine List, at http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukraine_list/ukraine_list.htm.
Jennie Dienes is map librarian/cataloger at the University of Kansas
Watson Library.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, June
12, 2005, No. 24, Vol. LXXIII
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