THE ORANGE REVOLUTION ONE YEAR AFTER: Yushchenko's first year: a Western perspective (PART II) (11/27/05)

THE ORANGE REVOLUTION ONE YEAR AFTER

Yushchenko's first year: a Western perspective

by Taras Kuzio

The Orange Revolution began in Ukraine after massive election fraud in the second round of the presidential election brought hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians onto the streets of Kyiv. After weeks of protests and a repeat election, the pro-reform candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, was elected president.

In the first year of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has made considerable progress in 15 areas (as noted in Part I of this article), while progress has been disappointing in seven.

PART II

Problem areas

1. Market economic reform: Quarrels among senior Orange leaders, coupled with expensive social policies and unclear plans for re-privatization, led to policy incoherence and government malaise. Economic reform and privatization failed to become a government priority. Economic growth slumped from 12 percent last year to only 3 percent this year, with August seeing the first negative growth since 1999.

Yurii Yekhanurov will head the Our Ukraine People's Union bloc in the 2006 elections. This will be the first time that a prime minister heads an election bloc in an election, both giving voters the chance to decide for themselves about the achievements, or otherwise, of the government and for the government to take responsibility for its actions in a free and fair election.
2. Rule of law: The National Security and Defense Council under Petro Poroshenko pressured the legal system and courts. Poor personnel policy led to the continuation of Sviatoslav Piskun as procurator general and Roman Zvarych as justice minister. Mr. Piskun returned to his position on December 10, 2004, two days after Parliament and the president ratified the "compromise packet" that allowed Ukraine to hold a re-run on December 26. Mr. Piskun was finally released only in October 2005 after being accused of thwarting investigations into high-ranking Kuchma officials.

Mr. Zvarych's short period as justice minister was dogged by scandal. His curriculum vitae was shot full of deception, which he refused to acknowledge. His claims to have an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Columbia University proved to be false. Mr. Zvarych also had no legal training. His replacement, Serhii Holovatyi, is a far better choice with a positive track record from the 1990s when he was justice minister in 1995-1997.
3. Divisions and "betrayal": The Ukrainian public finds it difficult to accept a split in Orange ranks. As a Financial Times (October 17) editorial noted, "A Yushchenko-Yulia Tymoshenko coalition remains the best chance for a reformist, Western-oriented government." After the 2006 elections, Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine People's Union will have a choice of creating a parliamentary majority with either Ms. Tymoshenko or Mr. Yanukovych. A pro-reform parliamentary majority would only be possible if the choice was in favor of Ms. Tymoshenko, not Mr. Yanukovych.

The signing of a Memorandum of understanding between President Yushchenko and Party of the Regions of Ukraine Chairman Mr. Yanukovych has led to feelings of "betrayal" of the Orange Revolution ideals. In Kyiv, 25 percent believe that Mr. Yushchenko "betrayed" the Orange Revolution, while only 6 thought it was Ms. Tymoshenko.

The signing of the memorandum with Mr. Yanukovych portrayed an image of weakness to the opposition. The additional votes received from the signing of the memorandum would not have been required if the first parliamentary vote for Mr. Yekhanurov's candidacy had succeeded. It failed by three votes because President Yushchenko had been in the United States for four days prior to it, instead of taking care of business at home - that is, ensuring that Parliament would approve his choice for prime minister.
4. Poor leadership: President Yushchenko has traveled abroad far too much in his first year - a factor he himself recognized only late in the year. His hands-off style of leadership is very different from that of his micro-managing predecessor, Leonid Kuchma. This has led to only sporadic interventions when crises have emerged in May or September, prior to which the president was unwilling to take tough decisions.

Mr. Yushchenko's lateness for meetings (often two hours or more) - and even with important VIPs - has become legendary. Another problem has been a lack of consistency in policies and statements. In both these cases, Mr. Yushchenko's support staff are partly to blame. His press department has a poor reputation in the West and his State Secretariat under Oleksander Zinchenko (January-September) did not function in the manner in which a president needs it to.
5. Two governments: Mr. Poroshenko, as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, acted as a second government, obstructing and interfering in areas beyond his remit, while ignoring others in national security which were. The additional powers given to the National Security and Defense Council were unconstitutional. Mr. Poroshenko has been accused of interfering in the rule of law and media by acting as a "grey cardinal," similar to Mr. Medvedchuk as head of the Presidential Administration.
6. No break with the ancien regime: By the first anniversary of the Orange Revolution, no senior official from the Kuchma regime has been charged with abuse of office, corruption, election fraud or the Gongadze murder. The organizers of Heorhii Gongadze's murder have still to be accused. Former Internal Affairs Minister Yurii Kravchenko committed suicide, while Gen. Oleksii Pukach fled abroad. Other senior Kuchma officials were permitted to flee to Russia or the U.S. Only the United States has arrested one of these officials, Volodymyr Scherban, while Russia has continued to provide protection. There has also been no progress in the investigation into the poisoning of Mr. Yushchenko in September 2004.
7. Business allies: The businessmen surrounding President Yushchenko were only removed after accusations were made against them by Mr. Zinchenko in September. These businessmen, such as Mr. Poroshenko, had played an important role in the 2004 elections and the Orange Revolution in providing resources for the Yushchenko campaign. Mr. Poroshenko and Andrii Derkach, two mini-oligarchs, provided resources to support the only two television outlets available for the opposition (Channel 5 and Era TV respectively).

After his election, their continued presence in Mr. Yushchenko's entourage became problematic as the president's image increasingly came to resemble that of Mr. Kuchma of being surrounded by "oligarchs." When asked if the new authorities were different from Mr. Kuchma, 52 percent said "yes" in March, while only 37 percent continued to agree in September.

Mr. Poroshenko's image has suffered an appreciable decline. His negative ratings are on par with those of Messrs. Medvedchuk and Kuchma. It would be a strategic mistake to include him on the Our Ukraine People's Union 2006 election list. But, mistakes are possible. Although not returned as Justice Minister to the Yekhanurov government, Mr. Zvarych was promoted to head the Our Ukraine People's Union 2006 election campaign.

Conclusion

Looking back over the first year of the Orange Revolution, it would be wrong to paint it in either fully white or black. There have been 15 positive steps and seven negative. That the positive outweigh the negative shows that there are achievements to celebrate on November 22.

President Yushchenko is committed to democratization, economic reform and Euro-Atlantic integration. Mr. Yushchenko does not possess the necessary political will to deal with high-ranking officials from the Kuchma era. The memorandum with Mr. Yanukovych was a major strategic miscalculation.

Ms. Tymoshenko receives greater respect for her political skills. She is also more credible in possessing the political will to bring to trial high-ranking officials from the Kuchma era. The organizers of the Gongadze murder are more likely to be brought to trial by Ms. Tymoshenko than Mr. Yushchenko.

Policy incoherence in the first nine months of the Orange Revolution is not solely the fault of the Tymoshenko government. Other factors are the creation of a parallel government in the National Security and Defense Council led by Mr. Poroshenko, Mr. Yushchenko's lack of leadership and inability to take decisive decisions except in crises, and his extensive travels abroad which negatively affected domestic policies.

Both Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko have positive and negative traits. If the Orange coalition could re-unite during, or after, the 2006 elections, these traits could potentially balance against one another to promote a reform agenda and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Taras Kuzio is visiting professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The article above is taken from the text of Dr. Kuzio's presentation on November 14 at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

PART I

PART II

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