VIEW FROM THE TREMBITA LOUNGE

by Taras Szmagala Jr.


Inverting the hierarchy

"What the heck was he thinking?" I asked Bohdan as we sat in our familiar seats in the Trembita Lounge. "Who?" he replied, "What was who thinking?" "Putin, of course. His idea to turn off the gas to Ukraine ranks high on the list of all-time stupid political moves." "Like Bush's 'Chicken Kiev' speech?" taunted Bohdan, a die-hard Democrat. "Well, certainly up there with Dukakis having his picture taken in that tank," I retorted. "Seriously, Bohdan, I don't get it."

"What don't you get?" Bohdan humored me. It was the New Year, and I already was dragging my friends into political conversations. Oh, well - another resolution bites the dust.

"Here's what doesn't make any sense," I said. "I'm no expert, but it seems to me that Russia's post-Soviet Union policy towards Ukraine is to treat Ukrainian statehood as a historical fluke. Sure, Russia recognizes Ukrainian independence. But many, if not most, Russians view this as a strange by-product of the fall of the USSR, hopefully to be rectified by some sort of pan-Slavic union in the not-too-distant future."

"So?" Bohdan puzzled, "What about that is strange to you?"

"Well, in order to accomplish this goal, Russia needs to convince Ukrainians - and the world - that Russians and Ukrainians really aren't all that different. Just as they did in Soviet times, the Russian objective is to make it seem that Ukrainians are just Russians from a specific area of the empire. And, as we Ukrainian Americans know, they have generally done this quite well. Heck, years ago it seems we spent half our time correcting people who didn't see a difference between the two nations."

"Now," I continued, "comes the Orange Revolution. For the first time since 1991, the world sees a Ukraine clearly differentiated from Russia. Putin meddles in Ukrainian politics, misplays his hand and is embarrassed. And Ukraine acquires a distinct identity on the world stage - a peaceful state striving to become a responsible member of the European community of nations. How does Putin react to this? By picking an unnecessary fight, acting like a bully, and, for good measure, dragging Western Europe into the action. Rather than smoothing over the differences between the two nations, Putin seems as if he is doing everything in his power to exacerbate them."

"That's easy to explain, Taras," Bohdan replied with a strange smile on his face. "Remember Volodya's hierarchy?"

I thought ... Volodya's hierarchy. Sounded strangely familiar.

Bohdan got tired of waiting. "Remember when we met during our first trip to Ukraine? Back in 1991? And we couldn't get a table at that empty restaurant? We couldn't figure it out. But my cousin Volodya pointed out the hierarchy, and it became clear to us."

Now I remembered. We were indeed unsuccessful in getting a table at a Kyiv restaurant, even though the huge room was completely empty. Apparently, the entire place was "reserved" and, despite our efforts to use reason with the maitre d', we could not get a table. It did not seem to matter that he had room. It also did not seem to matter that he'd be increasing his restaurant's business by giving us a table. We did not bribe him on principle, and he did not budge.

When we mentioned this to Volodya, a native Kyivan, he did not seem surprised. "You Americans need to understand our hierarchy," he lectured. "You see, in America, there is a hierarchy of methods you use to solve problems. First, you use reason. That's what you did at the restaurant - you applied common sense. If that doesn't work, you appeal to ego. By making the person feel important, or by asking for a personal favor, you can often get something done. And if that doesn't work, as a last resort you appeal to power or leverage. If you know someone who knows the guy's boss, you can use that information to compel him to act."

"In Soviet times," Volodya continued, "we had a hierarchy, too. But ours was inverted from yours. Generally, we were trained by our system to use power and leverage first. Ego is next, with appeals to reason the last resort. If you knew the guy's boss, you made that clear at the outset - that's how things got done in the Communist days. Power and fear were the 'coin of the realm.' You had problems because you immediately used reason - which, in our society, is used last, not first."

At the time, I thought this analysis to be interesting. And it certainly seemed to explain many of my experiences within the old Ukrainian system. But it also seemed to be a gross generalization. After all, simply because a person grew up under the Soviet system does not mean that he checked his rationality at the door. It struck me as hard to believe that a culture would be so dismissive of reason in favor of power. Volodya's hierarchy was just too convenient and simple.

An overgeneralization, perhaps. But we wouldn't know it from Russia's recent behavior. When faced with a political challenge on his southwestern border, President Vladimir Putin reacted exactly as Volodya predicted an old Soviet would. Logic suggests that, following the Orange Revolution, Russia would have redoubled its efforts to smooth over the waves caused by its political blundering. Yet Mr. Putin rejected the rational approach, and proceeded directly to the use of power and leverage. It was classic Brezhnev-era stuff: rather than using a public relations campaign or diplomacy to exert a subtle influence on Ukraine's upcoming March elections, Russia just decided to turn off the gas.

Maybe Volodya was on to something after all. And perhaps one can see the Orange Revolution as an attempt to invert the old Soviet hierarchy - to make reason primary, and to relegate power and fear to the back of the line. It hasn't been entirely successful, but progress is being made. One need only look to Russia to see how far Ukraine has come.


Taras Szmagala Jr. may be reached at [email protected].


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, January 22, 2006, No. 4, Vol. LXXIV


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