COMMENTARY: What's next for Ukraine? (01/29/06)

COMMENTARY

What's next for Ukraine?

by Alexander J. Motyl

I recently saw a film by the Polish director Krzysztof Zanussi. Filmed in 1980, "Kontrakt" begins with a young man and woman in Warsaw who decide to get married. Her father is a party functionary; he is a corrupt doctor who's parlayed bribes into a country villa. After the would-be bride bolts from the church, the film shifts to the villa, where the Communist jet set carouses in a manner reminiscent of Fellini's "La Dolce Vita." At the end, the jilted groom sets the villa on fire.

The film's message must have been obvious to a Polish audience. How could they not recognize the corruption that permeated Polish life, the vast differences in wealth between the nomenklatura and the rest of the population, the choice between collaboration and non-involvement faced by honest Poles, and the disgust that life in Poland inspired in all, even in the Communists?

Mr. Zanussi's timing was perfect. The film presaged the emergence of Solidarity in late 1980 and the hope in renewal that it embodied for millions of Poles. It may be worth remembering, however, that Solidarity was crushed in late 1981- indeed, exactly 25 years ago - and that a period of depression ensued in Poland that lasted until the demise of communism in 1989.

Back in the 1980s, Ukraine had no Solidarity. Instead, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was being actively misruled by the Scherbytsky regime. Dissidents were hounded; corruption, popular demoralization, and economic decay were rampant; and the future looked bleak - until Mikhail Gorbachev came along and, by introducing glasnost and perestroika, unintentionally unleashed forces that led to the USSR's collapse. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, most of its population was either stunned or surprised by so unexpected a development. I dare say, so too were most émigré Ukrainians.

The last 15 years have been difficult for Ukraine. In some ways, it still resembles Soviet Ukraine. One doesn't have to be an expert to appreciate that corruption is still rampant, that the political elites are mercenary and that the economy hasn't exactly taken off. Worst of all, life in Ukraine is still extremely hard for the vast majority of its population.

Then and now, Poland and Ukraine

This is where Mr. Zanussi's film comes in. Ukraine today is eerily reminiscent of Poland back in the 1980s. The chronology is different, of course, because Ukraine's version of Solidarity - the Orange Revolution - came after the collapse of communism and not before. But the overall characteristics of both countries - Poland then and Ukraine now - are remarkably similar.

We all know of the bad similarities. Both countries were rife with official corruption. Let's not forget that the corruption we see now in Ukraine is nothing compared to the outright thievery that the Polish and Ukrainian Communist Party nomenklaturas engaged in for decades. In both countries, agriculture was inefficient and heavy industry produced pollution while wasting scarce financial and natural resources in value-destroying operations. In both countries, the populations had to scramble to make a living. And just as Poles then traveled to Western Europe to engage in illegal labor and petty commerce, Ukrainians today are following in their footsteps.

But the good similarities are also striking. Poland then and Ukraine now possess states - something Ukraine lacked even in 1991. Poland then and Ukraine now possess empowered populations - something else Ukraine lacked in 1991. Poland then and Ukraine now are relatively open to and integrated into the world - in complete contrast to Ukraine in 1991.

Best of all, however, may be the dissimilarities. Ukraine now has several features that Poland then lacked. First, Ukraine now has a far more developed market economy than Poland had. Second, Ukraine now has a far freer media than Poland had. Third, Ukraine now has a far more vibrant civil society than Poland had. Fourth, Ukraine is a strategic concern, if not quite partner, of both the United States and the European Union. And fifth, while Poland had to contend with a Soviet superpower, Ukraine has as its neighbor a crummy authoritarian state, Russia.

Add up all these similarities and dissimilarities and Ukraine today begins to look like Poland at around 1989. That's not bad for a country that was ruled by a totalitarian empire until just 15 years ago.

Naturally, this conclusion is of small consolation to Ukraine's long-suffering population, who want to be like today's Poland and not like yesterday's Poland. A good part of this impatience stems from the extreme disappointment felt by Ukrainians in Ukraine and abroad after many of the expectations raised by the Orange Revolution remained unfulfilled.

Unfortunately, that disappointment was inevitable. Mass upheavals always generate the belief that everything will change at once, whereas the reality is always rather more prosaic - a few things change a bit, and slowly. But as anticlimactic as it strikes us, slow change is the only kind of change worth having. Rapid, comprehensive and fundamental change - the kind that transforms a society overnight - is always coercive, always bloody, and never works.

Naturally, the choice before Ukraine now, as before Poland then, is not something or everything. The real choice is between accomplishing the possible and hoping for the impossible.

The possible and the impossible

Let's start with the impossibilities. It was, and still is, impossible for Ukraine to become the Switzerland of the east. That will not happen for generations, so we'd better get used to it. It was, and still is, impossible for Ukraine's regional and income inequalities to be overcome anytime soon. Wealthy Germany has been investing over $100 billion in eastern Germany annually, and eastern Germany still suffers from unusually high unemployment and low investment. It was, and still is, impossible for Ukraine to rid itself of the systemic corruption that plagues it. If Italy can't do it after being fully integrated in Europe since World War II, why should Ukraine?

Of course, attaining these impossibilities is precisely what Ukraine's population wants - immediately. But it can't be done, not even if the entire Ukrainian government were to be replaced with incorruptible Harvard MBAs. You just can't transform a country that was systematically plundered and ruined by communism for over 70 years into a thriving market democracy in 15 years.

So what can be done, and has Ukraine done it? Has Ukraine accomplished the possible?

Ukraine has successfully dismantled the totalitarian institutions of communism and constructed more or less functional democratic institutions rooted in a Constitution accepted by all political players. Ukraine has dismantled the centrally planned economy and replaced it with more or less functional market relations. Ukraine's media, vibrant though cowed until 2004, have become fully free since, and getting them back under government control will be no easy task. Ukraine's populace, increasingly self-confident in the early 2000s, broke free during the Orange Revolution and is now almost deliriously empowered.

In sum, Ukraine has caught up with Poland in 1989, and that's great news. And there is no reason to think that Ukraine's steady progress will not continue in the foreseeable future. Viktor Yushchenko will remain president for four more years. He may be wishy-washy, but he is a democrat. Democracy and the market remain the goals of the people and the government. The economy is likely to resume growing. Political, social, and economic institutions will grow stronger every day they exist and are used. New, completely post-Soviet, and completely modern generations will increasingly assume positions of responsibility in Ukraine.

With a little luck, in 10 or 15 years, Ukraine just might resemble Poland today.

Two buts that aren't

What could go wrong? As long as Ukraine stays the course, the answer is: not much. But let's consider two possibilities that occupy people's minds.

First, let's imagine that the Party of the Regions does exceptionally well in the March 2006 parliamentary elections and that, miraculously, Viktor Yanukovych becomes prime minister. Would that spell Ukraine's end? Hardly. As odious as Mr. Yanukovych is, his becoming prime minister would force him to play politics according to Ukraine's increasingly consolidated democratic rules of the game. And remember that Mr. Yanukovych is no Vladimir Putin; indeed, he's not even a Leonid Kuchma - which is to say that his chances of re-establishing or establishing authoritarian rule are virtually nil.

Would he elevate Russian to a state language? That's what he says he'll do, but like other Ukrainian politicians in the past he'll be hard-pressed to pursue a course that makes for an excellent campaign slogan and a divisive policy.

Will he kowtow to Russia? When even Belarus's slavishly pro-Russian president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, jealously guards his own prerogatives, so, too, will Mr. Yanukovych.

Will he renationalize the economy? No way. Mr. Yanukovych's future economic policy, beholden as it is to the eastern oligarchs, is likely to mirror their interests, and those are decidedly pro-market and pro-Western. Ukraine's robber barons know full well that their economic fortune lies in the West - after all, why are they buying villas on the Riviera and not in Murmansk? - and that Ukraine's transformation into an appendage of Russia would also subordinate them to Russia's economic interests and priorities.

Ukraine has changed too much - it is too free, too democratic, and too pro-Western - for Mr. Yanukovych to be able to turn back the clock.

Second, there's Russia, whose heavy breathing has become especially nettlesome in the recent extortionate behavior of Gazprom toward Ukraine. Understandably, Ukrainians are obsessed with Russia, but they tend to forget that it's in awful shape and in no condition to be more than a constant thorn in Ukraine's side. We tend to see a big and mighty Russia, but the reality is very different. President Putin, who must rank as one of Russia's most incompetent leaders, has successfully transformed Russia into an authoritarian state that is extraordinarily dependent on energy for its economic development. As we know from history, such petro-states are dreadfully corrupt and always fragile.

Notwithstanding the re-emergence in Russia of a scary xenophobia, nationalism, and imperialism, Russia is what the Maoists used to call a "paper tiger." Worst of all for Russia, Gazprom's and Putin's chest-beating will succeed only in creating resentment and anger in their non-Russian neighbors, thereby consolidating non-Russian identity, promoting anti-Russian alliances, and isolating Russia.

In lieu of a conclusion

Although Ukraine's future is likely to be upbeat, there's no doubt that it would benefit immensely from a little more of the "vision thing." One wishes that Yushchenko - or for that matter Tymoshenko - had been just a tad more forceful in pursuing reform. One wishes that the president and next prime minister would do more to deregulate the economy, clean the bureaucracy, and fix the government. Indeed, one wishes that Ukraine would become Switzerland - tomorrow.

Well, we can wish for many things with the new year. But, before we exhort Ukraine to pursue the best and only the best, let's not forget that, in politics as in life, the good and the good enough usually is best.

Alexander J. Motyl, Ph.D., is professor of political science at Rutgers University - Newark.

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