ANALYSIS: Poor strategy, the elections and Ukraine's NATO ambitions (03/26/06)

ANALYSIS

Poor strategy, the elections and Ukraine's NATO ambitions

by Taras Kuzio

Ukrainian ministers continue to publicly remain optimistic about their country's chances of NATO membership. Different dates are given for the country's entry, from 2008 to 2010. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Khandohiy said Ukraine hoped to be included in those countries invited to join at the 2008 NATO summit, which is expected to be an enlargement summit. Three other countries could be included in this enlargement wave: Croatia, Albania and Macedonia.

Inclusion in the 2008 enlargement wave would likely see Ukraine and the other three countries join NATO in 2010. This would be good timing for Ukraine, as it would follow the October 2009 presidential elections. But, it would assume that the NATO friendly Viktor Yushchenko would be re-elected for a second term or that his successor was pro-NATO.

NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer supports the view that the 2008 NATO summit would be an enlargement summit that would invite in western Balkan states and Ukraine. He refused to give a concrete follow-up date when these four countries would actually become NATO members.

Defense Minister Anatolii Hrytsenko has said it is likely that Ukraine will obtain a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO summit in November in Riga - the first to be held in a former Soviet country. This would give Ukraine the opportunity to complete two annual cycles of the MAP before being invited to join NATO.

The unilateralist Bush administration is committed to supporting democratization abroad, including Ukraine and Georgia, which includes giving these countries the protection of NATO. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is on record as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership. An influential Ukrainian newspaper concluded that, "The U.S. will support it in every possible way and call on the other allies to help Ukraine integrate into the alliance."

Unilateralism could work in Ukraine's favor as it reduces the need for the U.S. to take into account Russian objections to NATO membership for Ukraine. This is especially true at a time when democratic regression is taking place in Russia.

The 2003 territorial conflict with Russia over Tuzla island near Crimea, the 2005-2006 gas crisis and the ongoing dispute over Russian Black Sea Fleet's illegal use of Crimean lighthouses have reinforced the need in the minds of a large portion of Ukraine's elites for the country to achieve NATO membership. President Yushchenko told a joint meeting of the National Security and Defense Council and NATO's North Atlantic Council in Kyiv that NATO membership would provide the necessary external guarantees for Ukraine's national security.

NATO membership, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer added, may be also seen as a steppingstone to European Union membership. The EU is currently inclined only to offer "enhanced partnership" to Ukraine rather than full membership. As the "carrot" of EU membership was crucial in encouraging post-Communist states to undertake painful and unpopular reforms, the absence of such a "carrot" may negatively influence reforms inside Ukraine.

Problems on the road to NATO

Although Ukraine has a high chance of being invited into the MAP process in 2006, the time frame for achieving full membership could be delayed beyond the 2008 NATO summit because of the view widely held by European members of NATO that Ukraine is not ready. The three western Balkan states are already in the MAP process.

President Yushchenko is correct to state that no country invited into NATO's Intensified Dialogue on Membership, which Ukraine was invited to join in May 2005, has never not ultimately joined NATO. But, the short time frame of 2006-2008 for a MAP before being invited into NATO may mean Ukraine's invitation may be postponed after 2008.

Ukrainian authorities are too optimistic about Ukraine's chances of entering NATO - even though there are the best international conditions for this step. It is not just a question of free and fair elections - a Western demand that is likely to be met by Ukraine. A British Foreign Office official working on Ukraine told me recently that such a free election would be one of the first in the Commonwealth of Independent States since the early 1990s (and certainly in Ukraine since 1994). Another condition is that President Yushchenko attempt to have good relations with Russia. In the West, Yushchenko is not seen as anti-Russian.

But, a third Western expectation is to wait and see whether reformers will dominate the parliamentary coalition and government. It is in this expectation that two contradictions face the authorities that will be decided by the 2006 election results.

First, many Western members of NATO will support Ukraine being invited into an MAP at the Riga summit based on the condition that there is a re-unified Orange Parliament coalition. A re-unified Orange coalition will send a signal to NATO and the EU that Ukraine's democratic breakthrough begun by the Orange Revolution and the election of Mr. Yushchenko as Ukraine's first reformist president is now consolidated and the reform process is sustainable. The paradox of this expectation is that one of the three branches of the Orange coalition - the Socialists - is hostile to NATO membership.

Second, as an alternative to a re-unified Orange coalition, Anders Aslund is lobbying in Washington for an Our Ukraine-Party of the Regions coalition. After his January visit to Ukraine he wrote that such a parliamentary coalition is what Prime Minister Yurii Yekhanurov, State Secretary Oleh Rybachuk and National Security and Defense Council Secretary Anatolii Kinakh also allegedly support.

If this is indeed true, do Dr. Aslund and these three members of the Orange "vlada" realize what signal such a coalition would send to NATO and the EU? Do they realize how support for such a coalition would undermine the goal of Ukraine's membership in NATO? An Our Ukraine-Regions coalition would give a signal that Ukraine is backtracking on reform and regressing from the Orange Revolution. NATO would postpone inviting Ukraine into an MAP and Ukraine would miss being invited to join in the third round of NATO enlargement in 2008.

An additional consequence of supporting a parliamentary coalition with the Party of the Regions would be to make Mr. Yushchenko a virtual president (which constitutional changes would simply reinforce). Mr. Yushchenko's support in western-central Ukraine would collapse and his supporters would defect to Yulia Tymoshenko. Eastern-southern Ukrainians would not give Mr. Yushchenko credit for doing a deal with their Party of the Regions. This would lead to Mr. Yushchenko not being re-elected for a second term in 2009.

Does Our Ukraine not remember the drop in its support after it signed a strategically futile memorandum with the Party of the Regions in late September 2005, a memorandum that Mr. Yushchenko himself discarded in January?

Would an Orange coalition support Ukraine's membership of NATO? Not completely.

Throughout the CIS, the left is hostile to NATO membership. This makes the post-Soviet left very different from the left in the Baltic states and Central Europe. Post-Communist Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski's ardently backed Polish membership in NATO. We could not imagine any Ukrainian left-wing leader, pro-Orange or anti-Orange, following in Mr. Kwasniewski's footsteps.

Ultimately, the major hurdle to be overcome in Ukraine will be the attitude of the Party of the Regions, which is set to have the largest faction in the newly elected Verkhovna Rada. The Party of the Regions is dominant in eastern Ukraine, where opposition to NATO membership is highest. Without the conversion of the Party of the Regions after March into a pro-NATO force, or at least one neutrally disposed toward membership, it is difficult to see how Ukraine can move beyond an MAP into membership by 2008-2010 as President Yushchenko and Ukrainian officials constantly reiterate.

Demands of the Bush administration

NATO and the Bush administration expect three objectives to be met in Ukraine for membership to become a potential future option.

The first objective is the holding of free and fair elections on March 26 as understood by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. This objective is very likely to be met as Ukraine holds its first free elections since 1994.

The second objective is continued political, economic and defense reforms. Although the pace of reforms since Mr. Yushchenko's election has been slower than expected, and often contradictory, that there is forward momentum is internationally recognized. Freedom House upgraded Ukraine to "free" this year, the country was granted market economic status by the EU and the U.S. and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) on money laundering has halted its monitoring of Ukraine.

There is an ongoing cleaning up, and reform of, the Internal Affairs Ministry and military under Internal Affairs Minister Yurii Lutsenko, who was on a high-profile visit to Washington recently, and Defense Minister Hrytsenko. Mr. Hrytsenko has called for greater coordination among Ukraine's security forces, where duties often overlap. NATO is set to assist in this endeavor by expanding its long-standing cooperation with the military to the Security Service of Ukraine, Internal Affairs Ministry, Border Troops and Ministry for Emergency Situations.

The most contentious issue is that of regional opposition to NATO membership and low public support. Some other post-Communist states, such as Slovenia and Hungary, also had low public support for membership. The populist Tymoshenko bloc has reiterated its opposition to joining NATO if there isn't public support for the move within Ukraine.

Ukraine is different from earlier countries that have joined NATO because it would be the first truly post-Soviet state to be invited to join NATO, as the three Baltic states were always treated differently (with some states, including the U.S., never recognizing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR) and never joined the CIS. Only 10 percent of Ukrainians understand what NATO is and why the country should join - a legacy of Soviet anti-NATO propaganda. Thus, the third objective is a NATO information campaign to raise public awareness.

An information campaign on NATO was lacking during the administration of Leonid Kuchma. This lack of a positive campaign on the merits of membership has left a vacuum into which the former Kuchma camp has launched an anti-NATO membership campaign.

Lack of an all-round strategy

The anti-NATO campaign is being led by the Ne Tak! (Not So!) election bloc grouped around the Social Democratic Party - United headed by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration in Mr. Kuchma's last years in power. An important financial source for Ne Tak! bloc and anti-NATO campaign is the Republican Party led by former Naftohaz Ukrainy CEO Yurii Boiko.

Mr. Boiko was set to be arrested in summer 2005 but this was halted after presidential adviser and energy tycoon Oleksander Tretiakov intervened. Mr. Boiko is thought to be a major recipient of income from the shady RosUkrEnergo created in July 2004 and included in the new gas contract with Russia signed in January.

This shows how the failure to launch criminal proceedings dealing with past corruption in the energy sector and continuing to work with the shadowy RosUkrEnergo undermines other policies, namely, the strategic aim to seek NATO membership. Not surprisingly, Defense Minister Hrytsenko and Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk are against the gas agreement.

Support for a coalition with the Party of the Regions (which Messrs. Yekhanurov, Rybachuk and Kinakh allegedly support) shows the degree to which the Ukrainian government itself is not united with regard to NATO strategy. Is their dislike of Ms. Tymoshenko more important than their support for Ukraine's NATO membership, which would be postponed if such a Rada coalition was formed?

The largest faction in the new Verkhovna Rada will be the Party of the Regions of Ukraine. It will include numerous senior-level Kuchma officials against whom no criminal charges have been laid. The slogan "Bandits to Prison" appears to have been replaced by "Bandits to Parliament."

How do Ukraine's foreign policy strategists expect to deal with the possibility that the largest faction in the new Parliament will be against NATO membership? Do those government officials who prefer an Our Ukraine-Regions coalition not understand that this would send a signal to NATO that Our Ukraine is cooperating with an anti-NATO political force?

If President Yushchenko had fulfilled his campaign promise to send "Bandits to Prison," the Party of the Regions would not be able to create the largest faction in the new Rada. Regions would not have been able to take revenge for what it sees as a stolen victory in 2004; and the largest faction in Ukraine's Parliament would have been pro-NATO (Our Ukraine), not anti-NATO (Regions).

Conclusion

Holding a free election and not proposing anti-Russian policies are two Western expectations of President Yushchenko that he will easily fulfill. He is a democrat and is not anti-Russian. A third more difficult expectation is that an Orange coalition be established in the Verkhovna Rada after the elections.

Ukraine has two coalition possibilities in the new Parliament. In choosing which coalition to join, President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine will, in turn, either influence Ukraine's successful drive to NATO or postpone it indefinetly.

The two possibilities are:

1. A re-united Orange coalition leading to an invitation to join the MAP at the NATO summit in Riga in October. This would be followed by an invitation to join NATO (together with Albania, Croatia, Macedonia) at its 2008 summit.

2. An Our Ukraine-Regions coalition that will lead to a postponement of NATO's decision on inviting Ukraine into the MAP. Such a postponement would lead to Ukraine not being included in the third wave of NATO enlargement in 2008.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is visiting professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He is also a former head of the NATO Information and Documentation Center, Kyiv.

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