ANALYSIS: An endgame for Ukraine's Orange Revolution? (04/02/06)

ANALYSIS

An endgame for Ukraine's Orange Revolution?

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Newsline

March 24

In addition to determining a new legislature with wider powers than those of its predecessors, Ukraine's March 26 parliamentary elections will effectively set in motion a constitutional reform transforming the country from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. The results of the elections were also expected to clarify whether President Viktor Yushchenko will be able to step up the implementation of his reformist policies declared during the 2004 Orange Revolution or whether he will get mired even deeper in political wrangling with his opponents.

The elections to the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada are the first in independent Ukraine to be contested under a fully proportional, party-list system. In effect, this means the representatives of each party in Parliament have been predetermined based on the party leadership's positioning of candidates on its candidates list, leaving voters merely to decide the number of parliamentary mandates each party will obtain.

Only parties garnering at least 3 percent of the vote will be represented in Parliament. Ballots cast for parties scoring less than 3 percent will be disregarded by the Central Election Commission in distributing election gains among the winners.

There are also two other important novelties in the election law. The new Verkhovna Rada will be elected for five years, compared to four years, as was previously the case.

Furthermore, individuals elected to Parliament will be barred from quitting the caucus of the party from which they were elected. The clause is potentially very controversial, as it does not include any suggestion as to what to do with lawmakers who might formally remain in a given caucus but vote against it.

The new Verkhovna Rada will have wider prerogatives than its predecessor as a result of the constitutional reform that was passed on December 8, 2004. That reform was seen as a compromise deal between the camp led by Mr. Yushchenko and that by his presidential rival Viktor Yanukovych to overcome an electoral impasse at the peak of the Orange Revolution.

Under the constitutional reform, a majority in Parliament, rather than the president, will appoint the prime minister and most of the Cabinet members. The president retains the right to appoint the foreign affairs minister, the defense minister, the procurator general, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine and all oblast administration chairs.

Moreover, Parliament, rather than the president, will have a decisive say in dismissing the prime minister or any other Cabinet member. On the other hand, the constitutional reform gives the president the right to dissolve Parliament if it fails to form a majority within 30 days after its first sitting, or to form a new Cabinet within 60 days after the dismissal or resignation of the previous one.

Forty-five parties and blocs were vying for parliamentary seats in the March 26 elections, but pre-election day surveys indicated that only six or seven of them have realistic chances of overcoming the 3 percent threshold for representation.

The election was expected to be won by Yanukovych's Party of the Regions, which leads in opinion polls with backing of about 30 percent. The combined popular support for the two former Orange Revolution allies, the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, equalled or even slightly exceeded that for the Party of the Regions as per surveys conducted prior to the election.

Analysts say there are two likely options for a future governing coalition in Ukraine, depending on how the main contenders fare on March 26.

First, President Yushchenko may try to rebuild the Orange Revolution alliance with Ms. Tymoshenko, with whom he officially split in September 2005 by dismissing her from the post of prime minister. A Yushchenko-Tymoshenko reunion would mean that Ukraine would continue to stay on track in its efforts to integrate with the rest of Europe, the final objectives being membership in NATO and the European Union.

However, this scenario is fraught with some serious problems. Ms. Tymoshenko has not concealed that she wants back the prime minister's post. But this is the last thing that many influential politicians in Mr. Yushchenko's entourage would like to see happen. A Cabinet led by her could very likely stir up another conflict within the ruling camp. Besides, a Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition would at best have a slim majority in the Verkhovna Rada, making it vulnerable to the national deputies' insubordinations or defections that have become characteristic of the Ukrainian Parliament.

A much more stable scenario would see Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine strike a coalition deal with Mr. Yanukovych's Party of the Regions. A cabinet supported by Our Ukraine and the Party of the Regions would seemingly enjoy the safety net of parliamentary backing. Since Our Ukraine and the Party of the Regions are essentially run by oligarchs representing the interests of big business in Ukraine, there would be few obstacles to them agreeing on a basic set of economic, financial or social reforms.

However, such a coalition might encounter difficulties defining Ukraine's foreign-policy priorities and goals. The parties "traditionally" have opposite geopolitical agendas, largely due to the fact that the Party of the Regions' electorate is primarily located in Russia-leaning eastern Ukraine, while that of Our Ukraine is principally based in the west of the country, which has closer affinities to Western Europe.

Finding the middle ground between the two in working out a joint foreign agenda would require much wisdom, responsibility and compromise from both sides. But a resulting alliance could be worth the pain - it could testify that the two major political forces in Ukraine see the country as an independent political player, rather than as a participant in a geopolitical tug-of-war.

One of the principal drawbacks of a potential President Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance is that it would leave Yushchenko open to charges from Ms. Tymoshenko and her followers that he has "betrayed" the Orange Revolution by siding with the man who was his rival in the contentious 2004 presidential election. Mr. Yushchenko could see his support in western Ukraine erode even further, without any guarantee that he will make up for such losses by gaining support in the east.

Our Ukraine's deputy campaign chief, Roman Zvarych, told RFE/RL before election day that, despite the rumors, there will be no coalition after the elections between Our Ukraine and the Party of the Regions.

Ms. Tymoshenko also firmly ruled out the possibility of a post-election coalition with Mr. Yanukovych. "Our positions are mutually exclusive," Ms. Tymoshenko said on March 21. "The political bloc that I head categorically stands for the complete separation of clans and criminals from the government. The core leadership of the Party of the Regions headed by Mr. Yanukovych represents one of the most powerful of such clans, whose intention is to use the government for the purpose of maximizing its capital. Cooperation between the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc and Party of the Regions is therefore impossible in principle."

Whatever option President Yushchenko chooses after the March 26 vote, he will have to keep in mind that the days when it was possible to run the country by decree and by bending the Parliament to the president's will via pressure, bribery or blackmail, which was the case under his predecessor, President Leonid Kuchma, are gone for good.

Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus and Ukraine specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.

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