ANALYSIS: Ukraine's free elections and its kamikaze president (04/02/06)

ANALYSIS: Ukraine's free elections and its kamikaze president

by Taras Kuzio

Ukraine held its fourth parliamentary elections on March 26 in an atmosphere totally different from that of earlier elections. President Viktor Yushchenko can be credited with ensuring that these elections will be Ukraine's first free and fair elections since it became an independent state in January 1992. The democratic breakthrough initiated by the Orange Revolution of late 2004 has been consolidated.

Ukraine's elections stood in stark contrast to neighboring Belarus, where the elections held a week earlier proved that the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka is the last dictatorship in Europe. Russia recognized the Belarusian election results, while the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United States rejected them. In the case of Ukraine, the opposite happened: Russia called the elections "unfair" while the EU, OSCE and U.S. described them in glowing and positive terms.

Voting patterns in the 2006 elections have not dramatically changed from those in the three rounds of the 2004 presidential election. Then, and now, the west and center was pro-Orange while the east and south was pro-blue (for Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions). There are though, two crucial differences. First, Mr. Yanukovych's 44 percent vote on December 26, 2004, is not repeated in the 2006 election. With all the votes counted, the Party of the Regions had 32.12 percent of the vote.

Second, there was a generally lower turnout across Ukraine in 2006 as compared to the 2004 elections. Traditionally, eastern Ukraine has a lower turnout than western Ukraine and this was the case in 2006. Another factor working against a high turnout for the Party of the Regions was its highly negative election campaign.

The elections were a crushing defeat for the Communists, who came in at the bottom of the political forces that entered Parliament. Their decline from 120 seats in 1998 to 21 in 2006 is meteoric. Two of Ukraine's regional clans also failed to enter the Verkhovna Rada: "Ne Tak!" (Not So!) headed by the Kyiv clan's Social Democratic Party - United and Labor Ukraine, the Dnipropetrovsk clan. The former Kuchma camp voted for the Party of the Regions.

There was never any doubt that only five or six political forces would enter Parliament, even though the threshold is very low at only 3 percent. Of these forces, three would be the "big players" - the Party of the Regions, the Our Ukraine bloc and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. Any parliamentary coalition would have to be created from two of these. As President Yushchenko is the honorary chairman of Our Ukraine, his bloc would inevitably be one of the two coalition partners.

Therefore, there were two likely coalitions: Our Ukraine plus the Tymoshenko Bloc, or Our Ukraine Plus Party of the Regions. Ukraine's new parliamentary coalition, which will create a government and choose a prime minister, will most likely be a revived Orange team of Our Ukraine plus the Tymoshenko Bloc plus the Socialists (SPU). Ms. Tymoshenko has energetically campaigned for an Orange coalition and has warned against the dangers of any alliance with Mr. Yanukovych.

Two factors explain why an Orange coalition will happen. First, an alliance with the Party of the Regions would be political suicide for President Yushchenko. It would be seen as a betrayal of the Orange Revolution and Mr. Yushchenko's support would collapse. Our Ukraine's public support slumped after it signed a strategically futile memorandum with the Party of the Regions in late September 2005 - a memorandum that President Yushchenko himself discarded in January.

Mr. Yanukovych is not a reformed leader and his Party of the Regions followed the Communists in sending greetings to President Lukashenka on his "victory." (Mr. Yushchenko and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed the Western position, refusing to recognize the Belarus elections).

Mr. Yanukovych has never acknowledged his defeat in 2004 and he still believes he won the election but was betrayed by then President Kuchma. Throughout the elections, the Party of the Regions continued to denounce the legitimacy of the Orange Revolution as an "illegal coup" and continued to denigrate its supporters as "Orange rats."

The Party of the Regions is in favor of economic reform because it is dominated by oligarchs and businessmen. Yet, it voted against World Trade Organization legislation in 2005. The Party of the Regions is opposed to NATO membership, is for full membership in the CIS Single Economic Space, and supports the elevation of Russian to a second state language.

The second reason that the Orange coalition will be restored is that such an alliance between Messrs. Yushchenko and Yanukovych would send a signal to the EU and NATO that the Orange Revolution is in retreat. The EU already is passive in its attitudes toward Ukraine and an Our Ukraine alliance with the Party of the Regions would give sustenance to those inside the EU who do not want Ukraine as a member. An alliance with a political force hostile to NATO membership would also lead to a postponement of NATO offering Ukraine a Membership Action Plan at its November summit in Riga.

Ms. Tymoshenko is in a powerful position because her bloc was second in the balloting and quadrupled the number of its seats in the Verkhovna Rada compared to the 2002 elections. Our Ukraine, in contrast, ran a poor third, with fewer Parliamentary seats than in 2002.

Why has Our Ukraine fared badly when its honorary chairman is Ukraine's president, swept into office by people power? Mr. Yushchenko is a "kamikaze" president. He made countless mistakes in 2005, including sacking the Tymoshenko government and dividing the Orange camp, signing a memorandum with Mr. Yanukovych, mishandling the gas contract with Russia in a non-transparent manner, and keeping Procurator-General Sviatoslav Piskun until October, thereby not following through on instituting charges against high-level officials. Mr. Yushchenko also wasted a year when, though he inherited Mr. Kuchma's extensive executive powers, he failed to use them to stamp his authority on the country.

Ms. Tymoshenko came in second because of Mr. Yushchenko's "kamikaze" mistakes that led to an Orange protest vote going to her, rather than to the Pora-Reforms and Order Bloc. Our Ukraine proved to be arrogant, both vis-à-vis Orange voters and vis-à-vis Mr. Yushchenko himself. Senior Orange businessmen accused of corruption in September 2005 refused to back down from standing in Our Ukraine, ignoring Mr. Yushchenko's advice. Meanwhile, political parties in Our Ukraine refused to merge into a single pro-presidential party.

President Yushchenko failed to understand perhaps the most important factor driving the Orange Revolution: the widespread feelings of injustice generated by the public's perceptions of abuse of office, corruption and "bandits" running Ukraine. Prime Minister Yurii Yekhanurov totally misunderstood this feeling, as seen by his invitation to Ukraine's oligarchs to a meeting in October 2005 at which he described them as "Ukraine's national bourgeoisie." The rule of law cannot move ahead in Ukraine without dealing with these issues from the past: election fraud in 2004, high-level corruption, the murder of Heorhii Gongadze and the attempted assassination of Mr. Yushchenko.

Ms. Tymoshenko will become either prime minister or chair of the Verkhovna Rada. Much of what Mr. Yushchenko and Our Ukraine have taken credit for economically was initiated under her government. Foreign investors' fears about property rights will have to be assuaged.

The free elections of 2006 and a resultant Orange coalition shows the consolidation of Ukraine's democratic progress after the Orange Revolution. It is doubtful though, that Ukraine's Parliament will last its full term of five years. The contradictions inherent inside the Party of the Regions between businessmen and pro-Russian, former Communist voters will lead it to implode, causing early elections.

Taras Kuzio, Ph.D., is visiting professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

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