INTERVIEW: Ambassador Roman Popadiuk on the new Ukraine (04/23/06)

INTERVIEW: Ambassador Roman Popadiuk on the new Ukraine

by Irene Jarosewich

Essential to the development of good relations between sovereign states is an informed and active diplomatic corps. It has been Ukraine's good fortune that each of the U.S. ambassadors dispatched to Kyiv were committed to the young nation's success - not only while they served in Ukraine, but for many years afterwards. The names and photos of William Green Miller, Stephen Pifer, Carlos Pascual and John Herbst have appeared numerous times on the pages of our newspapers during the past 15 years.

However, the dean of the U.S. diplomatic corps to Ukraine - the first ambassador to represent the United States in Kyiv - is Roman Popadiuk, currently the executive director of the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation in Texas.

Throughout these past years Ambassador Popadiuk has remained actively engaged in U.S.-Ukraine affairs. He has worked with each Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, helping the Embassy of Ukraine establish contacts in the U.S. government, with the media and with business groups. He has written and lectured on the subject of U.S.-Ukraine relations and has traveled to Ukraine.

Appointed to serve in Ukraine in 1992 by President George Bush, Ambassador Popadiuk felt enormous pride in being able to represent America in the homeland of his parents; Ukrainian Americans were enormously proud of him. Those early years were critical in developing a solid trust between the United States and Ukraine - exciting years that Ambassador Popadiuk recalls with fondness and no small amount of awe as he compares the Ukraine in which he served 14 years ago with the country that he visited recently as an election observer.

As a member of the delegation organized by the Washington-based International Republican Institute, Ambassador Popadiuk observed polling stations inside and outside of Kyiv on March 26 during the elections to Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada.

Shortly after his return to the United States, Svoboda Editor-in-Chief Irene Jarosewich spoke with Ambassador Popadiuk about what he saw and what he remembers.

Q: There was an almost immediate consensus among election observer organizations that the March 26 elections were genuinely free of any serious infractions - none of the intimidation and fraud that prevailed during several previous elections in Ukraine - most notably the presidential elections in the fall of 2004. In fact some of the observers with whom I spoke later were a bit pensive - feeling there's nothing much left to do in Ukraine. What were your observations on the ground?

A: I agree that these elections were fair - transparent and conducted in a peaceful manner. But I wouldn't be pensive - the March 26 elections were a historic event. The election opened the door to Ukraine's future and closed the door on its past. What this election did was solidify the political culture of Ukraine. Ukraine can no longer be thought of as a Soviet state with all the negatives associated with that rubric.

The Ukrainian people have come to accept the concept that power rests in their hands and that there is a procedure for the exercise of such power. The Orange Revolution proved that the popular will can prevail and the March 26 election firmly established this as the new right.

At the same time, it appears to me, that while the political culture seems to have coalesced for the population in general, a culture of political leadership does not appear to have gained a foothold among Ukraine's leaders. Politics in Ukraine continue to be personality-based, devoid of any real affinity for and responsibility towards the electorate and the need to pursue a common good.

The real danger for Ukraine, therefore, is the continuance of a disconnect between the electorate and the political leadership.

Q: The disconnect between the ruling elite and the electorate was made stunningly clear by the poor showing of President Viktor Yushchenko's party Our Ukraine - about 14 percent. However, it must also be noted that together the original Orange Coalition - that is Our Ukraine at 14 percent, Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc at over 22 percent and Oleksander Moroz's Socialists at over 5 percent pulled in almost 42 percent support in western and central Ukraine. This was 10 points ahead of Viktor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions, which dominated in the eastern oblasts, an area with a large population of ethnic Russians. So it seems as though the disconnect is also between the people themselves and how they see their future.

A: The east-west divide revolves more around economics and culture, rather than ethnicity. True, because of the large Russian ethnic minority in eastern Ukraine, the long history of Russian control of the region, as well as long-standing financial ties, there is an affinity for Russia. These factors, however, have been exacerbated by the general economic stalemate and have raised the level of frustration in the region.

The political situation reflects the frustration with the central government's inability to meet the region's concerns - a region which is the country's industrial base and provides much of Ukraine's wealth and tax revenue. It must be remembered that ethnic Russians in Ukraine favored Ukraine's independence. There was an expectation that the economic future would be better in Ukraine than in Russia. This is still true. Furthermore, it has not been lost on the Russian minority in Ukraine that totalitarian control and abuse is a legacy that emanated out of Moscow, not Kyiv. What concerns the voters most in the eastern regions is economic stability.

The Ukrainian government has done an excellent job for the past 15 years in consistently working from the principle that territory, not ethnicity, defines nationhood. A great deal of credit must be given to President Leonid Kravchuk. During my tenure in Ukraine, I saw him do much to establish the principle that Ukrainianism is based on geography. He did much to tamp potential hostility based on ethnicity.

This ethnic division of Ukraine, I believe, is a result more of outside observers pointing to a supposed fault line than it is a defining reality. As generational change occurs, and if the government of Ukraine can implement a more stable economic regime, the tendency towards Russia will evaporate. The continuing erosion of differences between the two regions can be seen by the success that Tymoshenko had among eastern voters. Her bloc made inroads in Kharkiv, Kirovohrad and other eastern strongholds.

As I see it, the internal divisions are less of a concern than the inability of the central government to perform. Weak and indecisive governments usually lose public confidence, which can leave them vulnerable to foreign pressures. Differences may exist in Ukraine, but they are not insurmountable.

Q: You mentioned that the legacy of totalitarian abuse emanates out of Moscow. That legacy appears to be firmly entrenched in neighboring Belarus, which recently underwent presidential elections. There the protests - which drew tens of thousands of people - against the abuses of the Lukashenka regime were quashed. Many Western observers pointed to the radical differences in the paths that the two former Soviet republics took post-1991. Did the events surrounding the election in Belarus have any impact on the Ukrainian electorate?

A: I'm not a Belarus expert, but I didn't notice any impact really, didn't sense the impact of the situation in Belarus on the population of Ukraine. Ukraine, rightfully so, has focused on itself now. The political culture really has developed differently in the two countries. The development of democracy faltered early in Belarus.

People often forget that in Ukraine there was a peaceful transfer of presidential power in 1994. There was a widespread assumption that Leonid Kravchuk would win, yet Leonid Kuchma won. Kuchma promised to be a reformer and early on was looked upon by the West as supporting reform. Ukraine, therefore, has had a series of successful elections.

There is no doubt in my mind that Ukraine's peaceful Orange Revolution in 2004 was a symbol, an inspiration for Belarusians, a goal to emulate. Unfortunately in Belarus, the hold of the state is so strong that there is no tendency by the government to respond to the populist will. In 2004 we saw Kuchma decide not to use the military; not so in Belarus.

Q: We're entering the 15th year since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 15th year of Ukraine's independence. If you were to highlight some of the most dramatic changes between the Ukraine you remember then and the Ukraine you saw now, what would they be?

A: The most dramatic difference is that there is simply no longer any question as to the future existence of Ukraine as a nation. When I was in Ukraine, there were reports that the Russian Embassy in Kyiv was saying that in five years' time Ukraine would be back as a part of Russia. Again, the March 26 elections solidified Ukraine's future.

There is also no serious talk of separation of any parts of Ukraine. There may be discontent in eastern oblasts, but it is not an ultimatum for separation or an unbridled desire to return to Russia. I was in Ukraine during the tension over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. There was a real fear that Crimea would break away from Ukraine and that this would lead to greater Russian interference.

In 1991, freedom and democracy - they were theories. People wanted to believe in them, but they were not sure what these meant. Now they deeply feel it. They believe and accept these values as their right. And you see it now in the media. The Orange Revolution took away the final barriers to media self-censorship. Civil society has blossomed. Political culture has evolved. People really do accept that power is in their hands. And though Ukraine still faces economic challenges, overall, economic progress has been immense.

And Ukraine has shown a great deal of international responsibility. Ukraine was the first country to voluntarily relinquish nuclear weapons and established an international precedent that continues today - that states can exist without nuclear weapons and relationships must be based on cooperation, not enmity.

There's a world of difference since 1991, Ukraine is light years ahead. And in these last elections, the Ukrainian electorate has shown again that it is ready to move forward. Now it's up to the political elite to understand.

| Home Page |