FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY: The emperor's diplomatic mission to Hetman Khmelnytsky in 1657 (05/21/06)

FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY: The emperor's diplomatic mission to Hetman Khmelnytsky in 1657

by Theodore Mackiw

Bohdan Khmelnytsky (also spelled as "Chmelnycky" or "Chmielnicki"), 1598-1657, was described by the well-known Russian American historian George Vernadsky as a military leader whose talent he equated with that of Wallenstein, whose diplomatic ability was hardly less than that of Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, and whose statesmanship and revolutionary leadership matched Oliver Cromwell's.

He was acclaimed as a liberator of the Ukrainian nation, and, if he had lived longer, he would probably have succeeded in establishing a stable Kozak government in Ukraine. Quite deservedly, Khmelnytsky impressed the minds of his contemporaries as well as successive generations of the Ukrainian people.

Khmelnytsky was first elected hetman - commander-in-chief, or chief executive - of the autonomous Ukrainian military republic, known also as the "Hetmanate" or the "Hetman State" (Hetmanschyna) in 1648, under the Polish protectorate, and again six years later, under the Russian protectorate (1654). Such autonomy was a status shared by many countries. Although Ukraine was a Russian protectorate, it nevertheless, as German historian Hans Schumann observed in his dissertation, had its own territory, people, system of government (a democratic one that certainly was unique at that time), administration, law, tradition, customs, and a military force, namely the Kozaks.

Khmelnytsky exercised the full power of his civil and military authority in Ukraine: he mostly sent his own envoys and received foreign ones (Poland and Turkey were the only exceptions). Consequently, he was regarded de facto as a sovereign ruler.

A clear distinction was drawn between Ukraine and Russia, as can be seen on contemporaneous maps created by numerous cartographers: for example, the French engineer Guilaume le Vasseur de Beauplan; the Dutch and English cartographers Hessel Gerardus (Gerritsz) and P. Gordon, respectively; and, the Germans Johann Baptist Homann, Conrad Tobias Lotter, Mathias Seutter, and brothers Christopher and Johann Wiegel.

When Khmelnytsky concluded a military treaty with Moscow in 1654, he expected to obtain military assistance in his struggle against Poland for the independence of Ukraine. However, the tsar interpreted this treaty as granting Russia a new territorial acquisition. When this became apparent to Khmelnytsky, he began to search for help from another source. (It is true, however, that the tsar sent his troops against Poland, but it was rather for the annexation of Bielorus [now known as Belarus] than to support the hetman in his struggle with Poland.)

The overwhelming victory of the Russo-Ukrainian armies over Poland (1654-1655) encouraged the newly crowned Swedish king, Charles X, to renew the old war against Poland. Prince George Rakoczy of Transylvania, who for many years had been a Swedish ally as a member of a coalition against Catholic Austria and Poland, now joined forces with the Swedes; and, the allies prepared an invasion of Poland. At the same time, Sweden invited Khmelnytsky to join his coalition, advising him to break with Moscow. The hetman gladly accepted this invitation and in 1656 concluded a close alliance with Sweden and Transylvania, in addition to agreeing to the partition of Poland.

The Austrian Court did not desire to become involved in this war and offered its mediation, trying to persuade Polish King Jan Casimir to attempt to come to an agreement with Khmelnytsky. However, when the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations ended unsuccessfully, the Polish king asked Emperor Ferdinand III to serve as mediator between the Kozaks and Poland, whereupon the emperor sent his best diplomat, Francis von Lisola, to the Swedish headquarters. There Lisola learned of the Kozak-Swedish rapprochement, which had already begun in late 1655, as he informed Vienna in his report of December 18, 1655._1_

At the beginning of April 1656, Khmelnytsky's envoy, a Greek monk, Father Daniel, arrived at the Swedish headquarters. In his report of April 7, 1656, Lisola wrote to Vienna that "the Swedish king was very happy about the Kozak envoy's arrival," and "Father Daniel's objective was to inform the Swedish king that the Kozaks have a great desire to conclude a treaty with him."

In addition, a former Polish undersecretary, Jerome Radziejowshi, now in the service of Sweden, made it very clear to the Austrian envoy that he could not only break off Ukrainian-Swedish negotiations, but with his mediation he could bring the Kozaks closer to the emperor.

Lisola wrote to Vienna in his report of September 15, 1656, that if the emperor wanted to paralyze the Ukrainian-Swedish Alliance, there was only one thing to do, namely to conclude a treaty with Khmelnytsky before the Swedish king could. He emphasized that "circumstances force the Kozaks to find a new protector because they are afraid of the Muscovite yoke and do not trust the Polish nobility. The Tatars are hostile to the Kozaks and do not like the Turks either. Therefore, the Kozaks have no other choice but to look for protection from Your Imperial Majesty or from the Swedish king."

The Viennese Court liked Lisola's suggestion and, after some debate, decided on October 9, 1656, to send an official envoy directly to the hetman at his headquarters in Chyhyryn.

The candidate for this mission, the chancellor of Hungary and bishop of Nitria, George Selepczeni (Szelepcsny) was invited to the next meeting of the Imperial Council, on November 3, 1655, at which time the plan and instructions were discussed, According to the instructions, Selepczeni was supposed to convince the hetman that the emperor was deeply interested in settling the Polish-Kozak war and was even willing to guarantee the peace treaty. Furthermore, the Kozaks should trust Selepczeni completely and tell him all their secrets in order to speed the negotiations. Likewise, it was also decided that Selepczeni should be in close contact with the Polish government and inform about all negotiations with Khmelnytsky. Everything was discussed there, even that the hetman should be addressed as "illustrissimus" (most illustrious).

In the meantime, Rakoczy's army passed through the Carpathian Mountains and attacked Polish troops, which surprised the emperor. He hastily sent Selepeczeni to negotiate with Rakoczy. At the same time, Peter Parchevich, the archbishop of Martianopel, arrived in Vienna in the fall of 1656 from Bulgaria to ask for assistance for the Church. The emperor desired to avoid any involvement in Balkan affairs and asked him if he would be willing to go as his envoy to the hetman of the Kozaks. Parchevich gladly accepted this mission, adding that he "knew the language of the Kozaks well." Thereupon he was informed about the purpose of his mission: to persuade Khmelnytsky to conclude peace with Poland and, concomitantly, to inform the Polish envoy about the hetman's opinion regarding peace with the Polish king.

Before Parchevich's departure, the emperor requested the Polish king through his envoy in Warsaw, Johann Christian Fragstein, to send him additional details. As Fragstein wrote in his report of February 10, 1656, the Polish king was very satisfied with this plan, only his chancellor suggested that Khmelnytsky be addressed as "generous" (respectful) instead of "illustrissimus."

However, before Fragstein's report arrived in Vienna, the credentials and the letter to the hetman were addressed as follows: "Illustri, Magnificis et Strenuis Syncere Nobis delectis Bogulas Chmelniskio [Bohdan Chmelnycky], Cossacorum aporovianorum Generali Militiae Duci Eiusque Assistentibus et Ordinum Ductoribus." Parchevich received his credentials on January 10, 1657 and, after making necessary preparations, left Vienna with his secretary, Msgr. Christopher Marianovich.

On March 1, 1657, Parchevich and his secretary arrived in Chyhyryn, where he was extended high honors. After six days this unusual mission was brought to Subotiv, two miles from Chyhyryn, where Khmelnytsky had his residence. At that time, the hetman was very sick and received Parchevich in bed. The archbishop greeted him in the flowery language that was stylish at the time. The hetman answered very politely and, after a toast in honor of the emperor, Parchevich and his companion were escorted to their quarters. The two were pleased by their reception.

They had many conversations with the hetman himself and other high officers, but at their request for a reply to the emperor, the hetman and his chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, answered that this unusual offer from "the Emperor of all Christians" required careful consultation with other Kozak leaders. Parchevich believed this, but in fact Khmelnytsky intentionally kept him for almost two months to impress other diplomatic missions and to use the presence of the emperor's diplomatic mission to add to his prestige.

In the middle of April 1657 the Kozak General Council convened, and problems of internal and foreign policy were discussed. The next day, after the General Council was concluded, (the archbishop being ill) Msgr. Marianovich asked for a reply to the emperor. The hetman received him in his quarters and apologized for the delay. Finally, on the following day Vyhovsky expressed the hetman's thanks and good wishes and handed Parchevich a letter from the hetman to the emperor (see sidebar). As can be seen from the text of the letter, which was very carefully worded, the hetman assured the emperor of his good intentions, and promised to prefer no one else's advice to the emperor's, provided that the safety of the Hetman State was assured. He also praised Parchevich's efforts and promised that his envoy would bring further details orally to the emperor himself.

In conclusion, it should be added that the Poles defeated Rakoczy and persuaded the Tatars to attack him from the south, so that he was forced to make peace with Poland. The Swedes gradually withdrew from Poland and concluded a formal peace with both Poland and Russia. In such circumstances, especially because of the uncertain relationships with Moscow, the hetman had no other choice than to negotiate with Poland. Therefore, it is no wonder that Khmelnytsky, in his reply to the Polish king through his envoy, Stanislaw Bienkowski, simultaneously indicated readiness to negotiate with him. This is substantiated in Lisola's report of June 3, 1657, in which he informed his government that Bienkowski later told him that the Kozaks were eager to negotiate with the Polish king. Thus, the mission of the imperial envoy was achieved, because circumstances left no other viable alternative for the hetman.

1. Lisola's reports and other documents are located in Haus, Hof u. Staatsarchiv in Vienna, Polonica I, Karton 66-69. [Back to Text]

Theodore Mackiw, Ph.D., is professor emeritus of the University of Akron.

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