ANALYSIS

New Parliament convenes, sets deadline for coalition


by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL

All seemed in order as the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada convened on May 25 for its first session, but the composure on the Ukrainian parliamentary rostrum was short-lived.

A dispute among deputies erupted immediately after the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party - the three allies in the 2004 Orange Revolution - proposed that the session be postponed until June 7.

By that time, they pledged, the three groups will have agreed on the principles of a renewed coalition. The motion eventually passed with 240 votes.

Dissent came from the ranks of the Party of the Regions and the Communist Party, whose members argued that the Orange Revolution allies have had enough time to agree on a coalition and should allow the legislature to get to work.

The March 26 parliamentary vote in Ukraine, which was internationally praised as fair and democratic, produced a legislature comprising five forces: the Party of the Regions (186 seats), the Tymoshenko Bloc (129), Our Ukraine (81), the Socialist Party (33) and the Communist Party (21).

Over the past two months, the five parliamentary groups have held several joint meetings chaired by President Viktor Yushchenko and many bilateral and trilateral conferences devoted to the formation of a parliamentary majority. All of them have thus far been fruitless.

In mid-April the Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party signed a protocol pledging to work toward creating such a parliamentary majority. Their subsequent efforts led to the preparation of two draft coalition accords - one endorsed by the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialists, the other worked out by Our Ukraine.

The main stumbling block in the coalition talks is the question of who will become prime minister. Ms. Tymoshenko has made no secret of her desire to regain the post she held before being dismissed by President Yushchenko in September 2005. But the restoration of Ms. Tymoshenko as prime minister is exactly what the president and his political partners from Our Ukraine would like to avoid.

Mr. Yushchenko officially split with Ms. Tymoshenko after she accused some of his closest allies of corruption practices and of running a "second" government. All of them were subsequently elected to the Verkhovna Rada from the Our Ukraine list. If the former Orange Revolution allies eventually decide to restore their coalition and Ms. Tymoshenko becomes prime minister once again, the old conflict may reignite.

There is also another source of potential discord between the president and Ms. Tymoshenko. Ms. Tymoshenko promised during the election campaign to cancel a gas-supply deal that President Yushchenko's Cabinet signed with Gazprom in January. The deal raised the gas price for Ukraine from $50 to $95 per 1,000 meters and gave RosUkrEnergo, an opaque Swiss-based company owned half by Gazprom and half by two Ukrainian businessmen, the role of sole supplier.

The cancellation by Ms. Tymoshenko of the gas deal with Gazprom could lead to a serious conflict between Kyiv and Moscow. Russia could cut gas supplies to Ukraine, as it did for a short time in January, or impose trade sanctions, as it recently did with regard to Georgian and Moldovan wines. Ukraine, which currently sends some 22 percent of its exports to Russia, would hardly benefit from any trade ban from Moscow.

Another hurdle to an Orange coalition is the Socialist Party's opposition to some goals pursued by the Yushchenko administration. In particular, the Socialists object to Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO. They also object to the privatization of land, thus undermining Mr. Yushchenko's efforts to implement reforms he pledged during the 2004 Orange Revolution in an effort to bring the country closer to the European Union.

If Our Ukraine fails to fulfill Ms. Tymoshenko's dream of regaining her seat as prime minister, she will most likely switch to the opposition, and President Yushchenko will have to seek a coalition with the Party of the Regions led by Viktor Yanukovych - his former presidential rival.

Such a coalition, with 267 votes in the Verkhovna Rada, would provide solid support for its Cabinet, provided that the two seemingly mismatched parties could adopt a consistent program. Both parties represent the interests of major oligarchic groups in Ukraine, so, in theory, they could very easily agree on a set of basic economic reforms. But difficulties could emerge in the determination of foreign-policy priorities, as Mr. Yanukovych's party is generally seen as Russia-leaning, in contrast to the Western-oriented Our Ukraine.

For President Yushchenko, this coalition option is fraught with much more serious dangers than mere differences of opinion on foreign policy. The Party of the Regions, which won the March 26 vote, would most likely demand the post of prime minister. It is not clear whether Mr. Yushchenko would prefer Mr. Yanukovych or someone else from his party to Ms. Tymoshenko as prime minister.

Under the constitutional reform that went into effect in January, the presidential powers in Ukraine were substantially reduced to the benefit of the Parliament and the prime minister. Since the Party of the Regions has many politicians with great experience in running the government during the administration of President Leonid Kuchma, President Yushchenko should think twice before handing the keys to the Cabinet over to them. Such experienced politicians could do more to diminish the role of the president in practice than the constitutional reform did in theory.

Mr. Yushchenko told the new Verkhovna Rada at its opening session that he will expect the new cabinet to embody his future vision for Ukraine.

"The government should be made up of those who, as a single team, will ensure Ukraine's development on the basis of European values, who are capable of consolidating the nation, stimulating economic reforms, and respecting the rights and freedoms of the people," he said.

However, the president could find these goals very difficult to achieve - not only because of discrepancies among the potential coalition parties but also because of the personal ambitions of their leaders.


Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus and Ukraine specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, June 4, 2006, No. 23, Vol. LXXIV


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