IN THE PRESS: Orange coalition's collapse, relations with Putin's Russia (07/30/06)

IN THE PRESS

Orange coalition's collapse, relations with Putin's Russia

"The People's Choice," editorial, The Washington Post, July 17:

"Two years ago, politics in Ukraine seemed to be a battle between good and evil. Now the picture is more complicated. The good guy is president, but the bad guy is likely to become the next prime minister. Some say it's a failure of democracy. We disagree.

"...Mr. [Viktor] Yushchenko and his Orange coalition have faltered. The government has had to face Russian bullying and a bevy of domestic problems while the momentum of revolution waned. In March's parliamentary elections, the party of Mr. [Viktor] Yanukovych claimed the most seats. And after months of parliamentary wrangling, he won the nomination for prime minister last week.

"... The emerging political settlement in Ukraine reflects the current divisions within the country, which has a large ethnic Russian population in the east, Mr. Yanukovych's natural constituency, and a fierce Ukrainian nationalist movement in the west, Mr. Yushchenko's power base. It should be no surprise that the leader of the parliament might represent one end of the country and the president the other.

"Mr. Yanukovych may not be the prime minister we would have voted for. But we respect the honest choice Ukrainians made."

"Political Courage and Ukrainian Politics," by Walter Parchomenko, Ph.D., Kyiv Post, July 20:

"With each passing day there is an increasing likelihood that President Viktor Yushchenko will be remembered in Ukraine's history books as little more than a maidan (Independence Square) legend during the Orange Revolution, a convenient rallying figure for Ukrainian citizens fed up with the corruption of Yushchenko's predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, and Yushchenko's rival in the extremely fraudulent 2004 presidential race, Viktor Yanukovych. Yushchenko may very well be seen by future generations as a weak, indecisive, and ineffective one-term president who routinely placed personal interests and political ambitions above the public interest; and as a president who intentionally squandered a rare second chance to revive a splintered Orange coalition and its maidan ideals because of his deep hatred of former Orange ally Yulia Tymoshenko and fear that this charismatic leader of uncompromising principles would rob him of a second presidential term.

"... Contrary to conventional wisdom, President Yushchenko never intended the new Orange coalition to be more than a virtual coalition, a facade to conceal the bare-knuckled, behind-the-scene fight to undermine Tymoshenko's reputation as the country's new premier [prime minister], and her chances to be a major contender in the 2009 presidential election. Thus, from the outset, the president and his inner circle approached the idea of forming a new Orange coalition in bad faith.

The mechanism intended to ensure the success of their plan was the new coalition document, which was signed only after more than 100 days of tortuous negotiations, finally produced a result that was to the president's liking. As soon as the new coalition document was signed, the president's true intentions became painfully evident. Compelling evidence to support this claim of bad faith on the president's part, notably includes the nomination by Yushchenko's party of his close advisor and family friend, the very confrontational Petro Poroshenko, to the key post of parliamentary speaker in the new parliament, an obvious effort to rein in Yulia Tymoshenko in her job as the new premier. ..."

"The Orange circus and Ukraine's circular politics," The Economist, July 13:

" 'We are forming a new political culture,' President Viktor Yushchenko told the people of Ukraine last week, 'which will last for centuries.' Given recent events, that seems an optimistic timescale.

"After the parliamentary election in March, it took three months for Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party to form a coalition with the two other parties that had swept him into office in the "orange revolution" of 2004: the Socialists and a block led by Yulia Tymoshenko. The first orange coalition, in which Ms. Tymoshenko was prime minister, collapsed last September; this one fell apart after just two weeks. The Rada, Ukraine's Parliament, has since become a circus of fistfights and cat-calling. ...

"There is still (just) a faint hope that some good will come from this farce. A new election might produce a more stable Parliament. Or a grand coalition might ease the resentments of eastern Ukraine, which overwhelmingly backs Mr. [Viktor] Yanukovych - though it is hard to see such a coalition lasting long. At least, says Hryhorii Nemyria, Ms. Tymoshenko's adviser, trying to be upbeat, there has been no violence-except within the Rada."

"Putin Village," Review and Outlook, The Wall Street Journal, July 14:

" ... For too long, the Putin regime could interpret America's softly, softly approach - leave aside the open coddling from Western Europeans - as a tacit endorsement. As both the G-8 hoopla and Mr. [Vladimir] Putin's thin-skinned response to the Cheney speech show, this Russian government cares deeply about Western opinion.

"Now would be a good time to recommit resources to election monitoring and democracy building. Woken up by January's gas war, the Western Europeans can lend a hand for a change. The new Russian middle class will appreciate and, one day, may take advantage of this engagement.

"Now would also be an ideal moment to prop up the fledgling democracies in Georgia and Ukraine that are feeling the heat from Russia and put those countries on a track to joining NATO. ...

"Russia doesn't deserve its place among the G-8 democratic nations, and the task of the U.S. and other members is to encourage reform that will make it worthy of membership. Political and economic freedom aren't only nice words to be hauled out at gatherings like this weekend's St. Petersburg summit. For Russia they are the key to future prosperity and stability, a future that Mr. Putin has put in jeopardy."

"For a European Energy Alliance," commentary by Yulia Tymoshenko, The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 13:

"... To be clear, neither Ukraine nor Russia disputed the necessity of measured price changes. But unfortunately for Russia's neighbors, the price of Russian gas is not determined by market forces. Gazprom and its chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, who also doubles as Russia's first deputy prime minister, call the shots.

"Gazprom charges each neighbor a different price, a price largely determined by that country's relationship with the Kremlin rather than by supply and demand or gas-transport calculations.

"And so, as a result of its newfound independence from Russia after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine suddenly had to choose between a fourfold gas price hike or the interruption of its supplies. Similarly, Georgia was also feeling Moscow's wrath following the Rose Revolution and faced punishing price increases as well. Belarus, however, a country still in strong alignment with the Kremlin, continues to enjoy highly subsidized gas. ...

"... G-8 leaders should enforce energy transaction standards that require open and transparent contracts in line with best business practices. This will help dilute the global power of leaders who play the energy card to achieve purely political goals.

"We see such problems today in the operations of state-owned energy firms in Latin America and through the use of opaque business intermediaries such as RosUkrEnergo, the firm that played a central role in the questionable gas deal between Ukraine and Russia. ...

"In the end, energy security for all of Europe requires recognizing that the linked nature of our supply and transmission systems makes us interdependent. This is where a formal Energy Alliance of consumers and suppliers could be useful. In this alliance, the nations of Europe would guarantee the energy supplies of one another in the event of a major disruption. ...

"The first critical step in an Energy Alliance would be to include Ukraine in the current energy dialogue that exists between the EU and Russia. It is self-evident that the country that hosts the majority of the transit of gas shipments to Europe from Russia would be included in this dialogue, especially in light of the events of this past January when Russia cut off the gas to Ukraine and Europe. ..."

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