Ukraine crisis: Sources, outcomes and potential ways forward
by Taras Kuzio
CONCLUSION
Yushchenko's position weakened
Until the crisis of summer 2006, President Viktor Yushchenko was increasingly viewed as a weak leader, lacking political will and strategy, and unlikely to win a second presidential term in the 2009 elections. The current crisis will reinforce this growing view inside, and outside, Ukraine.
The crisis could well cut short the president's first term if he is forced to call early parliamentary and presidential elections. President Yushchenko's weaknesses closely resemble those of President Leonid Kravchuk, who called pre-term elections in summer 1994, two years early, and was defeated by Mr. Kuchma. The leaders of the Party of the Regions of Ukraine (PRU) have threatened to push for early presidential elections if the Verkhovna Rada is dissolved and early parliamentary elections are called.
Early presidential elections would lead to the election of either Yulia Tymoshenko or a PRU candidate (if the PRU's candidate was to be Viktor Yanukovych, Ms. Tymoshenko would certainly win the election). Neither candidate would heal Ukraine's regional divide and political polarization. President Yushchenko's amorphousness, indecisiveness and lack of consistency are poor qualities, but they may actually be preferable to the polarizing Mr. Yanukovych or Ms. Tymoshenko.
Besides early presidential elections, a secondary threat to President Yushchenko lies in the anti-presidential stance of the Anti-Crisis Coalition dominated by the anti-presidential-institution left and the anti-Yushchenko PRU. There could be attempts to impeach President Yushchenko, but they are unlikely to be successful, or could lead to a return to the conflict between the executive and Parliament that plagued Ukraine prior to the adoption of the July 1996 Constitution of Ukraine. A return to such a scenario of conflict would take place if Mr. Yanukovych became prime minister; hence, Mr. Yushchenko's adamant refusal to countenance this step.
The left has traditionally opposed the institution of the presidency. The Anti-Crisis Coalition could attempt to abolish the presidency through further constitutional reforms that would transform Ukraine into a full parliamentary republic (where the president is elected by Parliament). Such steps were first proposed by the Kuchma regime in 2003 when constitutional reforms were first discussed. Moldova has been a full parliamentary republic since constitutional reforms were adopted in 2000.
Stability of the Anti-Crisis Coalition
The revived Orange coalition had internal contradictions between the pro-business Our Ukraine (OU), left-wing Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) and right-left Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB). These divisions rested upon ideological and personal rivalries.
Throughout 2005, Petro Poroshenko, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), and Prime Minister Tymoshenko openly dueled over the direction of Ukraine's economic and political policies. Mr. Poroshenko's conflict with Ms. Tymoshenko was deepened by the September 2005 crisis when the head of the Presidential Secretariat, Oleksander Zinchenko, made accusations of corruption against Mr. Poroshenko and other business allies of the president. Although these accusations have never been substantiated in a court of law, they have damaged the reputations and public standing of Mr. Poroshenko and the business wing of OU.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition also is beset by internal divisions. The two left-wing components (the Communist Party of Ukraine [CPU] and the SPU) have different ideologies from the pro-business PRU that is dominated by Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs (grouped in Rynat Akhmetov's Systems Capital Management) and other large businessmen.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition may be able to agree on reviving Kuchma-era multi-vector foreign and security policies, but it will be sharply divided over domestic policies. The PRU's main purpose in entering government is to ensure a halt to further re-privatizations, enforce the sanctity of property rights and ensure that there will be no criminal charges of abuse of office and election fraud stemming from the Kuchma era.
Executive-parliamentary conflict
Until the adoption of the Constitution of 1996, Ukraine - like most CIS states - was plagued by conflict over the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. The formation of an Anti-Crisis Coalition will return Ukraine to those conflicts of the first half of the 1990s.
Constitutional reforms have eroded the power of the president in favor of Parliament. The Anti-Crisis Coalition will control the positions of prime minister and chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The government will be responsible to the Anti-Crisis Coalition, not to the president (unlike in the Kuchma era when the executive controlled the government).
A strong-willed Prime Minister Yanukovych, with the backing of the largest parliamentary faction (PRU), will outplay the more indecisive and weak-willed President Yushchenko. Mr. Yanukovych would become de facto head of state due to the enhanced powers given to the prime minister following constitutional reforms. President Yushchenko also lacks the backing of a functioning Presidential Secretariat and the NSDC, both institutions which are currently ineffectual but, if functioning, could potentially provide him with greater authority vis-à-vis the Anti-Crisis Coalition.
President Yushchenko continues to control the appointment of the security forces and the foreign affairs minister. He has been unwilling, however, to use control over these institutions to impose presidential authority over dissident eastern Ukrainian and Crimean regions or to launch criminal charges against higher members of the former Kuchma regime.
Two Viktors: Round 2
President Yushchenko has failed to formulate a coherent medium- to long-term strategy since the parliamentary elections in March, instead reacting to events as they have unfolded and preferring to stand above the crisis. His radio and press addresses and television interviews have failed to clarify his position on the current crisis.
President Yushchenko eventually stated his preference for an Orange coalition in June - three months following the March elections. Mr. Yushchenko had to have been aware of the OU simultaneously negotiating with its Orange partners and the PRU during the three-month coalition negotiations.
Mr. Yushchenko's position on the crisis of summer 2006, therefore, has gradually evolved and includes the following:
The PRU's strategy has evolved during the three months since the elections. The PRU is seeking legitimacy as a post-Kuchma political party - something it will not achieve in a coalition with the SPU, and especially the CPU. The PRU, therefore, seeks to include OU within its coalition (either in the Anti-Crisis Coalition or in a grand coalition) because only in a coalition with OU can the PRU achieve domestic and international legitimacy.
During the three months of coalition negotiations the PRU offered to give OU the position of prime minister. But the PRU may be now unwilling to do this after the creation of the Anti-Crisis Coalition. OU's position is to join a grand coalition only if the CPU withdraws from the Anti-Crisis Coalition and OU obtains the position of prime minister in return for the PRU obtaining the position of Parliament chairman. This is the same arrangement that OU and the PRU agreed upon during the coalition negotiations, but OU chose instead to go along with an Orange coalition.
The PRU claims that its priorities in any coalition are adopting new legislation on corruption, the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, the opposition, elections, local referendums and foreign policy. The PRU also seeks to secure legal recognition of property rights, an end to re-privatization, state support for business, and the separation of business and politics. Most of these objectives seem laudable but, given the PRU's background and composition, may be unattainable.
Foreign policy implications
The foreign policy section of the Anti-Crisis Coalition program is brief, comprising only half out of seven pages. The program itself was hastily drawn up when the coalition was rapidly created following the collapse of the Orange coalition.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition is seeking to adopt new legislative guidelines on foreign policy, which will bring it into conflict with President Yushchenko, who has stated that he will not countenance any change in foreign policy. Under the new constitutional reforms, the president continues to have the right to conduct foreign policy.
Candidates proposed by Mr. Yushchenko for foreign affairs, defense and internal affairs ministers will be unable to work inside a Yanukovych government. Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk and Acting Defense Minister Anatolii Hrytsenko advocate Ukraine's NATO and European Union (EU) membership and are critical of Russian policies toward Ukraine and the CIS. Internal Affairs Minister Yurii Lutsenko, who resigned from the SPU, has made clear his refusal to work inside a Yanukovych government.
New foreign policy guidelines to be drawn up by the Anti-Crisis Coalition are to stress an "equitable and good neighborly" relationship with Russia by seeking to repair bilateral relations. The PRU has unfairly blamed the deterioration of relations with Russia on the Yushchenko administration. This ignores Russia's intervention in the 2004 elections in support of Mr. Yanukovych and continued Russian hostility toward Ukraine and Georgia, where democratic revolutions have taken place.
The Orange coalition program also calls for a "deepening" of Ukraine's "strategic partnership" with Russia but does so in the same sentence as calls for deepening strategic partnerships with Poland and the United States. The Orange coalition program also points to the need to complete negotiations with Russia over outstanding border issues.
Russia has reacted to the Anti-Crisis Coalition by not raising gas prices in July, as it is entitled to do in keeping with the January gas agreement. The Anti-Crisis Coalition will be unlikely to dissolve the gas agreement - a step that Ms. Tymoshenko had planned to undertake with U.S. backing once she was installed as prime minister.
The PRU in the Anti-Crisis Coalition would be likely to continue negotiations over transferring control over Ukraine's pipelines to an international consortium of Ukraine, Russia and Germany. The SPU partners in the Anti-Crisis Coalition have traditionally opposed this step. The PRU is also not opposed to the continued presence of the non-transparent RosUkrEnergo middle man, as the company was created in July 2004 when Mr. Yanukovych was prime minister.
The foreign policy section of the Anti-Crisis Coalition ignores regional alliances that have been promoted by Ukraine with U.S. support. The Anti-Crisis Coalition would be disinterested in Ukraine's continued participation in the pro-western GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) regional group or the Community of Democratic Choice grouping within the post-Communist world. The Orange coalition program outlines the transformation of GUAM into a "fully fledged international organization" by the end of 2006.
The likelihood of Ukraine being granted membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the fall could be postponed again, as the two left-wing members (SPU and CPU) of the Anti-Crisis Coalition are opposed to the legislation required for WTO membership. The Party of the Regions voted against WTO-required legislation in the 2002-2006 Parliament.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition program fails to mention the WTO. The Orange coalition program, in contrast, outlines the need to complete the adoption of legislation in 2006 that is needed to join the WTO.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition program barely mentions NATO, except to outline that any step toward membership would have to be endorsed by a nationwide referendum. During President Kuchma's second term in office, public support for NATO membership declined from a third to less than 20 percent and opposition has grown from a third to over 50 percent.
President Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine bloc continue to back NATO membership. The Anti-Crisis Coalition does not outline its support for the Kuchma-era level of cooperation with NATO when Ukraine was the most active CIS country in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
The Orange coalition program outlines the need to continue cooperation with NATO and to ensure government support for an information campaign about NATO. The Orange coalition program follows the Anti-Crisis Coalition position that Ukraine's NATO membership should be determined by a referendum.
The presence of three parties opposed to NATO membership in the Anti-Crisis Coalition would be unlikely to lead to an invitation to Ukraine to join a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at NATO'S November summit in Riga. Ukraine joined the Intensified Dialogue on Membership in 2005 following President Yushchenko's visit to the United States.
Ukraine's invitation to NATO membership at the 2008 enlargement summit was already under question following anti-NATO demonstrations in Crimea in June that led to the cancellation of "In the Spirit of PfP" exercises.
NATO is moving toward postponing the 2008 enlargement summit, which the Bush administration lobbied to have coincide with its last year in office, to a later date. Prior to the June demonstrations and the July crisis, Ukraine was to have received a MAP this year, a membership invitation in 2008 and membership in 2010.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition program barely mentions the EU. The program's call for full membership in the EU resembles similar calls made during the Kuchma era, which rested on empty rhetoric without the necessary domestic reforms to ensure that such a step became feasible. The Orange program outlines the aims of the government to bring Ukrainian legislation into line with the EU, to successfully implement the 2005-2007 European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan and to complete by the end of 2006 all of the requirements set out by the Council of Europe.
The Orange coalition program provides a great deal of detail on the steps Ukraine should take toward achieving EU membership. It outlines steps to beginning immediate negotiations toward creating a free trade zone with the EU following Ukraine's membership in the WTO.
The Anti-Crisis Coalition program seeks to "complete" the creation of the CIS Single Economic Space (SES) but that "completion" is never spelled out in the program. During the 2004 presidential and 2006 parliamentary elections, Mr. Yanukovych and the PRU campaigned in favor of greater integration into the SES without spelling out whether they would support the same level of full integration as Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Ukraine's official position on the SES has continued to oppose Stages 2 and 3 - monetary and customs unions. The PRU campaigned in favor of going beyond President Kuchma's stance and supporting Stages 2 and 3, without describing these additional stages. While the CPU's position supporting full CIS integration is longstanding, the SPU might balk at going beyond the first step.
If the Anti-Crisis Coalition continues the policy of agreeing only to join a free trade zone, Russia will continue to oppose agreeing to such a step, arguing that members of the SES need to agree to all three stages. If the Anti-Crisis Coalition were to give in to these Russian demands, it would imperil Ukraine's participation in a customs union with the EU, which Brussels has offered after Ukraine joins the WTO. No country can be in two customs unions at the same time.
In a grand coalition, the PRU should be made to compromise on foreign policy issues in exchange for its strategic domestic priorities (no re-privatization, sanctity of property rights, amnesty for criminal charges stemming from the Kuchma regime). This compromise should include:
Dr. Taras Kuzio, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshal Fund, and adjunct professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, is president of Kuzio Associates.
Kuzio Associates is an independent political-economic consultancy and government communications group with offices in Washington and Kyiv. Kuzio Associates draws upon two decades of expertise by its president, an internationally recognized authority on Ukraine, Central-Eastern Europe and the CIS. Kuzio Associates provides strategic advice to political clients on government relations and strategy, due diligence on Ukrainian companies and investment climate and opportunities in Ukraine.
The above is an edited version of an article that appears in issue No. 1, 2006, of Ukraine Strategic Insider.
CONCLUSION
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 6, 2006, No. 32, Vol. LXXIV
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