Scholars comment on the 15th anniversary of Ukraine's independence (08/20/06)

THE 15th ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

Scholars comment on the 15th anniversary of Ukraine's independence

It has been 15 years since Ukraine declared its independence on August 24, 1991. In that time, Ukraine has followed a difficult path along the road of its democratic evolution. There have been setbacks as well as accomplishments for the nascent country.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 echoed a popular desire for change and, to a large degree, the people's commitment to democratic ideals. However, two years after the revolution, the government appears unable to live up to those high standards.

If anything can been learned from events in Ukraine over the past 15 years, it is that predicting its evolution as a democracy is no easy task. What lies ahead in the next 15 years for Ukraine? It is with exactly this in mind that The Ukrainian Weekly recently questioned Ukrainian scholars and experts.

What follows is the conclusion of a two-part series prepared by Matthew Dubas and Andrew Nynka in which scholars evaluated just how far Ukraine has come on issues of Ukraine's integration with Europe, its development of national identity, and the most recent developments in the government and Verkhovna Rada.

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Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University - Newark and is deputy director of the Center for Global Change and Governance, and co-director of the Central and East European Studies Program. He is the author of six books, the latest being Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (Columbia University Press, 1999) and Imperial Ends: The Decline, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (Columbia University Press, forthcoming). He is also editor of the two-volume Encyclopedia of Nationalism (Academic Press, forthcoming).

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Given Ukraine's past statements on joining European institutions, and since then its lack of movement in that direction, is there a future for Ukraine in Europe? Can Ukraine be taken seriously by Western European institutions? What steps must Ukraine take to be accepted by these institutions? What progress has been made?

Ukraine's future in Europe is assured, because Ukraine is and always has been in Europe. And its links with other European states are growing with every year. The question is: Does Ukraine have a future in the European Union? And the answer to that is: Only if the EU takes itself seriously as a community of democratic values.

The fact is that the EU is terrified of stepping on Russia's sensitive toes and, thus, equally terrified of the prospect of Ukraine possibly joining - even at some point in the very distant future. The EU knows full well that offering states the eventual prospect of membership acts as an accelerator of reform. So why doesn't the EU simply state that Ukraine would be welcome in the EU if and when it fulfills all the EU's membership criteria?

Since that won't happen for a long time - after all, becoming a full-fledged democracy and market economy is no easy task - that's a no-lose, risk-free proposition for the EU. But the EU's lack of will and Germany's spineless behavior toward Moscow prevents Brussels from taking so easy a stand.

Ukraine must, therefore, keep on doing what it has been doing since 1991: moving slowly but surely toward the institutionalization of democracy and the market. That's good, regardless of what the EU does or does not do. Fortunately for Ukraine, the EU's hypocrisy and spinelessness will also deter it from ever telling Ukraine in no uncertain terms that it cannot join.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

The language issue: How important is it for Ukraine to find consensus on the issue of a national language? The use of language - Ukrainian versus Russian, whether in schools, textbooks, the government, etc. - has been and surely will continue to be a hot topic in Ukraine. Is resolving this issue critical for Ukraine? Can Ukraine develop a strong national identity while, at the same time, maintaining both the Russian and Ukrainian language?

The reality in Ukraine is that both Ukrainian and Russian are entrenched, and there is no reason to think that will change. If so, policy has to proceed from that fact. What then should Kyiv do?

Ironically, the PRU [Party of the Regions of Ukraine] suggested the perfect solution to Ukraine's language problems when it declared Russian a "regional language" in several oblasts. Were the Orange camp a tad smarter, it would have pounced on this solution and adopted it as its own. Ukrainian would then have the status of a "state language" and the lingua franca of Ukraine. In turn, Russian, Polish, Belarusian, Crimean Tatar, Hungarian, Rusyn and many other languages spoken by minority groups would have "regional" status. State officials would have to know Ukrainian and some regional language or languages. The media, publishing, education, and culture would also reflect this reality.

And the population of Ukraine would be encouraged to know Ukrainian and to speak whichever language they desire on an everyday basis. Could that lead to a strong sense of political community and national identity? Why not? If other countries can be multilingual, why shouldn't Ukraine?

PARLIAMENT

This year we've seen the Parliament in turmoil and the year of the "crisis." What lessons can be learned from this? How has Parliament changed in the last 15 years? What does it mean for Ukraine to have Viktor Yanukovych as PM? What does this bode for Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies? What do you make of Moroz's "betrayal"? What are the futures of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko?

It's high time to stop using the overwrought term "crisis" (which means a life-threatening condition) and recognize that Ukraine's political system has simply been beset with problems, some big, some small. Of course, all political systems have problems, and once we recognize this fact, we can begin to appreciate that Ukraine looks remarkably like many other countries that chug along with their periodic ups and downs.

Ukraine's primary problems are twofold. The constitutional reform was poorly conceived, leaving too many questions unanswered (and with the absence of a Constitutional Court, that spells trouble). And, even if it had been well-conceived, it would have taken time for inexperienced parties and politicians to adapt to it. But the insufficiently noticed achievement of Ukraine's political system is that its democratic rules of the game are gradually becoming more institutionalized.

For all the mudslinging and cynicism and charges of treason, the fact is that the elections of March 26, the post-electoral maneuverings of the parties, and the ultimate formation of a coalition between the PRU, Our Ukraine, the Socialists and the Communists happened within the Constitution. That is great news.

That means that Prime Minister Yanukovych will be governing a country and a political system that have changed enormously since 2004. We forget, in our breathless obsession with day-to-day politicking, that the Orange Revolution changed Ukraine's institutions, mentality and political culture. Just as Yanukovych and his pals will have to live with that, so too will Moroz, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.

The bottom line is that these individuals do not warrant all the attention they're getting from crisis-mongering analysts here and in Ukraine. We should be focusing on Ukraine and its political and economic institutions, and on how they are changing - and that is generally for the better, regardless of who governs.

PRESIDENCY

With the recent shift in power from president to prime minister, does the prime minister have too much power? Are we likely to see the removal of the office of president? How has the presidency progressed since independence?

Parliamentary systems are generally a good thing, and having powerful prime ministers is also generally a good thing. The real issue is whether the Constitution delineates, with sufficient clarity, how a more powerful prime minister and a still-powerful president are to get along. The present reform doesn't, which means that a Constitutional Court is all the more imperative. By the way, let's remember that the president still possesses enormous power: he appoints a range of ministers, approves the government and can take advantage of the constitutional reform to impose his will on the process. Yushchenko may or may not have done that well, or well enough, but he certainly could have.

Removing the office of the president is in no party's interests - after all, every politician of every party wants to be president and Yushchenko will not be around forever. Threatening to impeach Yushchenko or threatening to abolish the post makes for good political sloganeering, however, so we should expect that to continue.

REFORMS

People believed in the Orange Revolution, few still believe. This disenchanted nature of the Ukrainian people can be equated to the Missouri slogan - "show me." What can Ukraine show the world it has accomplished since it gained independence?

The notion that Ukraine hasn't progressed since 1991 is one of the mostdurable and ridiculous myths. Quite the contrary, today's Ukraine is radically different from Ukraine in 2004 and unrecognizably different from Ukraine in 1991. And Ukraine is better. It has a vigorous press, a robust civil society, a market economy and functioning, though immature, democratic institutions. That's not bad for a country that has ostensiblydone nothing but remain mired in "stagnation" for 15 years.

Naturally, Ukrainians aren't happy with this, because they want their living standards to improve radically and immediately. I would too if I lived there. But radical and immediate change happens only in countries experiencing bloody revolutions, and they never end up changing in the way the population desired.

So Ukraine's snail-like progress is just right: it's going in the right direction and, because its progress is slow, it's going to stick. The main change awaiting Ukraine is membership in the WTO. That'll force the Ukrainian economy to adopt even more market-friendly reforms and, although we shouldn't expect miraculous transformations, that will push Ukraine further along the road toward integration with the global economy.

Significantly, there's consensus in Ukraine on that goal, all the more so since Russia aspires to it as well; hence, in contrast to NATO membership, there is no way that WTO accession can be construed as being anti-Russian.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a senior fellow at the German Marshal Fund of the U.S.A. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the German Marshal Fund. Dr. Kuzio is also an adjunct professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies of George Washington University.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The collapse of the Orange coalition (OC), after three months of negotiations and back-room dealing, suggests that Ukraine could return to the vacuous "multi-vector" foreign policy of the Leonid Kuchma era under the Anti-Crisis Coalition (ACC). Our Ukraine (OU), with the president's consent, ignored U.S. and Western advice and negotiated simultaneously with its Orange partners and with the Party of the Regions (PRU). This led to the defection of the Socialists and the creation of the ACC. For President Viktor Yushchenko and OU it would seem to have been more of a priority to not permit Yulia Tymoshenko to return as PM than to achieve a breakthrough in foreign policy. Ukraine could have now lost its chance of entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) before Russia and of ever joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Following the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko's election, Ukraine was on track to join the WTO and NATO. Ukraine missed its chance of joining the WTO in December 2005 due to the obstruction of the Kuchma-era Parliament and President Yushchenko's weak and delayed strategy to achieve this goal.

The aim of joining the WTO was outlined during President Yushchenko's April 2005 visit to Washington, D.C. But, he did not release a decree to this effect until late May and his parliamentary allies and the Yulia Tymoshenko government only began working on adopting the required legislation in early June. The final month of Parliament before its summer recess on July 8 was insufficient time to adopt all of the required WTO legislation.

There is a possibility that Ukraine could join the WTO in the fall of this year. With an OC this would have been a certainty. With an ACC this is now unclear as all three members of the coalition voted against WTO legislation in the 2002-2006 Parliament.

Ukraine's chances of joining NATO following the election of Yushchenko were the best it ever possessed. During Yushchenko's Washington visit, President George W. Bush successfully lobbied NATO to upgrade Ukraine into the Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues, the stepping stone to a Membership Action Plan (MAP). If the MAP had been successfully implemented, NATO planned to invite Ukraine into membership at its 2008 enlargement summit, followed by actual membership of NATO in 2010.

These plans are now in ruins following the creation of the ACC, whose three members are against NATO membership. The fault lies squarely with President Yushchenko and his OU bloc, who put personal conflicts (with Tymoshenko) above national and state interests of joining NATO.

The European Parliament has lobbied for the EU to change its stance on Ukraine's membership prospects. But, this has been to no avail. The EU has blamed its inability to open the door to Ukraine on its internal crises with Turkish membership, the failure of referendums on adopting the EU constitution and enlargement fatigue.

More detailed answers to this question can be found in my "Is Ukraine's future in Europe?" published in the Washington Quarterly, the journal of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (http://www.twq.com/06summer/docs/06summer_kuzio.pdf).

NATIONAL IDENTITY

The language issue is highly exaggerated as a problem for Ukraine, and is often blown out of all proportion during elections. The reality is that the language issue has been "resolved" for all intents and purposes under the 1989 language law and 1996 Constitution and Council of Europe Charter. In the Universal [of National Unity], Ukrainian will continue to remain the state language while Russian, Hungarian, Romanian and Tatar will continue to be permitted free use in areas of Ukraine where these languages are widely used. This conforms to the Constitution and Council of Europe Charter on Minority and Regional Languages requirements.

When Western scholars and media speak of Ukraine divided into two linguistic groups they miss two crucial points. First, language in Ukraine is not a marker of ethnic identity, unlike in Belgium, Canada or other regions of the world. The majority of Russophones in Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians. Second, the population is divided into three, not two groups. Approximately one-third of Ukrainians are primarily Ukrainophones, another third are Russophones and a final third are bilingual.

The ramifications of this are clearly seen in the political arena. In Kyiv most schools have long used only Ukrainian, yet, one hears more Russian than Ukrainian in Kyiv. At the same time, Kyivites have always voted for national democratic parties and backed the Orange Revolution. In Donetsk most schools are Russian and there are few people who are bilingual. The majority vote for the PRU and opposed the Orange Revolution.

In other areas of nation- and state-building, there has long been an elite consensus. This includes majority support for Ukraine's territorial integrity throughout Ukraine. Regionalism does not translate into separatism, as it does not in many other countries of the world. In education and teaching, national historiography has always been taught, rather than Sovietophile and Russophile texts and theories. This is one area that has been largely ignored by the diaspora. Ukrainian textbooks (which I have been assiduously collecting since the early 1990s) have long included positive coverage of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), even though their political status has still to be resolved.

PARLIAMENT

Constitutional reforms moving Ukraine from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary-presidential system will prove to be positive in the medium to long terms. Successful post-communist democracies have created parliamentary systems while autocracies thrive in the super-presidential systems of Russia and the CIS. In December 2004 all of Ukraine's factions - except the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc - voted for constitutional reforms.

In the short term, it is the opponents of democratization who have gained. Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz, who first initiated constitutional reform proposals, is parliamentary speaker after defecting from the Orange coalition. The Party of the Regions control the parliamentary coalition and government. The prime minister's position has been enhanced. Yushchenko, who won the 2004 elections, is in danger of being sidelined through these constitutional changes and his own inaction, lack of strategy and weak political will.

The first nail in the coffin for the OC came in September 2005 when President Yushchenko disbanded the Tymoshenko government (under the new constitutional reforms the president will no longer have the right to remove the government). The mistake permitted the PRU to soar from an average of 20 percent support in 2006 to over 30 percent in the 2006 elections.

As a consequence of the September crisis, OU came in third place in the 2006 elections with 9 percent fewer votes than in 2002. Because OU had arrogantly assumed it would come in second place (i.e., first in the Orange camp) but in reality came in third, it wished to renege on the informal agreement struck with its Orange partners that whoever came first in the Orange camp could put forward its candidate for PM. OU should have immediately accepted the results and ceded the PM position to Tymoshenko. This is what Roman Bezsmertnyi advised OU to do. Instead, OU chose an alternative path to simultaneously negotiate with its Orange partners and the PRU.

This became a second nail in the OC coffin when, after three months of tortuous negotiations and back-room dealing, an OC finally established itself but collapsed before a government, again led by Tymoshenko, could be created.

Yushchenko is in danger of following Leonid Kravchuk in losing power ahead of the end of his term through early elections. July 2006 polls show that Yushchenko would come third with only 8 to 14 percent in a presidential election held today, trailing Yanukovych at 31 to 36 and Tymoshenko at 20 percent. The position of PM has been enhanced after constitutional reforms, Yanukovych controls the largest parliamentary faction, PRU, and he has greater political will than Yushchenko.

With Yanukovych approved as PM, the PRU will have what it has always sought since 2004; namely, revenge for the "betrayal" by Kuchma of its election victory. The Orange electorate will feel that Yushchenko has "betrayed" the Orange Revolution, as has the Socialist Party, and will flock to Tymoshenko. Calls by diaspora NGOs to rally around Yushchenko are, therefore, out of step with developments in Ukraine.

There is a possibility for the ACC to push ahead with further constitutional reforms to transform Ukraine into a full parliamentary republic (where the president is elected by parliament). The two left-wing members of the ACC would support this move, as would anti-Yushchenko forces inside the PRU.

PRESIDENCY

It would be wrong to ignore many positive advances made since the Orange Revolution in the sphere of democratic rights. At the same time, it would be also true to say that the Yushchenko presidency is largely one of failed and missed opportunities.

A major failure was that Yushchenko was never interested in breaking with the Kuchma era and moving Ukraine decisively ahead, in both the domestic and foreign domains. He reneged on key 2004 election promises of dealing with the oligarchs by separating business and politics and of putting "bandits in prison." Instead of prison, these "bandits" are sitting in Parliament, and are likely to enter government.

Why has this happened? Yushchenko never seriously intended to deal with this issue as he maintained Prosecutor Sviatoslav Piskun in place until October 2005. Piskun is now a PRU deputy. Piskun protected senior Kuchma-era officials from being prosecuted and allowed many of them to flee Ukraine.

Is this issue not important for democratic progress and the rule of law in Ukraine? This question needs to be asked because the Orange Circle has spent the last year arguing in presentations throughout North America that "bandits to prison" did not take place is not a tragedy. The Orange Circle argued that nobody was sentenced for Soviet crimes and therefore, why should there be such an issue over Kuchma-era crimes! This comparison of Soviet and Kuchma-era crimes is morally repugnant. During the Orange Revolution nobody campaigned in favor of putting Soviet war criminals on trial.

The outcome of this inaction on this issue has been a return of Kuchma-era officials into government and Parliament. The rule of law has not progressed as senior Ukrainian officials have once again protected each other from prosecution. They, as in the Kuchma era, are again seen to be above the law. The only individuals to have been charged have been middle- and lower-ranking officials due to the work of the Internal Affairs Ministry headed by Yurii Lutsenko. The Prosecutor's Office, which deals with crimes committed by high-ranking officials, continually fails to initiate any charges.

Contrast these policies to those in Russia under Vladimir Putin. When Putin came to power in 2000 he gave immunity to Borys Yeltsin on condition that he stay out of politics and did not comment to the media. Yushchenko also gave immunity to Kuchma but ignored the part of the deal demanding that he stay out of politics and the media.

Putin also told oligarchs that they could keep what they have but they had to stay out of politics. Most of them abided by this deal; those that did not went into exile or were jailed. In Ukraine there was only one re-privatization and no deal with the oligarchs. In contrast to Russia, oligarchs and big businessmen flocked into the 2006 Ukrainian Parliament.

In Ukraine and in the diaspora there has not been a separation of business and politics but instead a tighter relationship between business and politics than that in the Kuchma era. In Ukraine this is seen by the influx of an even greater number of businessmen into Parliament in each of the five factions. PRU oligarch Rynat Akhmetov sent many of his business managers from his Systems Capital Management companies into Parliament. The large number of businessmen in parliament do not desire to be in opposition to one another or to the government, as businessmen in Ukraine still believe that good relations with the authorities is essential for good business development. The larger number of businessmen in Parliament explains why OU and the PRU felt close enough to each other to hold coalition negotiations.

REFORMS

Ukraine's negative international image changed 180 degrees during the Orange Revolution. Much of this has been squandered since the implosion of the OC in September 2005. The positive international response for Ukraine having conducted a free and fair election in March has been overshadowed by months of failed coalition negotiations between Orange Revolution partners.

What we have now is creeping Ukraine fatigue among the friends of the Orange Revolution in the West who always wanted to see Yushchenko succeed. The summer 2006 crisis, and return of Yanukovych to government, is a crisis of President Yushchenko's own making. It did not have to be like this.

The biggest disappointment will come domestically. Throughout 2005 Ukrainians felt increasingly disappointed by developments inside Ukraine (see the International Foundation for Electoral Systems survey at http://www.ifes.org/publications-detail.html?id=270). Most of the Ukrainians who went on the streets during the Orange Revolution did so because they believed Yushchenko and his team were different from Kuchma-era politicians who were only interested in personal gain. This view has been shattered and we are in danger of a return to the cynicism and apathy of the Kuchma era among Ukrainian citizens.

Dr. Dominique Arel is associate professor of political science and the chair of Ukrainian studies at the University of Ottawa.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

If by "Europe," we mean domestic standards of democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights, and free markets, then there is a definite future for Ukraine in Europe, and the steps that Ukraine must take have been known for more than a decade. Two years ago the Ukrainian government was censoring the broadcast media, intimidating businesses and political opponents, and gearing up for a fraudulent campaign. Tremendous progress has been made on these fronts, especially when compared to the stifling of political contestation in Russia. Yet, as long as the Ukrainian political leadership remains incapable of moving forward with a coherent reform program based on a strong consensus, Ukraine will not be taken very seriously in Brussels.

The Coalition of National Unity, between the Party of the Regions and Our Ukraine, could actually be a step in the right direction - even though most of the Orange electorate does not see it that way - as no meaningful integration into Europe can take place without the support of Eastern elites. If by "Europe," we mean joining NATO, then I don't think Ukraine has a future, and I am not sure it should have one, since the majority of the population, going well beyond an east/west divide, is against it.

In the Universal of National Unity Yushchenko had to accede to Yanukovych's demand that any accession to NATO would have to be approved by referendum. Since it is how other former Communist states joined the military alliance a few years ago, I don't quite understand how Orange politicians can argue that you can dispense with a popular consultation on this fundamental question.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Language is critical because it is linked to identities that seek political recognition. We all know that, outside of western Ukraine, Russian is the socially dominant language in urban areas. In that sense, Ukrainian is effectively a language with a minority status, even though two-thirds of the population claims it as a "native language." Language politics is about creating incentives to speak another language. Russian-speakers will only have an incentive to use Ukrainian if central institutions of the state function in Ukrainian only. Elites from eastern Ukraine have twice agreed to this core principle: in the 1996 Constitution, following an all-night parliamentary session, and in the universal signed in early August, after marathon talks that lasted nearly a week.

The question is whether Russian-speaking citizens can receive the assurance that they can continue using Russian in public in day-to-day with representatives of the state. This is the meaning of these demands in the southeast for having Russian recognized as a "regional" language based on the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. Yushchenko had to concede the latter point in the universal. What this means is that the internal language of the state is Ukrainian, but that citizens - citizens, not civil servants - can choose the language they wish to use in official interactions. A strong national identity is based on confidence, not on whether a single language can be used socially, which in Ukraine cannot happen.

PARLIAMENT

After four months of paralysis, Yanukovych became prime minister in a coalition with Our Ukraine and the Socialists. Since the Orange Revolution, it was not healthy to have a government that was in effect excluding the geographical half of the country from power. The major disappointment in the past year and a half is the poor leadership displayed by the "Orangists," beginning with Yushchenko. But we have to remember the Orange Revolution was about a process - making Ukraine adhere to the "European" standards mentioned above - and not about specific policies. The March elections were fair and free and the media is open.

The Our Ukraine leadership wasted two months before agreeing to the inevitable, i.e. having Tymoshenko as PM since she soundly defeated Our Ukraine in "Orange Country" in March, and then, at the last minute, it wanted to recreate the Poroshenko-Tymoshenko rivalry which proved so disastrous the first time around. Engaging in the character assassination of Moroz, like the Ukrainian media has been prone to do, does not change the basic fact that forcing Petro Poroshenko as speaker [Rada chairman] was the height of ineptitude. The fact that Moroz defected does not constitute some sort of "coup d'état."

This is what coalition politics is all about. Parties join, parties leave. If Moroz's electorate is not satisfied by his choice, there is only one way to find out: at the next elections. The president was certainly not empowered to make that determination in lieu of the electorate. Our Ukraine was thus forced into a coalition with the Regions, and that could turn out to be the best outcome for Ukraine. Tymoshenko, meanwhile, is playing the populist card of purity. She will lead a vigorous opposition in Parliament, which is also very healthy for an open political system.

PRESIDENCY

It is too early to pass judgment on the new arrangement of powers between the president and the PM, especially since it is an experiment in progress. The president controls the three power ministries - Foreign Affairs, Defense and Internal Affairs - and one should note that the inclusion of the Internal Ministry to the presidential jurisdiction was a last-minute concession by the Party of the Regions, as it did not figure in the 2004 constitutional amendments. The major structural problem in Ukrainian politics has been the uncertain delimitation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, which led to the de facto creation of parallel governments encroaching on each other in the Tymoshenko-Poroshenko interlude.

On August 4, after finally filling the quorum of judges in the Constitutional Court, Parliament forbade the court from revisiting the 2004 amendments. It goes without saying that this vote is of extremely dubious constitutional validity, but the experiment of shared presidential-parliamentary powers can hardly move forward if there remains uncertainty on whether the political compromise that led this demarcation of powers in the first place could be overturned at any moment by the court. The real problem, which was not addressed by the 2004 amendments, are the undefined powers of the Prosecutor General, an office which has retained its Soviet practice of "reviewing" court decisions, which amounts to placing itself above the law. The office of the presidency is not in danger, since it is hard to foresee that a constitutional majority could ever be mustered for its termination.

REFORMS

There is little doubt that we all expected so much more from the Orange government. Yushchenko can't seem to be able to make a decision when it is time to act, and the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko people don't trust each other. You can't have effective reforms in such an environment. Yet we have to put our disillusionment in perspective.

Ukrainian democracy is immature when compared to the West, and even Central Europe, but it still remains a far better alternative than the restoration of autocracy in Russia or the sorry spectacle of a provincial despot in Belarus. Or, for that matter - the "blackmail state" under Kuchma.

Yanukovych himself, even as a comeback prime minister, knows that he will be constrained in his actions - by the political opposition, the presidential administration, the media and international expectations - in ways that he couldn't have imagined two years ago. That, in itself, is an accomplishment. Unlike Russia, no "vertikal" of authority can be recreated in Ukraine.

Elites from eastern and western Ukraine are forced to compromise, and they will now attempt to work together within a government. If this produces a political paralysis, the same way the Our Ukraine-Tymoshenko marriage produced a paralysis, then we should all become very worried. But I remain optimistic on that score.

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