Europe. That’s what 2013 was all about for Ukraine and its people. This was the year that Ukraine was to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. There were stops and starts along the way – with Ukraine delivering on some issues, but refusing to budge on others (e.g., the release of imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko). Nonetheless, the administration of President Viktor Yanukovych repeatedly stated that Kyiv was moving toward Europe. In the end, however, Yanukovych and company decided not to sign the agreement, opting instead for a deal with Russia.
The year began with news of the latest report from Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2013” noted a noteworthy decline in freedoms in Ukraine. Freedom House wrote: “With Russia setting the tone, Eurasia (consisting of the countries of the former Soviet Union minus the Baltic states) now rivals the Middle East as one of the most repressive areas on the globe. Indeed, Eurasia is in many respects the world’s least free subregion, given the entrenchment of autocrats in most of its 12 countries. The authoritarian temptation poses a threat even in Eurasian countries with recent histories of dynamic, if erratic, democratic governance. Thus, Ukraine suffered a decline for a second year due to the politically motivated imprisonment of opposition leaders, flawed legislative elections, and a new law favoring the Russian-speaking portion of the population.”
In mid-year, Freedom House released another report, this one the “Nations in Transit” annual assessment of democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, which noted a “troubling deterioration” of civil society in Eurasia. More specifically, the report said that Ukraine’s parliamentary elections were marked by political persecutions, legal manipulations, bribery and other official abuses.
By the end of the year, Freedom House was saying President Yanukovych should resign as a way to trigger early presidential elections – the only non-violent way to end the standoff with tens of thousands of demonstrators on the Euro-Maidan. Further use of force by Ukrainian authorities should lead to the immediate imposition of targeted sanctions by the United States and European Union against Ukrainian officials responsible for such actions, Freedom House said on December 9, adding that the international community must stand with the democratic aspirations of those brave Ukrainian people who had taken to the streets. “President Yanukovych has lost support and legitimacy among the Ukrainian people,” stated David J. Kramer, president of Freedom House. “We don’t support rule by mob, but Yanukovych created a crisis by rejecting the path toward integration with the EU and ignoring protesters’ demands that the government work on behalf of the people.”
Regime consolidates power
Throughout 2013, the Yanukovych regime was busy consolidating its power. It began with the appointment of a new Cabinet of Ministers, which held its first meeting on January 9. As our Kyiv correspondent characterized it, “it’s all in the ‘family.’” (Donbas Oblast natives associated with the Yanukovych family were increasingly being referred to collectively as “the family.”) Though there was speculation that Prime Minister Mykola Azarov would be replaced by a Yanukovych family insider, Serhiy Arbuzov, the president tapped the latter as first vice prime minister. The core group in the Cabinet directly representing the Yanukovych family interests was identified by observers as the “Big Six,” consisting of Mr. Arbuzov, Energy and Coal Production Minister Eduard Stavytskyi, Internal Affairs Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko, Finance Minister Yurii Kolobov, Agrarian Policy Minister Mykola Prysiazhniuk and the leader of the newly created Revenue and Duties Ministry, Oleksander Klymenko. “Their integration into the government testifies to the complete loss of trust by Yanukovych to outsiders,” wrote Serhii Leshchenko, one of Ukraine’s most recognized political reporters. “He agrees to trust with his future only those with whom he earned money during these last years in government.”
Vladimir Gontar/UNIAN
Demonstrators demand freedom for Yulia Tymoshenko during a protest held near the Pechersk Raion Court in Kyiv on August 5, marking the second anniversary of her imprisonment.
In addition, Mr. Yanukovych tapped several associates of Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s most influential businessman, a member of the Party of Regions who is believed to be among its chief sponsors. These associates included Oleksander Vilkul, vice prime minister for infrastructure, utilities and maintenance; Ihor Prasolov, minister of economic development and trade; and Volodymyr Kozak, minister of infrastructure.
Soon thereafter, the president appointed a new chair of the National Bank of Ukraine: Ihor Sorkin, who was known to have longstanding ties with Donbas business clans and whose wife was the deputy chair of the board of UkrBiznesBank, which is owned by Oleksander Yanukovych, the president’s elder son.
Indeed, Oleksander Yanukovych, a dentist and economist, had accumulated assets valued at about $210 million – most of that since his father became president. Various news media reported that his business empire included banking, real estate, construction, wholesale trade in fuel, coal exports and champagne production. Observers of the political scene, like Dr. Oleh Soskin of the Institute of Society Transformation in Kyiv, said the Yanukovych family was increasing its assets and planning to rule Ukraine for a long time.
Later in the year, on July 6, the Central Election Commission elected as its chairman Mykhailo Okhendovskyi, who was renowned for his role during the 2004 Orange Revolution for defending the CEC in the courts when the presidential election’s second round was ruled as fraudulent. He had remained on the CEC in the eight years since as a commissioner from the Party of Regions quota. Observers said his election, and the fact that he replaced a relatively impartial chairman, was yet another signal that the regime was trying to ensure the re-election of Mr. Yanukovych to a second term in 2015.
Serhij Marchenko
A view of the May 18 demonstration in Kyiv held by opposition forces as part of the “Rise Up, Ukraine!” initiative.
The Constitutional Court was the next object of President Yanukovych’s interest. As our Kyiv correspondent reported, the president thus took the final step towards ensuring control of the key governmental organs necessary for maintaining power following the 2015 presidential elections, which were already expected to be extremely contentious and possibly violent. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine voted on July 18 to appoint as its head Viacheslav Ovcharenko, a native of Yenakiyeve, the president’s hometown.
Reacting to the CEC and court appointments, Petro Leshchuk, a political science lecturer at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, commented: “These people proved their devotion to not just anyone, but to Yanukovych personally. Okhendovskyi defended him in the turbulent days of the winter of 2004, while Ovcharenko ‘lost’ the case materials of the president’s ‘complicated youth.’ These are his people. Only he could have given the command to appoint them.” The reference to “complicated youth” was about Mr. Yanukovych’s two criminal convictions: one at age 17 for theft and the second at age 19 for inflicting bodily injury.
If the growing influence of the “the family” wasn’t bad enough, in June readers of The Ukrainian Weekly learned that Ukraine’s leaders were using thugs to do their dirty work. President Yanukovych and the Party of Regions used Adidas-clad “gopniki” to intimidate political opponents. Some gopniki (a Russian word used to denote impoverished, often criminal, elements of society) are well-trained athletes, or “sportsmeny,” while others are bony alcoholics, reported Zenon Zawada.
Oligarchs often hire thugs with tainted pasts to serve as their bodyguards or to carry out violent raids on targeted properties. However, the Yanukovych administration gave gopniki new opportunities, putting their “talents” to use in persecuting the political opposition, usually with violence. Law enforcement organs also used gopniki-sportsmeny to assist them. For example, during the April 15 protests at Mr. Yanukovych’s grandiose Mezhyhiria residence – which has come to symbolize the corruption of his regime – the police dressed recruits in black uniforms without any identifying badges to push about 50 protesters far from Mezhyhiria’s gates, before Berkut special forces flew in to encircle them.
Hiring thugs is useful because they shift the responsibility for violence against the public away from the government, said Dr. Alexander Motyl, a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark and a Ukraine expert. “The dictatorial state always claims to be fulfilling the ‘real’ wishes of the people,” he told The Weekly, referring to such governments in general. “To use the police against the people would undermine the legitimacy of the state needlessly, as one can draw on thugs to do the dirty work.”
Developments in Gongadze case
Meanwhile, there were developments in the murder case of journalist Heorhii Gongadze as a former police officer, Oleksii Pukach, was sentenced to life in prison on January 30 – more than 12 years after the journalist’s killing. The Kyiv district court that heard the case for about a year and a half reached the conclusion that it was Lt. Gen. Pukach who wrapped and tightened a belt around Gongadze’s throat like a noose, while ordering another officer to kick him in the stomach until he stopped breathing.
When asked whether he agreed with the verdict, Mr. Pukach dropped a bombshell on the courtroom, declaring that former President Leonid Kuchma and former Verkhovna Rada Chair Volodymyr Lytvyn were involved in ordering Gongadze’s murder. “I will agree with it when Kuchma and Lytvyn will be with me together in this cage,” Mr. Pukach blurted out. Indeed, news reports said Mr. Pukach had identified Messrs. Kuchma and Lytvyn in court testimony from 2011 as having ordered the murder.
The Tymoshenko case
For Yulia Tymoshenko, the year began with a statement from the Procurator General’s Office that she could face life imprisonment for her alleged role in the murder of a lawmaker 16 years earlier. On January 18 Ms. Tymoshenko was notified that she was suspected of having ordered the killing of businessman and legislator Yevhen Shcherban; Procurator General Viktor Pshonka said investigators had found enough evidence that Ms. Tymoshenko, together with former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, had ordered Shcherban’s slaying. Ms. Tymoshenko’s lawyer Serhiy Vlasenko rejected the new accusations as absurd.
Less than two months later, on March 6, came a Kyiv court ruling that stripped Mr. Vlasenko of his national deputy’s mandate. The Kyiv Higher Administrative Court ruled that Mr. Vlasenko violated the law by moonlighting as Ms. Tymoshenko’s defense attorney while at the same time serving as a national deputy in Parliament. As his defense, Mr. Vlasenko cited a legal technicality, stating that he’d been defending Ms. Tymoshenko as a civic defender, not as an attorney, which anyone can do. Mr. Vlasenko said it was likely he would be arrested now that his legal immunity was gone. U.S. and European officials said the action taken against Mr. Vlasenko was yet another example of politically motivated prosecutions of opposition leaders.
Ms. Tymoshenko’s daughter, Eugenia, told RFE/RL on August 2 that her mother needed immediate surgery and “such treatment can only be conducted by independent doctors outside Ukraine.” In June, a group of German physicians had examined Ms. Tymoshenko at a clinic in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, where she had been undergoing treatment for back pain since May 2012.
Protesters held a rally in Kyiv on August 5 to mark the second anniversary of the opposition leader’s arrest. Activist Yuriy Bakal said the demonstrators gathered in Kyiv to protest Ms. Tymoshenko’s “politically motivated” imprisonment. “Some concerned people have gathered here – people who, like most people in the country, believe that [Tymoshenko] was convicted unjustly,” Mr. Bakal said. “Why is she still in prison? Because we don’t live in a democratic country. All democratic countries have already recognized that her prosecution was politically motivated.”
Ukrainian lawmaker Mykola Tomenko of the Batkivshchyna faction was among the demonstrators on August 5. He said, “The opposition’s immediate goal is to give Tymoshenko an opportunity to receive medical care abroad, particularly in Germany. But our ultimate goal remains the same as before: It’s not just Tymoshenko’s release from prison, but it is her participation in the next presidential election.”
At year’s end, despite all the urgings and pressure of the European Union (see subsection “Europe or Russia?”), the United States and other international actors, Ms. Tymoshenko remained in the Kachanivska prison in Kharkiv.
Putin’s designs on Ukraine
Throughout the year, Vladimir Putin and company were making clear their designs on Ukraine. In July, when Ukraine was celebrating the 1,025th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus’, the Russian president visited Kyiv on July 27 for the ceremonies there and Sevastopol on July 28, purportedly for Naval Fleet Day. In between all the ceremonies, however, Mr. Putin took up the task of appealing to Ukrainians – both government officials and the public – to abandon the European Union. He used economic arguments, as well as the standard lines offered up by Russians such as “friendship between Slavic brotherly nations.” Speaking at the military ceremony in Crimea, he said: “Today all of you are marching in the military parade in a single uniform, signifying strength and devotion to the principles of our ancestors, who lived together for centuries, worked and defended a common homeland, having made it mighty, great and undefeatable.”
Celebrations of the 1,025th anniversary of the Christianization of Kyivan Rus’ by Grand Prince Volodymyr were ostensibly a religious affair, but it was even more of an occasion for Russian leaders – both political and ecclesiastical – to promote their concept of the “Russkii Mir,” or “Russian World.” Part of that worldview, of course, is that Ukraine belongs in that “world” and must be brought back into the fold.
President Putin repeatedly cited what he called the “spiritual unity” and “common roots” of the Ukrainian and Russian nations, at one point stating: “We are all spiritual heirs of what happened here 1,025 years ago. And in this sense we are, without a doubt, one people.” And, the Russian leader argued that Ukraine should reconsider entering into the EU Association Agreement and opt for the Eurasian Union instead – a move he claimed would be more beneficial to Ukraine.
Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, meanwhile, spoke of the concept of “Holy Rus” – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus united under one faith. (It is important to recall here that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate is one of the largest constituent parts of the ROC; thus, the Moscow patriarch is keenly interested in keeping the UOC-MP under his control, especially as other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches are independent.) Observers noted that the Kyiv trip of the Russian president and the Russian patriarch was the latest sign of the deepening ties between the state and Church in Russia, as well as their shared agenda.
When that type of “soft” persuasion did not work, just a day after Mr. Putin’s trip, Russia announced a ban on all chocolate imports made by Ukraine’s biggest confectionary producer, Roshen. The owner of Roshen, Petro Poroshenko, just happened to be one of the biggest advocates of Ukraine signing an Association Agreement with the EU. The ban on Roshen – ostensibly due to health concerns about ingredients in the chocolates – was just one shot fired in the trade war between Russia and Ukraine, in which each levied import duties on the other’s products.
In August, the trade war intensified as Russia increased its pressure against Ukraine. RFE/RL reported that, at midnight on August 13-14, commercial traffic leaving Ukraine for Russia ground to a halt. Russian officials began demanding that trucks be completely unloaded, inspected item by item and then reloaded. They began seizing and questioning the authenticity of documentation. According to the Ukrainian Employers Union, a trade association that represents many of Ukraine’s largest exporters, border officials said Moscow had declared all goods from Ukraine to be “high risk.”
In late November, after Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution halting work toward the signing of an Association Agreement with the European Union, Vice Prime Minister Yurii Boiko described the economic damage inflicted on Ukrainian industry by the Russian trade battles initiated in August, which he estimated at $3.75 billion to $5 billion in lost trade. Russian tactics, he said, included, but were not limited to, denying required certifications for the Customs Union market, rejecting products for alleged safety concerns (Roshen sweets), delaying customs procedures that result in delivery delays and refusing to renew customs duty-free agreements (Interpipe pipes). Such restricted trade with Russia had caused industrial production to fall for four consecutive months, resulting in mass layoffs, which Mr. Boiko estimated at 15,000 jobs per month. “We almost completed the program of introducing European standards, and yet we didn’t get a signal from our European partners that the incurred losses will be compensated with new markets,” he said. “I underline: we didn’t make an issue of a financial aid grant, as Greece did. We merely requested a replacement of [lost] trade.” (More about Russian pressure on Ukraine appears in the section below.)
Europe or Russia?
The question for most of 2013 was would Ukraine sign an Association Agreement with the European Union or not. It would be, as many analysts characterized it, a civilizational choice. As the year began, Moscow was becoming frustrated with Kyiv seeking to pursue closer ties with Europe while simultaneously seeking benefits provided by the Russian-controlled Customs Union. A Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry official stated on January 1 that Ukraine could not have it both ways.
At about the same time, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule told RFE/RL that Ukraine would have to deliver on some issues if the Association Agreement was to become reality later in the year. Indeed, on February 7, Mr. Fule visited Kyiv and set a November deadline for Ukraine to fulfill its obligations for signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement – especially in three key areas: adoption of a new election law, judicial reform and elimination of selective prosecution. “We can’t wait. The window of opportunity is open now,” he told the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. “Because if we, Ukraine and the EU, allow the November deadline to pass, there won’t be anything similar. There won’t be a December deadline or a January 2014 deadline.” If the November deadline was not met, the agreement with the EU would be shelved for no earlier than 2016, Mr. Fule added.
On February 25, President Yanukovych traveled to Brussels to meet with European Union leaders. The EU gave him a list of 11 tasks that he needed to complete by mid-May if the Association Agreement was to be signed in November. Among the most challenging tasks was the release of opposition leaders Yurii Lutsenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, seen as prime examples of how Ukraine’s leaders meted out “selective justice.”
Meanwhile, some observers of the political scene said President Yanukovych was flirting with Moscow to make the EU amenable to more compromises, using a strategy of playing the West against Russia that had been employed by President Kuchma. In fact, the Yanukovych administration appeared to be testing the EU’s patience every step of the way.
On March 4, meeting with President Putin in Moscow, President Yanukovych seemed to have succeeded in getting Russia to back down from its insistence that Ukraine join the Customs Union. In recent weeks, Russian officials had expressed their willingness to consider other forms of cooperation, and the Yanukovych administration appeared as close as ever to renting the country’s natural gas transit system to the Russians, which some observers warned would be the most significant sacrifice of national sovereignty to the Russians since the 2010 Kharkiv agreements. Soon thereafter there were reports that Kyiv was proposing a plan for “associate membership” in the Customs Union for Ukraine and that Mr. Yanukovych had ordered the preparation by mid-July of a plan of cooperation with the Customs Union.
There were two developments in April in the Tymoshenko and Lutsenko cases that affected Ukraine’s EU prospects. The European Court of Human Rights concluded on April 30 that Ms. Tymoshenko’s detention before and during her trial on abuse of office charges was arbitrary and constituted a violation of her rights. And on April 7, President Yanukovych signed a decree pardoning former Internal Affairs Minister Lutsenko after he had served 27 months of his four-year sentence for abusing his authority. Also pardoned was former Environment Minister Heorhii Filipchuk.
The pardons were seen as a hopeful sign that perhaps a similar resolution could be found in the Tymoshenko case, and calls continued for her release, including from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the United States and former members of Ukraine’s Parliament.
European Commissioner Fule wrote on Twitter: “I welcome very much President Yanukovych’s decision to pardon Lutsenko and Filipchuk. This is the first but important step to deal with the problem of selective justice.” Mr. Yanukovych released Mr. Lutsenko thanks only to pressure from the European Union leadership and the skillful diplomacy of former European Parliament President Pat Cox and former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who tirelessly negotiated with him. In the view of political commentator Prof. Ihor Losiev of the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Mr. Yanukovych finally released Mr. Lutsenko “to throw them a bone and get them off his back.”
In late April our Kyiv correspondent reported that Ukraine was perilously close to missing the EU’s May 15 deadline. The reality was that pro-EU parliamentary opposition had blockaded the Parliament instead of working with the majority to pass legislation. Opposition deputies accused the government of provoking the blockade by failing to approve elections for the Kyiv City Council and its chair (mayor) in June, as required by the Constitution of Ukraine. In turn, Prime Minister Azarov accused the opposition of undermining the Association Agreement. At the same time, Party of Regions national deputies were repeatedly absent from meetings of the parliamentary Committee on Euro-Integration Issues, undermining its quorum.
Nonetheless, the European Commission, meeting on May 15, approved a draft proposal by the EU Council to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine.
Then, on May 18, the Yanukovych administration once again undermined progress toward the EU with its handling of a demonstration led by the opposition: rights to freedom of assembly were violated, and journalists and protesters were attacked in Kyiv during the “Rise Up, Ukraine” initiative. In addition, scores of buses and trains were prevented from traveling to Kyiv for the demonstration.
Continuing to play his game of courting both sides, President Yanukovych was in the southern Russian city of Sochi on May 26 for informal talks with President Putin. Mr. Yanukovych arrived for discussions centered on bilateral relations within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both presidents were to attend the Eurasian Economic Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on May 28-29. Ukraine was now seeking observer status in the Eurasian Customs Union, and Foreign Affairs Minister Leonid Kozhara said Ukraine was seeking to join all the Customs Union agreements that did not contradict its obligations to the EU.
Just a few days later, on May 31, in Minsk, Prime Minister Azarov signed a memorandum with the Moscow-based Eurasian Economic Commission – the executive organ of the Customs Union – that deepened cooperation between that supranational structure and the Ukrainian government. Its provisions allowed Ukrainian officials to attend certain meetings, observe decision-making and become familiar with the content of certain rulings, though without any voting power. A particularly troubling phrase called for officials “to refrain from actions or statements against the interests of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space.”
After the memorandum signing, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stressed that the memorandum was only the first step toward Ukraine’s integration “We welcome this step, but we understand that if our partners want to participate in our Eurasian Economic Union, they are supposed to approve a whole series of very complex, sometimes unpopular decisions. All decisions at that, not just part of them.” (The existing Customs Union was scheduled to morph into the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015.)
EU leaders said they weren’t aware of the Ukrainian government’s plans to sign the memorandum and they sent a letter to the Ukrainian government requesting a meeting to discuss Ukraine’s obligations to the Customs Union. Besides interfering with conditions of the EU Association Agreement, critics said the memorandum could interfere with Kyiv’s obligations to the World Trade Organization, of which Ukraine is a member.
By late-May to mid-June, key leaders of the European Union were expressing their lack of confidence that an agreement would be signed with Ukraine. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius said on May 29 that the EU leadership would not sign the Association Agreement if it had to decide today. Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said on June 15 at the Wroclaw Global Forum: “We offered the Association Agreement to Ukraine, but we still don’t know whether it will be signed or if Ukraine will be ready for it.” It should be noted that these comments came from two of Ukraine’s strongest supporters.
On June 19, President Yanukovych held his first meeting with the opposition since the 2012 parliamentary elections. Only one of the country’s three opposition leaders opted to attend the meeting, which also included representatives of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Arseniy Yatsenyuk presented a list of demands signed by all three opposition factions – Batkivshchyna, which he represented; UDAR, headed by Vitali Klitschko; and Svoboda, led by Oleh Tiahnybok. Their main demands were to arrange for Ms. Tymoshenko’s release and to ensure Ukraine’s signing of the EU Association Agreement.
At the end of July, Rikard Jozwiak of RFE/RL rightfully noted: “Ukraine is the most unpredictable country of the current ex-Soviet aspirants. On one hand, Kyiv has reached further than any of the other five in that its Association Agreement and DCFTA [Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement] have already been initialed. But questions remain whether they will be signed at the Vilnius summit and, even then, whether the text will be ratified by all EU member states. EU leaders say they want to see Ukraine complete a number of electoral and judicial reforms – especially to address concerns over selective justice.”
In late August Ukraine’s top leaders seemingly eliminated any doubt that they supported signing an agreement with the EU. As they did so, they faced not only ever-increasing pressure tactics from Russia, but mounting opposition at home. In an August 29 interview with TV journalists, President Yanukovych said: “The autumn of this year will finalize everything,” he said, as reported by the presidential website. “We will fulfill all the conditions, of that I don’t have any doubt. I don’t see any obstacles today to signing this document. Therefore, I’m hoping the time will come and the decision will be made.” A day earlier, opening the weekly meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, Mr. Azarov stated: “After signing the Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine will create a free trade zone with the EU,” he said. “That has to be accepted as reality.” Both leaders offered assurances that Ukraine would maintain close economic ties with Russia.
The Communist Party reacted strongly, with Chairman Petro Symonenko saying, “I want to warn you again that you are committing a crime.” Speaking in Parliament on September 3, he argued: “You will completely destroy the economic sovereignty of our state. …You will be transporting products from Europe at zero tariffs, but the Ukrainian producer will be transporting at those [prices] that he had been selling them for. Well, why are you making fools out of the Ukrainian people? Control all these issues first, protect the Ukrainian producer, and then talk about European values.” The Communist Party said it would begin collecting signatures to hold a referendum on the Customs Union. Additionally, a handful of Party of Regions national deputies declared they wouldn’t support the Association Agreement, also raising the possibility of forming a parliamentary group for the Customs Union.
On September 18, the Cabinet unanimously approved the draft of an Association Agreement with the European Union. According to RFE/ERL, the head of the EU delegation in Ukraine, Jan Tombinski, told reporters in Kyiv that the agreement’s approval represented an “important step” by the Ukrainian government and that its signing at a summit in Vilnius in November “will be a joint success of all citizens of Ukraine and the EU.” On Twitter, EU Enlargement Commissioner Fule called the move “clear proof” of Kyiv’s “European choice.” Prime Minister Azarov said the agreement raised the prospect of “a European quality of life” for Ukraine. He said Kyiv would meet the criteria for democratic progress laid down by the EU as preconditions for signing the document. However, he said not a word about the Tymoshenko matter, which remained a huge sticking point as far as the EU was concerned.
Once again, just as things appeared to be moving in the right direction, on September 25 came a report that the EU had set, then reset, the deadline for approval of an Association Agreement with Ukraine. November 18 was now the day when the EU Foreign Affairs Council would meet to decide on whether the European Union should sign an Association Agreement with Ukraine, reported European Member of Parliament Pawel Zalewski. That was just 10 days before the Vilnius summit. The postponement of the deadline meant the EU and Kyiv had not reached a compromise on the Tymoshenko case. But, it was also a signal – yet another one – to Ukraine that the EU was ready to remain flexible and that Kyiv could choose the path in resolving this issue. There were indications also that the EU would be willing to sign the agreement even if the opposition leader was not released, perhaps if there was at least some movement toward that happening.
Striking an urgent tone in his speech at the Yalta European Strategy conference on September 21, former Polish President Kwasniewski pointed to the solution proposed months ago by him and former European Parliament President Cox who had made 21 visits to Ukraine, totaling 90 days, since launching their diplomatic mission in June 2012. “Tymoshenko is sick. She needs an operation, afterwards therapy, afterwards rehabilitation,” Mr. Kwasniewski said. “We hope that she will go abroad,” he added, stressing that Ms. Tymoshenko doesn’t trust Ukrainian doctors to treat her. “We hope the Ukrainian government accepts the proposal that was prepared many months ago.”
As of the end of October, the EU and Kyiv remained deadlocked on the Tymoshenko issue. Mr. Yanukovych was still rejecting the EU’s proposal that he issue a pardon to Ms. Tymoshenko, which would allow her to be active in the 2015 presidential campaign, but would not permit her to run. Meanwhile, the EU offered another solution in an October 4 letter to the Ukrainian president, suggesting an amnesty for the opposition leader “out of concern for her medical care and humanitarian grounds.” On October 15, Mr. Kwasniewski went as far as to suggest a “partial pardon,” whereby her prison sentence would be reduced from seven years to two, meaning the time she had already served. But Mr. Yanukovych continued to insist that Ukrainian law does not allow him to grant a pardon. He did appear to be open to compromise when he said on October 17 that, if the Verkhovna Rada was to pass a law ensuring Ms. Tymoshenko’s release, he would sign it.
Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Sikorski confirmed that the foreign affairs ministers of the Netherlands, Great Britain and Sweden would vote against signing the Association Agreement if Ms. Tymoshenko wasn’t released. “Very little time is left and the risk of not signing is very large,” Mr. Sikorski said at a press conference on October 22 in Kyiv after meeting with Mr. Yanukovych. “There’s no more time for bluffing. There’s time left for actions.”
As the date of the Vilnius summit drew ever nearer, the Party of Regions was undermining the chances for the Association Agreement’s signing. Rather than work on a compromise, the Party of Regions parliamentary faction was avoiding meetings and upping the ante, ignoring big concessions offered by the EU and the imprisoned Ms. Tymoshenko. Both the EU and the former prime minister voiced support for a bill submitted in Parliament by independent National Deputy Anzhelika Labunska which would give prisoners the right to seek medical treatment abroad if they spent at least a year of uninterrupted treatment that didn’t result in a full recovery. Upon ruling on a convict’s treatment abroad, a judge would also have to rule on whether to grant the convict freedom, which wouldn’t require overturning the conviction. Freedom could be granted if a convict was determined to be in ill health. At the same time, the Ukrainian government filed criminal complaints against Ms. Tymoshenko in American and Swiss courts.
Meanwhile, President Yanukovych met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for five hours on October 27 in the resort city of Sochi, reportedly to hear the Kremlin’s last-minute pitch for Kyiv to drop the EU.
On November 13, the EU leadership decided to postpone the singing of the Association Agreement until “the last seconds before” the Eastern Partnership Summit scheduled for Vilnius on November 28-29, said Pawel Kowal, chair of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee in the European Parliament. Until that time, the EU diplomatic mission of Messrs. Kwasniewski and Cox was to continue working on a compromise in the Tymoshenko case. “The likelihood of signing the agreement is less than 50 percent,” commented Volodymyr Fesenko, board chairman of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research in Kyiv.
Meanwhile, foreign affairs ministers of EU countries on November 18 issued an appeal to President Yanukovych to take action in the Tymoshenko matter. German Foreign Affairs Minister Guido Westerwelle issued an urgent appeal to Ukraine to act. “We want Ukraine to orientate itself toward the EU, but the conditions have to be right,” he said. “That is, above all, the rule of law and for that the Tymoshenko case surely has a particular significance. I urgently call on Ukraine to act and to unify in a practicable way toward the rule of law, and not play for time. The clock is ticking, time is running out, and everyone in Ukraine should be aware of this.” Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Linkevicius, whose country held the rotating presidency of the EU, indicated that Mr. Yanukovych had to show decisiveness and said that the “moment of truth” had arrived for Ukraine.
Vladimir Gontar/UNIAN
Former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski (left) and former European Parliament Chair Pat Cox, leaders of the EU’s diplomatic mission to Ukraine, at the November 13 extraplenary session of the Verkhovna Rada.
On November 21, Mr. Kwasniewski said it was over: Kyiv would not sign the AA in Vilnius. The Ukrainian government had decided to suspend preparations for the deal with the EU, purportedly due to concerns about “national security.” A government statement said the process was halted in order to fully analyze the impact of the planned agreement on industrial production and trade with Russia. At the same time, the government proposed setting up a tripartite commission on trade to include Ukraine, the EU and Russia.
The resolution was not submitted to the European Union (EU) as the Ukrainian government’s official position and therefore lacked any international standing, leaving the door open for a final decision from Mr. Yanukovych, who as Ukraine’s president was designated as the final authority on the country’s foreign policy decisions. “Ukraine has gone and will continue to go on the path of Euro-integration,” the president said during a working visit to Vienna on November 21. Opposition leaders called for the resignation of Prime Minister Azarov and his Cabinet and President Yanukovych’s impeachment should he fail to sign the agreement in Vilnius. In that event, they also asked the EU leadership to impose sanctions on the members of his administration. “We are tired of betrayals, disappointments, poverty and lawlessness,” declared Oleksander Turchynov, the close political confidante of imprisoned former Prime Minister Tymoshenko. “We want to live in a normal, civilized European state where there’s freedom of speech, respect for people and their rights, where everyone is equal before the law.”
Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, issued a statement in Brussels on November 21: “…This is a disappointment not just for the EU but, we believe, for the people of Ukraine. The reforms adopted over the last months have been far-reaching. The signing of the most ambitious agreement the EU has ever offered to a partner country would have further enhanced the reform course of Ukraine and sent a clear signal to investors worldwide, as well as to international financial institutions that Ukraine is serious about its modernization pledge and becoming a predictable and reliable interlocutor for international markets. …We believe that the future for Ukraine lies in a strong relationship with the EU, and we stand firm in our commitment to the people of Ukraine who would have been the main beneficiaries of the agreement through the enhanced freedom and prosperity the agreement would have brought about.”
Plans for halting the agreement were reached together with Russian officials and in advance of the November 21 resolution, it was learned. Mr. Yanukovych had held two confidential meetings with Mr. Putin, on October 27 and November 9, the details of which were unknown. Mr. Azarov had met with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev on November 20, though officials denied they had reached any agreement.
The Euro-Maidan
The Cabinet resolution adopted on November 21 ignited the largest mass demonstration in Kyiv since the Orange Revolution of 2004, drawing between 100,000 and 200,000 Ukrainians on November 24 to Kyiv’s European Square to demand the resolution’s cancellation and the Association Agreement’s signing by Mr. Yanukovych. There was still some small measure of hope, as EU Enlargement Commissioner Fule said the discussion was ongoing.
Ukraine’s capital erupted in the biggest social unrest since the country regained its independence in 1991 after police on November 30 brutally beat and arrested protesters peacefully demonstrating against President Yanukovych’s ultimate decision not to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. The next day, the protest swelled in the number of participants – estimates ranged from 200,000 to 1 million – and the level of outrage over the police’s excessive use of force. Conflicts exploded throughout Kyiv between protesters and police, injuring hundreds. Opposition forces took control of several strategic sites in central Kyiv, including Independence Square (the maidan), the adjacent Trade Union Building and the Kyiv City Council.
As our editorial of December 8 pointed out: The current battle in Ukraine is no longer just about signing the Association Agreement – a prospect that may be lost for years. It’s about removing a band of criminals who have violated previous commitments to Euro-integration, brought the economy to the brink of collapse with their rampant theft and corruption, played a divide-and-conquer game with their own people by exacerbating cultural divides, and ruined the delicate structures of rule of law and checks and balances in government. … it’s for the government (and its police) to respect people’s rights and dignity, a key foundation of Western civilization.”
As hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians rallied in central Kyiv for the third week of the Euro-Maidan, they resisted forceful attempts by police to clear them from key occupied sites, including the Kyiv City Council building, where protesters pushed away buses, and the perimeter of Independence Square, the site of a nightlong struggle on December 10-11 with Berkut special forces. The Yanukovych administration ordered the raids – which failed to remove protesters from these two key sites – to prepare for signing an agreement with the Russian government that many feared would commit Kyiv to joining the Moscow-led Customs Union.
European Ukraine-Facebook
Detail of a section of the barricades erected around the Euro-Maidan, this one showing the names of cities and towns represented among the demonstrators. The photo above was posted on December 22.
On December 17, the agreement with Russia came to be. President Yanukovych that day signed a series of documents with the Russian government and its natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, that will bind Ukraine’s economy and politics to Russia and close the door to an Association Agreement with the European Union for at least the next two years. The key agreements consist of a conditional reduction in prices for Russian gas by a third (subject to a quarterly review) and a loan of $15 billion, in the form of periodic $3 billion purchases of two-year bonds, at an annual interest rate of 5 percent (amounting to a total interest payment of $1.5 billion). The December 17 agreements saved the Ukrainian economy from “bankruptcy and social collapse,” Mr. Azarov told the Cabinet the next day. What was not known is the concessions Mr. Yanukovych surrendered in Moscow to get these conditions, fueling speculation that they were significant: either requirements to buy more Russian gas, a stake in Ukraine’s state-owned gas transit system or, what’s most feared, commitments to join the Eurasian Economic Union to be launched in 2015.
The Euro-Maidan protests continued and plans were made for the long term. A new political movement called “Maidan” was formed in an effort to consolidate actions and activists nationwide.
Then, on the night of December 24-25, a young activist and journalist, Tetiana Chornovol, who had written extensively about the opaque schemes of Ukraine’s politicians, was savagely beaten after her car was pursued and run off the road outside of Kyiv by an SUV. That same night, the leader of the Kharkiv Euro-Maidan, Dmytro Pylypets, was stabbed 12 times. And these were just two of the most heinous attacks on opposition activists that were taking place in various venues throughout the country.
The Chornovol attack prompted a new wave of outrage that rejuvenated the Euro-Maidan protests. Demonstrators gathered outside the Internal Affairs Ministry beginning on December 25 to demand the resignation of Minister Zakharchenko. An Auto-Maidan protest on December 29 took nearly 1,000 cars and buses from Kyiv to Mr. Yanukovych’s palatial Mezhyhiria estate. Similar protests were being organized near the residences of other political leaders.
On New Year’s Eve, tens of thousands – 200,000 according to some estimates – gathered on Kyiv’s Independence Square to sing the Ukrainian national anthem en masse and to welcome the arrival of 2014, as well as to demonstrate their continued hope for a Ukraine that would assume its rightful place in Europe. Thus, at year’s end, the Euro-Maidan was demonstrating to the world the Ukrainian people’s, if not the Ukrainian leaders’, civilizational choice.
Looking ahead to 2015 election
The results of a poll conducted between March 5 and 13 by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology indicated that the most popular opposition leader in Ukraine was now Vitali Klitschko, leader of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR). Yulia Tymoshenko was the second most popular and Arseniy Yatsenyuk came in third. Asked whom they would vote for if pre-term elections were held today, 21 percent said they would choose Yanukovych; 14 percent – Mr. Klitschko; 11 percent – Ms. Tymoshenko and 7.1 percent – Mr. Yatsenyuk.
On June 15, Mr. Yatsenyuk led the party that he founded, the Front for Change, in merging with the Batkivshchyna Party founded by Ms. Tymoshenko. The merger took place at a ceremonial congress on St. Michael’s Square in Kyiv. Among the merger’s goals was to consolidate Ukraine’s pro-Western opposition for the 2015 presidential election. Mr. Yatsenyuk was also aiming to strengthen Batkivshchyna to bolster his resources for his campaign, in which he will compete with not only President Yanukovych, but possibly other opposition candidates.
Olexiy Haran, a political science professor at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, said the Presidential Administration was seeking to undermine the merger and discredit its leaders. “Bankova Street’s line of attack is targeted against Yatsenyuk and Batkivshchyna,” he said. “Bankova’s idea is to first finish off Batkivshchyna, and then shift the attack against UDAR.” Batkivshchyna was the leading opposition party in Ukraine with 18.4 percent support, followed by UDAR at 15.5 percent, according to an April poll conducted by the Razumkov Center.
On October 24, the Party of Regions made clear its intent to undermine Mr. Klitschko, who according to various polls, was seen as the top challenger to Mr. Yanukovych in the 2015 presidential elections. On that day the Verkhovna Rada approved two riders to legislation that would deny residency status to Ukrainian citizens who are permanent residents, or taxpayers, in foreign countries. A few hours after the deeply tucked riders were revealed, the UDAR leader called it a step towards undermining his candidacy given his 13-year residency in Germany. “I want to state that I won’t be intimidated or stopped by this,” Mr. Klitschko declared from the parliamentary rostrum. “And to put an end to all kinds of attempts to deal with me as a possible candidate, I want to state – I am competing for the presidency.”
The “Klitschko riders” were the first gambit in what’s expected to be an extended, intense campaign by the Yanukovych administration to place obstacles in Mr. Klitschko’s path to the presidency. Another goal is to stir conflict within the fractious opposition, observers said. “I think these are types of behind-the-scenes parliamentary games,” said Volodymyr Fesenko, board chairman of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research in Kyiv. “They are probably oriented towards causing conflict within the opposition rather than truly banning Klitschko from participating in the elections.”
At year’s end, the results of yet another poll, this one conducted jointly on December 20-24 by Democratic Initiatives and Razumkov, revealed that if the presidential elections were held now and a run-off was required between the top two vote-getters, Mr. Yanukovych would lose in the second round to Ms. Tymoshenko, Mr. Yatsenyuk, Mr. Klitschko or Mr. Poroshenko, but not to Mr. Tiahnybok. The president would fare the worst against Mr. Klitschko, with 40.7 percent voting for the UDAR leader and only 30.5 percent for the incumbent.
Other developments
• In 2013, Ukraine took over the rotating chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As he took over the OSCE leadership post on January 1, Ukraine’s Foreign Affairs Minister Leonid Kozhara said Ukraine would seek to make progress on resolving protracted conflicts, strengthening conventional arms control, combating human trafficking, reducing the environmental impact of energy-related activities and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Mr. Kozhara reiterated those priorities when he addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on January 17 in Vienna. As the year and Mr. Kozhara’s term came to a close, what was most disconcerting was that Ukraine in 2013 had failed to live up to OSCE principles.
• On February 5, opposition lawmakers in the Verkhovna Rada began a protest, physically blocking the Parliament rostrum, in order to demand a halt to what has become known as “piano voting,” whereby national deputies present in the chamber press the electronic voting buttons for absentee colleagues, RFE/RL reported.
• On March 2, more than 500 citizens gathered at the Hostynnyi Dvir (Hospitable Court), a historic building in the Podil district of Kyiv, to protests its secret takeover by an unknown developer who was widely believed to have ties to the Yanukovych family. It was yet another expression of outrage on the part of the public over the destruction of historical structures and landscapes in the Ukrainian capital. Historic preservation proponents were irate that developers are replacing Podil’s classical architecture – with its aesthetic appeal and accessibility to the public – with glass-encased structures and overpriced shopping malls.
• In March and April, opposition leaders held rallies throughout Ukraine under the banner “Rise Up, Ukraine!” However, the action failed to attract broad support, as most Ukrainian citizens, while they oppose the current government, were not willing to do much to support the opposition other than cast their ballots. “We’re told the opposition is weak, it can’t bring people to the streets. But it’s not the opposition that’s weak – it’s the people not coming out,” Batkivshchyna Party Chair Arseniy Yatsenyuk said in an interview published by Korrespondent magazine in late January. “If the people are satisfied, and the opposition is dissatisfied, that means the moment hasn’t arrived yet. But it will absolutely come.”
However, observers noted that recent political failures had given the public little reason to support the opposition. One example was the failure on April 19 to oust Prime Minister Azarov. The parliamentary vote fell 36 votes short of the simple majority required, but key opposition deputies of both the Batkivshchyna and UDAR parties did not vote, and some did not even show up. “There are several reasons why people don’t trust the opposition,” said Petro Oleshchuk, a political science lecturer at Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. “It doesn’t offer new faces and new ideas; it’s identified with the Orange era and, therefore, quarreling and unfulfilled promises; it doesn’t show how its actions specifically can help the average citizen; it doesn’t demonstrate a readiness to go to the full extent in defending its ideas and it has a distinct image of ‘losers.’ “
• According to official statistics reported in May, 2.7 million citizens have left the country since Ukraine’s independence. Olena Malynovska, chief researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, explained that of that number about 2 million moved to the CIS countries and more than 700,000 to the rest of the world. The primary reason for the migration of Ukrainians, she said, is economic instability. “In 2010, the average salary in Ukraine amounted to 4 percent of the salary in Germany, 6 percent in Italy, 7 percent in Spain, and 20 percent in Poland and Russia. These data do not require any comments,” she noted.
Aleksandr Sinitsa/UNIAN
Members of UDAR block the rostrum in the Verkhovna Rada on February 6 to protest “piano voting.”