In a bizarre tweet following his begrudging signing of the Russia, Iran and North Korea sanctions legislation earlier this month, President Donald Trump blamed the poor state of U.S.-Russia relations on Congress, rather than on Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where that responsibility squarely belongs. Sorry, Mr. President, the foe here is not Congress, but an oppressive, corrupt dictator who can’t seem to shake his unhealthy imperial impulses.
One can rightly accuse Congress of many shortcomings. Over the last few years, our legislative branch has become increasingly polarized, hyper-partisan and unable to reach compromises so essential to the normal functioning of a democracy. Reasons for this abound and include increased gerrymandering/redistricting, the 24-hour news cycle, and increased ability of powerful outside interests to punish Members of Congress who do not completely toe their line. Congress, however, does not act in a vacuum and reflects the nation’s growing social polarization. Unfortunately, the signs are not promising that congressional dysfunction will end anytime soon.
But there are exceptions to gridlock on Capitol Hill. One thing Congress certainly cannot be accused of is being weak on Russia, or, for that matter, not being supportive of Ukraine. The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), approved overwhelmingly by both the House and the Senate, is a powerful expression of Congress’s deep frustration with Mr. Trump’s reluctance to acknowledge Russia’s interference in our elections and bipartisan fears that Mr. Trump would try to weaken existing sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
The legislation has a strong Ukraine component and the findings and policy statement sections reference Ukraine often and make a strong and coherent case as to why sanctions are necessary. Key provisions of the law stem mostly from Russia’s occupation of Crimea and ongoing military intervention in the Donbas. It codifies six executive orders signed by President Barack Obama that targeted Russia’s financial services, energy, defense and other sectors, preventing President Trump from revoking them. CAATSA includes other measures that support Ukraine, such as the authorization of energy security and other assistance, and an assertion of a policy of non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Considerable portions of the act are based on a bipartisan bill introduced earlier in the year by two longtime strong supporters of Ukraine, Sens. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) called the Countering Russian Hostilities Act.
So, CAATSA, although it goes well beyond Ukraine, is among the more consequential pieces of legislation pertaining to Ukraine in recent years and stands as a further testament to longstanding congressional interest in and support for Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and democratic development. This support, which Congress has manifested for many decades, has only heightened since early 2014. In addition to numerous meetings with visiting Ukrainian officials, hearings, briefings, resolutions, statements and press releases, more members of Congress have visited Ukraine than ever before. Indeed, for the last four years Ukraine ranks among the most visited countries in the world by Senate and House members. These visits have been an important element in building support for Ukraine.
Perhaps most significantly, in 2014, there were two comprehensive bills exclusively devoted to Ukraine that were enacted. To have two bills pass on a bipartisan basis by overwhelming majorities that focus on one country, or for that matter, on any one issue, within a nine-month period is exceedingly rare in recent Congressional history. In fact, these two bills, the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy and Economic Stability for Ukraine Act of 2014 and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, are referenced several times in CAATSA. A critical element in building and sustaining support for these bills, and others that include a Ukraine component, has been the role of the Ukrainian American community as well as the considerable efforts of the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, Georgian, Belarusian and other communities, and the wide network of influential organizations and individuals in Washington and around the country that support Ukraine. Indeed, these efforts were important in ensuring the passage of CAATSA.
In fairness, part of Mr. Trump’s reluctance in signing the CAATSA, which codifies and expands the existing sanctions while preventing him from lifting sanctions without congressional agreement, is not unusual. Previous administrations, Republican and Democratic, strongly dislike Congress taking the lead on sanctions, arguing that it is the executive branch’s prerogative rather than that of the legislative branch. (Many constitutional and national security experts disagree and argue that the legislative branch does have a role in setting sanctions). I experienced this executive branch reluctance several times on legislation with which I was deeply involved when I worked at the Helsinki Commission, even when the administrations in question were not opposed to those sanctions in principle. Clearly, the Senate and the House, including the overwhelming majority of Republicans, felt the imperative to assert themselves in this matter, sending an unmistakable signal to President Trump that they don’t trust him when it comes to dealing with Russia.
One of the CAATSA provisions that supports Ukraine asserts a policy of stating that the United States “does not recognize territorial changes effected by force” and “will never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force.” The White House statement following the signing of the law, in which Mr. Trump stated that he can make better deals than Congress, complained about this provision, further fueling suspicions that he might be open at some point to a deal with Russia that might not be in Ukraine’s best interests.
The key will be in how the administration implements this critically important legislation. Going forward, I’m confident that Congress will keep a watchful eye, as will Ukrainian Americans and the many other Americans who recognize the danger that Russia poses to the United States, Ukraine and the rules-based international order.
Orest Deychakiwsky may be reached at [email protected].