PART I
It has sometimes been difficult for Ukraine to find international support, but a strong argument can be made that Ukraine has had few better friends over the course of the last century than the United States Congress. This was especially true in the decades leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Ukraine was a captive nation and a relative unknown in the United States.
It is impossible to take a detailed, comprehensive look at Congress’s historic role in one article, but I hope to at least give you a sense of the scope of congressional engagement on Ukraine. Congressional efforts could be distilled to one word: freedom. It is the unifying theme. In this overview, I will try to briefly give readers some sense of the what, when, where and why of Congressional activity vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Introduction: Independence 1918 and 1991
A century ago, in 1917, a Congressman named James Hamill [D-N.J.] introduced a joint resolution to proclaim a nationwide Ukrainian Day. And even though Ukraine was then a terra incognita in the United States, the resolution passed and President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed April 27, 1917, as a day to collect funds for the aid of the “stricken Ruthenians (Ukrainians).” As a result of the collection, $85,000 – which is $1.75 million in today’s dollars – was collected.
Later, a Ukrainian information bureau was established in Rep. Hamill’s office, and he was active in trying to obtain U.S. recognition for Ukrainian independence, including through his subsequent December 1918 resolution on the eve of the Versailles conference. But this measure was defeated, given U.S. policy at the time which decidedly did not support Ukrainian national aspirations. An excellent source on this is Dr. Myron B. Kuropas’s book “Ukrainians in America.”
Fast forward 72 years later to the fall of 1991, when a resolution introduced by Helsinki Commission Chair Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) and Commissioner Rep. Don Ritter (R-Pa.) calling for recognition of Ukraine’s independence garnered significant support. It was adopted – as an amendment to a larger piece of legislation – despite a lack of support from the administration of President George H.W. Bush. Although the first Bush administration was not opposed to Ukraine’s independence per se – in contrast to Wilson – and certainly had an appreciation for Ukraine’s national aspirations, for various reasons it undertook a cautious approach.
In a little over a month, over a quarter of the Senate and a fifth of the House joined the resolution as co-sponsors – which was no small feat and a tribute to various organizations and individuals in the Ukrainian American community. In some respects, this resolution represented a culmination of longstanding efforts by the Ukrainian American community and its many friends in the U.S. Congress prior to independence to assist the Ukrainian people in their aspirations for human rights, freedom and independence.
The post-World War II era
So, what happened in Congress between 1918 and 1991? The inter-war period saw relatively little congressional activity on Ukraine. A notable exception was the 1934 Congressional resolution on Stalin’s man-made Famine (Holodomor) introduced by Rep. Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.).
Post-World War II saw an uptick. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and follow-on legislation – while not Ukraine-specific, did allow for the admission of some 80,000 post-war refugee Ukrainians living in Europe into the U.S. While previous Ukrainian emigrations had done much to establish the infrastructure of the Ukrainian American community, this highly politicized emigration and their American-born children gave the impetus for greater political activity, especially with respect to Congress.
During the late 1940s, through the 1960s the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), especially under its President Lev Dobriansky, took the lead in Congressional activity on Ukraine. This included lobbying on behalf of a Ukrainian section within the Voice of America and presenting testimony in front of various congressional committees on issues concerning Ukraine.
Two pieces of legislation were of special significance. One was was the 1959 Captive Nations resolution, authored by Dr. Dobriansky, who had many connections in both parties in Congress and who played a critical role in undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet Union. The other was the 1960 bill authorizing the erection of the Taras Shevchenko Monument in Washington. The memorial dedication ceremony in 1964 saw the largest gathering of Ukrainian Americans ever – some 100,000.
Both of these pieces of legislation and, in particular, the Captive Nations resolution, infuriated the Soviet government. This was also a time when the January 22, 1918, independence of Ukraine was commemorated in Congress annually with events and numerous congressional statements. To take just one illustrative example – I came upon a few January-February 1956 issues of The Ukrainian Weekly reporting on the Independence Day activities, and they were filled with various congressional statements, prayers for a free Ukraine in the Senate and House, and a report on the introduction of a resolution condemning Russian Communist oppression of Ukraine by Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), later vice-president of the U.S. Clearly, the focus during this period was on the national rights of Ukrainians.
The peak of activity: 1975-1991
But it was the decade and a half prior to independence, starting from late 1970s, that saw the most intensive period of congressional activity on Ukraine. And it is here that there was somewhat of a shift in emphasis – from national rights to individual rights – although these, of course, were not mutually exclusive. A key reason for this transition was the newfound attention placed by the United States on the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act – especially the plight of political prisoners, including the Helsinki Monitors. These courageous men and women called upon the Soviet government to live up to its freely undertaken Helsinki human rights commitments.
The largest and most repressed of the five groups in the USSR was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Its members peacefully advocated not only for greater individual rights and freedoms, chronicling many individual violations, but also for greater cultural and linguistic freedoms as well as self-determination for Ukraine. Not surprisingly, they were considered to be a particular threat to the Soviet regime and were harshly repressed. Four of them died in the Gulag as late as 1984-1985, right before the era of glasnost and perestroika. Many members of Congress, often working closely with the Ukrainian American community, vigorously rose to the Ukrainian Helsinki monitors’ defense. After their release, many became involved with Rukh, Ukraine’s movement for independence, including its co-founders Mykhailo Horyn and Vyacheslav Chornovil.
Institutionally, the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (popularly known as the Helsinki Commission) shortly after the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, whose mandate included pressing the Soviet government on human rights, brought greater attention to Ukrainian issues. This interest was manifested through numerous resolutions on behalf of individual Ukrainian political prisoners, hearings on human rights in Ukraine (occasionally with the participation of former political prisoners), frequent congressional statements, press releases, Capitol Hill events and direct contacts with Soviet officials in Washington or at international conferences.
The congressional interest in human rights went beyond the Helsinki Commission and the issues went beyond the political prisoners or condemnations of human rights violations. The 1980s saw Holodomor resolutions in connection with the 50th anniversary in 1983 and, very significantly, the creation of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine. This commission did much to study and publicize this hitherto largely unknown genocide. Efforts of the Helsinki Commission and many others in Congress – especially members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Baltics and Ukraine – focused on the plight of the suppressed Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, calling for its legalization, especially in connection with a resolution on the Millennium of Christianity in Kyivan Rus’-Ukraine. Encouraged by the Ukrainian American community, specifically the Committee to Commemorate the Millennium of Christianity of Rus’-Ukraine, an unprecedently large number of senators and congressmen wrote individual letters to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev calling for the legalization of the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church. The 1986 Chornobyl disaster also brought considerable Congressional attention to Ukraine, with resolutions, hearings, statements and exhibits.
Sometimes too, congressional efforts were geared toward our own government – for example, encouraging the State Department to raise individual cases of human rights abuse or related issues with the Soviets or calling for the establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Kyiv (with the purpose of reducing Ukraine’s international isolation). There was also much congressional unhappiness with the 1985 denial of U.S. asylum to Ukrainian seaman Myroslav Medvid, who jumped a Soviet ship near New Orleans.
Many of these activities were initiated or abetted by especially active lobbying campaigns not just by diaspora community organizations like the UCCA, the Ukrainian National Association (UNA) and the Ukrainian National Women’s League of America (UNWLA), but also by numerous grass-roots groups of community activists who would pepper their congressmen and senators with phone calls, letters, face-to-face meetings, faxes. (This was before the rise of the Internet). These groups included Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine (AHRU), Philadelphia Human Rights for Ukraine Committee, Smoloskyp organization in defense of human rights, and various ad-hoc human rights committees in cities with Ukrainian populations across the U.S. Also, key roles were played by offices such as the UCCA’s Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) Human Rights Bureau and during the critical years of 1988-1995 – the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of independence – the Ukrainian National Association’s (UNA’s) Washington Office, which employed professional staff. In addition, committees in support of Rukh and Ukraine 2000 played vital roles. As an example, Ukraine 2000’s international affairs director, Robert McConnell, testified or submitted testimony on Ukraine to more than 40 congressional hearings in less than a two-year period. An essential role was also played by Ukrainian American media, first and foremost The Ukrainian Weekly, which consistently informed the community and encouraged advocacy efforts.
The bottom line is that the Ukrainian American community was especially engaged during those years. Without it, there would not have been all the considerable activity that took place in Congress, especially in the pre-independence era. Keep in mind that prior to independence, many Americans were ignorant of Ukraine, often confusing Ukrainians with Russians or conflating Russia and the Soviet Union.
As mentioned earlier, before the restoration of its independence, with the exception of Congress, Ukraine was largely a terra incognita on the overall political landscape in the U.S. The executive branch paid relatively little attention to Ukraine, as it was essentially a colony, and the focus, not surprisingly, was on the capital, Moscow, and not on the “periphery.” Nevertheless, Ukraine was not completely ignored and there certainly were people who were advocates for Ukraine within the executive branch, including several Ukrainian Americans.
This relative lack of attention changed dramatically following independence and the establishment of formal relations with an independent Ukrainian state. At that point, quite logically, the executive branch/State Department, with the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, took the lead on Ukraine policy. Still, Congress has continued to be very active and supportive, on a bipartisan basis – both Republicans and Democrats. It is important to underscore that this bipartisanship on Ukraine existed before Ukraine regained its independence.
Post-independence: 1991-2013
Since independence, we have seen legislation, hearings and briefings, direct meetings with Ukrainian legislators and officials, especially diplomats from the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, and visits to Ukraine by members of Congress. The drivers of most of the activity are the Helsinki Commission, the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This included hearings on the political situation in Ukraine, sometimes with the participation of high-ranking Ukrainian officials; successful legislation authorizing the establishment of the Holodomor Memorial near the U.S. Capitol; Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Ukraine (i.e., lifting restrictive Jackson-Vanik trade provisions); resolutions calling for Ukraine joining the NATO Membership Action Plan; and resolutions congratulating Ukraine for democratic successes. There were many Congressional resolutions, statements and briefings in support of free and fair elections in Ukraine, on the Holodomor, Chornobyl and other issues. Congress also raised, when necessary, human rights or democratic deficits.
Congressional attention was especially manifested immediately before, during and after the Orange Revolution, with Congress strongly supporting the democratic aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Thus, it readily called out human rights abuses and democratic deficits, especially in the late Kuchma period and during the Yanukovych years. For instance, Congress was very active in defending the politically motivated imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and others.
Regarding resolutions, hearings or Congressional statements that sometimes constructively criticize the actions of the Ukrainian authorities, it is important to underscore that often in Washington – both within and outside of Congress – Ukraine’s biggest critics are often Ukraine’s strongest supporters – people who genuinely care about the country and want it to succeed as a secure, thriving European democracy.
There were also important pieces of legislation like the Nunn-Lugar Act, which provided $1.3 billion to help safeguard and dismantle weapons of mass destruction, and numerous broader appropriations bills that provided nearly $5 billion in bilateral assistance alone to Ukraine between 1991 and 2013. This assistance included military/security as well as projects focusing on economic growth, energy security, health, agriculture, and democracy, human rights and good governance. Clearly much of this was designed to assist Ukraine in becoming a more secure, democratic, prosperous, safer and healthier country.
Keep in mind that Congress has the power of the purse – the U.S. Constitution grants Congress exclusively the power to appropriate funds. Sometimes Congress has appropriated additional funding for Ukraine beyond the administration’s formal request or supported the work of specific organizations such as the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation. Indeed, for several years in the mid-1990s, Ukraine was the third largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance in the world. This funding encompassed not only military and security aid, but also assistance in the economic, energy, humanitarian, health, democracy and good governance realms.
Orest Deychakiwsky worked at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the U.S. Helsinki Commission), a U.S. government agency composed mostly of U.S. senators and House members, from 1981 to 2017. His many responsibilities throughout his more than 35 years of service included Ukraine. He served as a member of numerous official U.S. delegations to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (and its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and was an OSCE election observer in Ukraine and other countries.
He currently serves as vice-chair of the Board of Directors of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, on the Advisory Board of the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council and writes a monthly column for The Ukrainian Weekly called “Washington in Focus.”