On December 18, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law the Ukraine Freedom Support Act (UFSA) of 2014, the culmination of nearly a year of organized efforts towards a comprehensive aid package for Ukraine in response to Russia’s armed invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. This legislation represents the unique way the people of the United States have decided to assist the people of Ukraine, unlike any support demonstrated by other nations of the world. This was demonstrated by the marrying of various components of support into one comprehensive piece of legislation.
First and foremost, the UFSA made law that it is the official policy of the United States to “assist the government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “to deter the government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine.” Above and beyond whatever you may have heard about the Budapest Memorandum, the U.N. Charter or the Helsinki Final Act – we now have unanimously passed legislation that unequivocally states what we have always assumed as citizens of the Defender of Liberty.
Why do I ascribe so much significance to this policy statement? Simply put, it’s all in the context. I am often confronted on television by know-it-all pundits, too clever by far when they rhetorically demand to know “what is a defensive weapon?” – as if all arms exist to attack and oppress. My response always turns to an analogy of farm supplies: were you or I to purchase a bag of fertilizer, along with garden tools, potting soil and some kneepads, your perception of that fertilizer would be much different than if I bought that same amount of fertilizer along with propane or gasoline, radio transmitters and shaped containers.
In much the same way, the UFSA lays out a defensive shopping cart, full of defensive articles and weapons, along with the requisite training and assisting services, that the UFSA authorizes the president to deliver. All of this is done expressly “for the purpose of countering offensive weapons and re-establishing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, crew weapons and ammunition, counter-artillery radars to identify and target artillery batteries, fire control, range finder, and optical and guidance and control equipment, tactical troop-operated surveillance drones, and secure command and communications equipment.”
Now, add to the aforementioned policy statement and defensive weapons the following:
expanded nonmilitary assistance for Ukraine;
expanded broadcasting in countries of the former Soviet Union;
support for Russian democracy and civil society organizations;
sanctions on Russian and other foreign financial institutions; and
sanctions relating to the defense and energy sectors of the Russian Federation.
Already, I’ve mentioned aspects of a comprehensive aid package the likes of which would be the envy of half the world. But there’s an additional element added to the UFSA that lays the groundwork for future legislation, testing both the resolve of the president and that of the Russian Federation. Buried within the language of the UFSA are three reports which Congress requested.
The first is a written communication from the president selecting three new sanctions out of a possible nine. This communication was due to Congress 30 days after the UFSA became law, and was intended to signal further resolve on the part of the United States. The president, it should be noted, was given the option of not adding additional sanctions if national security concerns would prevent implementation; however, whatever the final outcome, detailed written communication was legislated by Congress even in the event of non-enaction of such sanctions. The benefit of having such a record is its ability to advise legislators on how to tailor future legislation. “Fool me once…” as they say.
In the second report mandated by the act, the president is required to submit a report to both houses of Congress detailing the “anticipated defense articles, defense services and training to be provided” to Ukraine and a timeline for delivery, no later than 60 days after the date of enactment.
Lastly, Congress requested a report on non-compliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under treaty on the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (commonly referred to as the `Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or `INF Treaty’).
Taken in total, you’ll not find a stronger statement of support for Ukraine issued by any other government, which is why passage of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 was advocated for so vocally by our community. And although President Obama has not seen fit to follow the timeline of the UFSA, we have already seen direct assistance arriving to Ukraine as a result of the UFSA. Already in 2015, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America has had conversations with leaders in Congress seeking to follow up on the UFSA with additional legislation, much in the same way that discussions began in early 2014.
If the UFSA is an example of what can be accomplished in only the first year of this international conflict, we are already ahead of the U.S. response to military invasions throughout the world. I’d like to think that we can use this success as a way of leading by example and inspire other countries to do the same.