Twenty years ago, on April 15, 1995, President Boris Yeltsin delayed signing the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between Russia and Ukraine. “It will be correct to sign major political documents between Russia and Ukraine only after we are convinced that the relations between Symferopol and Kyiv do not infringe on the interests of Crimeans.” Other issues delaying the signing of the agreement, initially scheduled for September 1994, included the division of the Black Sea Fleet.
Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Kozyrev, in Moscow during a meeting of the Council for Foreign Policies, said, “the possibility of using direct force to protect ethnic Russians abroad is not ruled out. There is a large arsenal of means to protect our compatriots – from the expression of mild dissatisfaction by an anonymous representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry to the application of political and economic sanctions. In certain instances, the use of direct military force might be necessary to protect our compatriots abroad.”
The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America responded on April 17, 1995, that Mr. Yeltsin’s statements represented “a new and intolerable phase in the assault upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”
The UCCA continued: “These statements demand a swift and firm response from Ukraine’s allies. Referring to the Crimea’s sizeable population of Ukrainian citizens of Russian descent, President Yeltsin asserted that Russia ‘has considerable interests in the Crimea.’ He went on to unacceptably impugn Ukrainian sovereignty by referring to Symferopol and Kyiv as capitals of two equal sovereigns and urging respect for the ‘will of Crimeans.’”
As President Bill Clinton was scheduled to attend the Victory in Europe (V-E Day) parade on May 9, 1995, in Moscow, the UCCA reminded: “Moscow must understand that the era of the tsars and commissars have receded into history and that only a democratic Russia respectful of its national minorities and neighbors will earn a place in the world community, with all the accompanying privileges, economic and political. If Russia wishes to belong the world’s democracies, it should learn to behave like one. This message should be relayed in advance of the joint celebration of the victory over fascism. Otherwise, the U.S. will have merely acceded to a dubious victory of one fascist power over another.”
Ukraine’s Acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk noted that while he was working to resolve issues related to the Black Sea Fleet, “De jure, it is a fleet owned by two countries – Ukraine and Russia; de facto, it is controlled by Russia.” Moscow warned that if the Black Sea Fleet issues could not be resolved, the terms of economic treaties between Ukraine and Russia would likely be revised. Ukraine owed $2.5 billion in gas debts to Russia that it was required to pay prior to July 1995, with the money taken from credits given to Ukraine by international financial organizations.
Ultimately, Mr. Yeltsin confirmed the treaty’s wording that “the two parties respect and confirm the inviolability of each other’s existing borders.” During the discussion in Moscow, he added, “The Crimea will never be the source of discord between Russia and Ukraine.”
Russia and Ukraine formally signed the treaty on May 31, 1997, and the treaty was ratified by Russia on March 2, 1999. Russia’s Duma unanimously denounced the treaty on March 31, 2014. The Kharkiv Pact signed in 2010, which also dealt with the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, was ratified by the parliaments of Ukraine and Russia on April 27, 2010. The Duma unanimously denounced that treaty on March 31, 2014. Russia formally initiated Crimea’s annexation to the Russian Federation during a treaty signing at the Kremlin on March 18, 2014.
Source: “Force may be used to protect Russian compatriots, Ukraine-Russia treaty in doubt as Yeltsin cites interest in Crimea,” by Marta Kolomayets, The Ukrainian Weekly, April 23, 1995.