In Germany, the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) narrowly beat the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in the federal election held on September 26.
Yes, the latter has lost after 16 years leading the government, and Germany’s long-serving chancellor, Angela Merkel, whose party’s support had been declining for some time, is leaving the helm.
But, in effect, there have been no great surprises. It’s turned out to be more a vote for stability and continuity, rather than for any fundamental change.
Both the SPD and the CDU will need at least two coalition partners in order to lead a government and it’s the two “junior” parties, the Greens and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), that have been projected to play the role of kingmakers.
By lunchtime on the day following the vote, the main parties had won the following number of seats in the Reichstag: SPD, 206 (25.7 percent of the votes); CDU/CSU, 196 (24.1 percent); Greens, 118 (14.8 percent); and FDP, 92 (11.5 percent). The far right AfD lost ground, obtaining 83 seats (10.3 percent), though it could also be a factor. Meanwhile, the far-left did poorly and is unlikely to cross the 5 percent threshold needed to field representatives in parliament.
For Ukraine and much of eastern and central Europe, the key question is what, if any, changes will come in Berlin’s foreign policy as a result of the elections? Moreover, any new gradations in German foreign policy as a result of the election will likely be driven by the coalition partners.
The Green party has adopted quite a principled stand toward Russia and the FDP has highlighted its support for Russia’s civil society. Both groups in varying degrees have called for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project to be stopped or abandoned.
So, there is nevertheless an element of intrigue as to what type of coalition will be cobbled together. The possibilities include the following: the SPD goes with the Greens and FDP; another “Grand Coalition” of the CDU and SPD, with the Greens or FDP; or the more unlikely scenario of the CDU somehow managing to come out on top with the support of the Greens, FDP and perhaps others.
In the meantime, until the new alliance is forged, outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel will stay on as head of a caretaker CDU-SPD coalition government.
The SPD, led by chancellor candidate Olaf Scholz, has promoted the theme of “Future, Respect, Europe,” while the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), have emphasized “Stability and Renewal.”
The center left Greens led by Annalena Baerbock have focused on climate-related issues. The FDP continues to uphold free-market economic policies.
All four are in effect centrist parties and are committed to the European and transatlantic orientation of Germany’s foreign policy. But there are differences in emphasis and approach. This was clear from a pre-election debate between the main candidates televised on June 26.
As Politico put it: “With [Ms.] Baerbock of the Greens and the CDU’s [Armin] Laschet representing opposing views on the debate stage – the upstart idealist seeking to shape things up in a values-based manner, and the more conservative realist emphasizing business and existing interests first – it was [Mr.] Scholz who worked to thread the needle between the divergent visons.”
Mr. Scholz backs the French in wanting more “sovereignty” for Europe (read less U.S. influence). “We must ensure that we have a strong and sovereign Europe. In my view that is the most important task we have as Germans,” he said.
And for him Germany is the key factor. “We are the big country in the middle of the European Union with the biggest population and the biggest economic strength,” he said.
Clearly, Mr. Scholz sees France as Germany’s closest partner in Europe. He has backed the French government in its current exasperation with the new strategic partnership between the U.S., U.K. and Australia known as AUKUS, which has led Canberra to cancel a lucrative contract for French built submarines.
He also added that, “We will have to make sure that this Europe can speak more with one voice.” This had a rather ambiguous ring to it considering that in June of this year Ms. Merkel and French president Emmanuel Macron were put in their place by other European states after suddenly urging the European Union to begin a direct dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, the leaders of both the SPD and the CDU do not support its membership at this stage in either NATO or the European Union. The EU has first to integrate the west Balkan countries, they agree, and Ukraine will have to wait its turn, whenever that might be.
All four leading German parties concur that cooperation and dialogue with Russia should continue, but they have somewhat different perceptions of what the balance between engagement and containment should be. Nevertheless, they all acknowledge that Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, cyberattacks, information manipulation and repression of its internal critics are factors that cannot simply be dismissed.
The Greens and the FDP have been the most forthright in urging that sanctions against Russia are not relaxed until the conditions are met.
On Nord Stream 2, Mr. Scholz conceded that, while for Germany its interest in the pipeline is purely economic, this is clearly not the case for Russia. He and Mr. Laschet both agreed that if Moscow began to use it as a weapon against Ukraine, Berlin would retaliate by stopping the transfer of gas through it.
Ms. Baerbock was more categorical and insisted that Nord Stream 2 be scrapped. She dismissed the notion that it is a purely economic project, stressing that it is meant to destabilize Ukraine. “I went to Russia and talked to key actors. It was said openly the goal was about Ukraine and to circumvent sanctions.”
And what will the changes in Berlin mean for the Minsk and Normandy Four interrelated processes in which Germany under Ms. Merkel played a prominent role? For the time being, with elements of uncertainty in the air and the Kremlin anxious to see what emerges, it’s unlikely that there will be any progress.
Yet this is a good moment for Kyiv to keep hammering home the message that the Normandy Four framework will remain unproductive if Berlin is not prepared to assume a more responsible role and treat Moscow as the aggressor and not an equal partner in moderating peacemaking, or if Berlin opposes broadening the effort through the inclusion of other states prepared to pull their weight.
Ms. Merkel’s departure in this context is no great loss. In fact, the German newspaper Der Spiegel published an interview with her long-term foreign policy adviser acknowledging that, for all her charm and apparent good intentions on the surface, it was she who blocked Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU. She based her approach on what was “tolerable” for Mr. Putin.
With her leaving, it remains to be seen whether President Macron will seek temporarily to assume the unspoken leadership role in Europe and, if so, whether Paris will be as tough with its rhetoric toward Moscow as it currently is with Washington.
Of course, Russia, Nord Stream 2 and Ukraine are not the only challenges facing the new German government. Relations with China are among the priorities, and all four parties advocate for the development of a common EU strategy toward Beijing.
Climate change is another issue. During the televised debate, the candidates were reminded that a recent public opinion survey showed that this is one of the top three concerns of the German public.
So now, as the horse trading gets under way, the waiting begins. And for those hoping for some positive change in Berlin’s foreign policy, with Ms. Baerbock cast in the role of the principal kingmaker, there could be reason for cautious optimism.