Ten years ago, on August 15, 2008, Georgia signed a ceasefire agreement following Russia’s invasion of Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The ceasefire deal, brokered with Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Mikheil Saakashvili in Tbilisi, was agreed to on August 12-13.
Analyst Vladimir Socor, writing for Eurasia Daily Monitor, noted: “Russia has junked the six-point agreement in the traditional way of Russian and Soviet diplomacy in Europe’s East: It eviscerates an international agreement of its content while preserving its carcass for continuing reference to excuse Kremlin actions.”
Moscow, continuing along traditional lines, demanded new concessions in return for theoretical promises to respect an agreement already signed. Russia demanded compliance from Georgia, but ruled out any countervailing or reciprocal means for the West and Georgia to obtain Russian compliance.
Under Points 1 and 2, “no resort to force,” Russia had shifted its focus away from human casualties, and instead focused on scorched-earth policies – destroying infrastructure, highways, railways, bridges, military bases and looting local Georgian civilian administrations at gunpoint.
Point 3, “free access for humanitarian assistance and permission for refugees to return,” was impeded by Russia’s de facto naval blockade of Georgia’s coast and interdiction of cross-country transport in Georgia.
Point 4, says “Georgian troops are to return to the places of their regular stationing,” but due to points 1 and 2, Georgian troops had nothing to return to, as the bases were destroyed.
Point 5, “Russian forces shall withdraw to the positions [they had held] prior to the start of hostilities,” was violated by Moscow in two ways – by stationing and moving troops deep inside Georgia and by carving out “security zones” under Russian military control outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia also demanded that the West and Georgia accept the extended zone of occupation. The second part of Point 5, “Awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeepers shall implement additional security measures,” was a loophole that allowed Russia to bite off more chunks of Georgian territory.
Point 6 focused on negotiations toward a political settlement on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but lacked reference to Georgia’s territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders. Russia balked at the inclusion of such a reference, with Mr. Sarkozy bowing to its demands; both France and Russia claimed that recognition of “independence and sovereignty” was sufficient, being of a higher order than integrity and borders, and subsuming these.
Georgia reluctantly agreed to these terms as the threat of Russian invasion of Tbilisi seemed imminent. Mr. Saakashvili waited until the arrival of U.S. Secretary Condoleezza Rice on August 15, who also advised him to sign the document on the basis of U.S. assurances. During a press conference in Tbilisi, Secretary Rice repeatedly called on Russia to withdraw its troops “immediately” from Georgian territory.
Statements of support and solidarity with Georgia were issued by President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The U.S., in particular, was elbowed out of the negotiations by Moscow, who argued that Washington could not serve as an objective mediator. However, French officials did not challenge Moscow’s qualifications as an impartial peacekeeper.
The ceasefire agreement itself was written by Russia, in the French language, with glaring procedural flaws and notable grammar mistakes, style errors and misspellings, including the French president’s last name “Sarcozy.”
“In sum, Elysee Palace seems to have rushed into a diplomatic misadventure,” Mr. Socor commented. “The United States, the European Union on the institutional level and NATO need to step in. They need to protect Georgia in their own strategic interests.”
Source: “Russia nullifies ceasefire in Georgia,” by Vladimir Socor (Eurasia Daily Monitor), The Ukrainian Weekly, August 24, 2008.