Thirty years ago, on August 19-21, 1991, hardline conservative Communists in Moscow attempted a coup d’etat in the final days before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Leonid Kravchuk, who was chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, resigned from the Communist Party following the failed coup. After the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine on August 24, Ukraine’s Constitution was amended to create the position of president of Ukraine, with Mr. Kravchuk named as president (he would be officially elected on December 5, 1991, in the country’s first presidential election since regaining independence). Mr. Kravchuk was seen as instrumental in persuading the Communist parliamentary majority to accept the opposition’s demands for Ukrainian independence.
Democratic opposition groups in Ukraine criticized Mr. Kravchuk for not supporting Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation. However, Mr. Kravchuk issued a statement on August 19, which urged the citizens of Ukraine to remain “calm and patient,” reassuring them that Ukrainian authorities remained in control of Ukraine.
“The Ukrainian government acted carefully and gingerly, obviously it wanted to avoid confrontation while asserting its right to be guided by the laws of the Ukrainian SSR,” said Prof. Taras Hunczak, a history professor at Rutgers University who was on the ground in Ukraine at the time. “I surely wish that the speech made by Mr. Kravchuk had been a bit stronger, but he is not a Yeltsin, he is a man of a different character. This is by no means shameful behavior for a republic that wants to go its own way.”
Prof. Vasyl Markus, a political scientist at Loyola University in Chicago, commented:
“Kravchuk was overly cautious; he covered himself and the Ukrainian government in case of the success of the coup. However, as the situation became clearer on Tuesday, August 20, he could have taken a much more decisive stand. I think it was typical Kravchuk; his previous statements (during the last session of the Supreme Soviet) have been of the same kind.”
Dr. Roman Solchanyk of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, summarized that, “Kravchuk’s statement to the citizens of Ukraine on August 19, I think it fair to say, was a balanced one. The first day of the coup called for a balanced approach; it would be unfair to expect Kravchuk on the first day to outrightly condemn developments in Moscow.”
Scholars, including Dr. David Marples of the University of Alberta, noted that the question of how the collapse of the Soviet Union would unfold would be in the hands of the republics, not Moscow. “…If there is a union treaty, it will be greatly revised from the original text. Ukraine now is in a strong position, it can demand its own taxes, monies, armed forces. Gorbachev is now only a figurehead,” Dr. Marples added.
Dr. James Mace, former staff director of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, suggested that the Supreme Soviet pursue a union treaty to decouple Ukraine’s economy from the Soviet Union. “If Ukraine adopts its own currency which is convertible and the ruble still exists in the Soviet Union, once again Ukraine will be raped economically. After the events of the last few days, Yeltsin will get anything he wants, and Ukrainians should take advantage of it.”
More could have been done by Ukraine’s democratic opposition forces in those initial moments after the failed coup, observers noted. Ukraine’s lasting independence would require the backing from the countryside, Dr. Mace added, in order to build widespread support, from more than simply holding mass meetings.
Mr. Kravchuk’s missteps and his continuance of the Soviet legacy were also seen as hopeful opportunities for rising democratic opposition figures such as Vyacheslav Chornovil and Lev Lukianenko to assume political leadership roles in Ukraine. However, meaningful and lasting change for a democratically free Ukraine continues to be an ongoing challenge, especially in the face of a militarily aggressive Russia that continues to violate and threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Source: “What the coup meant for Ukraine,” by Marta Kolomayets, The Ukrainian Weekly, August 25, 1991.