August 3, 2018

Church diplomacy: Kyiv between Moscow and Constantinople

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In 2018 Ukraine is celebrating the 1,030th anniversary of the baptism of Ukraine-Rus’. This year’s celebration will be special – in April of this year, President Petro Poroshenko announced the possibility of a historic decision for the country: a single, autonomous autocephalous Church, independent of Moscow, may be created in Ukraine. It was expected that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew would grant a Tomos for this by July 27-28. Then the expected date shifted to Ukraine’s Independence Day (August 24). Today it is clear: the process is very likely to be completed by the end of the year. In the UCMC analysis below: why this issue is important to the country, how it is related to geopolitics and what we can expect.

Geography and geopolitics of the Orthodox world

Today, the Orthodox world has about 300 million believers worldwide. The Patriarchate of Constantinople (in Istanbul) has historically claimed primacy in the Orthodox world. At the same time, the Russian Patriarchate believes the primacy of Constantinople to be a pure formality, because the largest Orthodox Church in today’s world is Russian. According to the established typology, universal Orthodoxy is conditionally divided into two parts: the Greek (Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Cyprus, Hellas and Albania) and Russian (Antioch, Georgia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechia-Slovakia). Romania stands apart, as it can hardly be called pro-Greek, and it is pro-Russian only situationally and declaratively. Ukraine has belonged to the Russian sphere of influence for the last three centuries. Now it wants to exit the Russian influence zone and gain independence (autocephaly) with the support of Constantinople.

Moscow or Constantinople? 

Both Constantinople and Moscow consider Ukraine their canonical territory. Christianity came to Kyiv from Constanti-nople, and Kyiv had been subordinated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople for 700 years. In 1686, due to historical circumstances, Constantinople handed over the Kyiv Metropoly to the Russian Church. Constanti-nople believes that this decision did not grant ownership of these territories to Moscow, which later “annexed” them. Therefore, Patriarch Bartholomew supposedly has the right to return the Kyiv Metropoly back to its subordination and immediately release it by giving it independence (autocephaly).

What’s the problem? 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has three religious organizations that consider themselves Orthodox. However, only one of them is considered canonical, that is, it is recognized by the Orthodox Churches of other countries: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which is part of the Russian Orthodox Church. The other two – Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) – are not recognized; Moscow calls them schismatic. It is the non-canonical nature of the UOC-KP and the UAOC that poses the greatest problem for both believers and priests. After being granted the Tomos, these churches will be able to unite into one canonical church.

The view from Kyiv

Each Ukrainian president considered creating an Orthodox Church completely independent from Moscow, but none could implement this intention. Following the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in the Donbas, such talk was revived. Ukrainian politicians have repeatedly accused the UOC-MP of serving the interests of the Kremlin. “It is not only religion but also geopolitics… This is a matter of national security, because the Kremlin sees the ROC as a key instrument of influence on Ukraine,” President Petro Poroshenko said at that time. 

The Crimea annexation and hostilities in the Donbas made the popularity of the “Moscow Church” in Ukraine decline. According to the Razumkov Center in Kyiv, the events of 2014 led to the UOC-MP losing the lead in the number of supporters among Ukrainian Churches.

The view from Constantinople

The ecumenical patriarch has repeatedly stated that the Kyiv Metropoly is its canonical territory. But only now have these words begun to encourage the patriarch to take action. 2016 was decisive: the Pan-Orthodox Council was held in Crete, for the first time in the last thousand years. It was prepared for 50 years, and for Patriarch Bartholomew it was a lifetime project. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church did not come to him. It made Patriarch Bartholomew realize that the ROC could not be trusted and that his interests coincided with the interests of Kyiv. At the moment, it seems that Patriarch Bartholomew is on the Ukrainian side: he has already unofficially promised the Tomos of autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, although Constanti-nople has not yet spoken about the decision in public.

Advantages for Constantinople 

The ecumenical patriarch is interested in the Ukrainian Church becoming autocephalous, because the Moscow Church now has the status of the largest in the Orthodox world due to Ukrainian parishes. As a result, the ROC claims that, since it is the largest, it should be the first. After the Tomos is granted, more than half of Ukrainian parishes will leave Moscow, so the “most numerous” status will be lost to Russia, as well as its primacy claims.

Poland and Estonia as precedents

In 1924, the patriarch of Constantinople gave the Tomos of autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church, which was part of the Kyiv Metropolitanate before that. Both the metropolitan of Warsaw, and President Jozef Pilsudski applied for this status. On the basis of the requests of both the Church and the president, the then-ecumenical patriarch granted the Tomos to the Polish Church.

In 1996, a similar conflict arose around the Estonian Church. In 1920s-1930s, the Estonian Orthodox Church belonged to canonical jurisdiction of Constantinople, but after the annexation of Estonia by the USSR, this Church was attached to the Russian Orthodox Church. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an independent Church was created in Estonia, and in 1996 Constanti-nople restored its autonomy. The ROC did not recognize this decision. Today there are two Orthodox canonical Churches in Estonia.

Why is the decision delayed? 

In April, after receiving a petition from Kyiv, a special commission was created in Constantinople. It consists of the three metropolitans of the Patriarchate of Constantinople who visit all the provincial Orthodox Churches. They do not ask for a permission to grant a Tomos. They simply inform other Churches about the intention of Constantinople because the ecumenical patriarch himself can grant it without the prior consent of other Orthodox Churches. This process is currently under way. 

At the same time, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church also visit the local Churches and persuade people to oppose the decision of Constantinople on autonomy for Ukraine.

Probable scenario 

If Ukraine receives the Tomos, a council of the three Ukrainian Churches will be held with the participation of the bishops of the UOC-KP, the UAOC and those of the UOC-MP who petitioned Patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly. This will be the unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. A sole primate will be elected at this council, and he will receive the Tomos. Next, the new Ukrainian Church will be in communion with all the world’s Orthodox Churches. 

It is important that the Verkhovna Rada adopt a law on the name of the Church. Although the UOC-MP is called “Ukrainian,” it is actually part of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, when a single national Ukrainian Church appears, there will be no other UOC, according to the Tomos. Therefore, those who do not want to be part of it will not have the right to be called Ukrainian. Then the UOC-MP would be the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

War for houses of worship

The wave of transition of the UOC-MP religious communities to the jurisdiction of the UOC-KP began in 2014. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Donbas, some parishes initiated meetings, polls and petitions in support of the creation of UOC-KP communities. Thus, according to the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, more than 70 communities have transitioned to the UOC-KP’s jurisdiction. The creation of a single local Church will strengthen the position of the Kyiv Patriarchate and obviously will encourage even more Orthodox communities or individual parishioners to leave the UOC-MP.

Blackmail from Moscow

After a sensational announcement about the beginning of the process of recognition of a Ukrainian autocephalous Church by Constantinople, the Russian Orthodox Church issued explicit threats: if Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew “legalizes the schismatics,” this decision will not be recognized in the Universal Orthodox Church. In addition, the ROC threatened almost the largest schism since the Great Schism of 1054. In the occupied part of the Donetsk region, the ROC has been gathering people to be sent to Kyiv as a “support group” for opponents of Ukrainian autocephaly. These people participated in the events organized by the UOC-MP on the Day of Baptism of Kyivan Rus’.

The Vatican’s position 

Moscow has even tried to seek the support of the Vatican, which has no formal influence on the Orthodox Church. During the past few months, Metropolitan Hilarion, the Russian Orthodox Church’s minister of foreign affairs, twice visited the pope. Although both visits were not an occasion to discuss the Ukrainian issue, the Vatican supported the position of the Russian Church. Firstly, the Vatican has put too much effort into establishing a dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church; secondly, it is not interested in the emergence of a canonical Orthodox Church in Ukraine that will compete with the Greek-Catholics.

What do Ukrainians think? 

About 31 percent of Ukrainians support the creation of a single local autocephalous Church, some 20 percent do not support this, 35 percent do not care, and 14 percent of respondents are not sure how to answer. This was revealed in a sociological survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Oleksandr Razumkov Center in late May 2018.

Conclusions 

At the moment, it seems that the procedure for granting a Tomos to Ukraine has already been launched, and only a force majeure can stop it. A Tomos is a historical document. If a Tomos is granted to Kyiv, then this fact will not only contribute to President Poroshenko’s election campaign, but will also divide the latest Ukrainian history into “before” and “after.”