Shouldn’t we avoid socially divisive historical issues in wartime? This was one of the arguments advanced in a letter signed by nearly 70 scholars protesting against draft laws 2538-1 and 2558, passed by Ukraine’s Parliament on April 9 but (as of this writing) not yet signed by President Petro Poroshenko. Hailing from North America and Europe (including Ukraine), the academics addressed their letter to President Poroshenko and Verkhovna Rada Chairman Volodymyr Groisman; it was published in the journal Krytyka (http://m.krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law).
Along with two others passed the same day, the draft laws form the package of four “decommunization” laws. Draft law No. 2538 concerns the legal status of the “fighters for Ukraine’s independence.” Introduced by Yurii Shukhevych, son of Ukrainian Insurgent Army leader Roman Shukhevych, it prohibits publicly insulting those fighters, or denying the rightness of their cause, though it prescribes no punishment (http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54689).
Draft law No. 2539 pertains to perpetuating the victory over Nazism, making May 8 (Victory in Europe Day) a Day of Memory and Reconciliation (May 9 would remain Victory Day, as it was in the USSR and still is in Russia). The text employs the term “World War II” rather than the Soviet and Russian “Great Patriotic War.” Replacing a law enacted in 2000, it prohibits the “falsification” of World War II history.
Law No. 2540 provides access to the archives of the Communist organs of repression from the period 1917 to 1991. Finally, law No. 2558, introduced by Oleh Lyashko and members of his Radical Party, condemns the Communist and Nazi regimes, and prohibits the propagation of their symbols (http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54670). It overturns a 2011 law recognizing the flag of the USSR as a symbol of victory in World War II.
All four bills were reportedly drafted by the Institute of National Memory headed by historian Volodymyr Viatrovych.
Pointing out that the laws on the independence fighters and totalitarian symbols were passed without serious debate, the scholars’ open letter criticizes them as violations of freedom of speech. In particular, it condemns the criminalization (in Article 6 of draft law No. 2538) of denying the legitimacy of the independence struggle, and the glorification of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Similarly, the letter opposes punishing denial of the criminal nature of the entire Communist regime (in draft law No. 2558), pointing out that in the 1920s, Soviet Ukraine experienced a period of Ukrainization. The letter also notes that during World War II, Red Army soldiers fought against Nazi Germany.
The draft laws’ politicization of history, argue the academics, amounts to a legal and administrative distortion of the past. Such measures are grist for the Russian propaganda mill, which depicts the Kyiv government as a Nazi junta that persecutes Communists and other innocent victims of Ukrainian nationalism.
In a separate article in Ab Imperio, Prof. John-Paul Himka concurs (“Legislating Historical Truth: Ukraine’s Laws of 9 April 2015,” Ab Imperio, April 21, http://net.abimperio.net/node/3442). He objects to the oversimplification of history and the lives of historical figures, pointing out that this will hurt Ukraine’s international image at a time when authoritarian Russia is taking a similar approach to its own history. Prof. Himka also criticizes draft law No. 2540 for centralizing archival collections in the Institute of National Memory – a move opposed by the Union of Archivists of Ukraine. He also asks why documents of Nazi organs of repression are not included. Josh Cohen voices similar objections in the online journal Foreign Policy (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/27/dear-ukraine-please-dont-shoot-yourself-in-the-foot-nationalists-russia-bandera-rada/).
By contrast Alexander Motyl, analyzing the draft laws in the light of the interests of justice and freedom, concludes that with some modification, they are beneficial (http://krytyka.com/ua/articles/dekomunizatsiya-ukrayiny).
There are two aspects to the April laws: prohibitive and prescriptive.
The prohibitions of insulting official heroes, condemning their struggle, “falsifying” history and disseminating totalitarian symbols unduly restrict free expression. True, denazification in postwar Germany included censorship, and statutes outlawing Holocaust denial remain. But some of the decommunization provisions are vague and overbroad, susceptible to arbitrary or selective enforcement. Insults, if truly defamatory, can only damage the living. Expressing opinions about history should not be limited in a free society. Even if history were just a set of incontrovertible facts, falsifications, in a free society, could always be corrected. Bans on symbols are unenforceable: witness the global proliferation of graffiti.
The prescriptive aspect of these laws, on the other hand, is praiseworthy. The state should promote the public celebration of the national liberation struggle, without which it would never have come into existence. Honoring military formations that fought for independence is natural: the World War II Allies honor their armed forces, even though they committed atrocities and war crimes. Ukraine is entitled to praise its heroes, even if their records are not blameless; Americans adulate their founding fathers, even though some owned slaves. Easily accessible archives will foster the search for historical truth. While prohibiting individuals from disseminating Communist or Nazi insignia smacks of totalitarianism, it is right to cleanse the public sphere of the symbols of a regime that was forcibly imposed on Ukraine and took millions of innocent lives. Housing Lenin idols in a museum of totalitarian kitsch, or selling them to Texas millionaires, would be a better solution than simply trashing them. But renaming streets and towns in a manner more reflective of Ukrainian (rather than Soviet or Russian) historical narratives would be normal, performing an important educative function.
In a time of war, neither divisive laws nor divisive debates are particularly helpful. But it is important that Ukrainians know what kind of Ukraine they are fighting for. Apparently, many do not, as we see from recent reports about draft-dodgers (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-mobilization-undermined-by-draft-dodgers/2015/04/ 25/fc3a5818-d236-11e4-8b1e-274d670 aa9c9_story.html?hpid=z5). Should Ukraine be neo-liberal, oligarchic, Christian-democratic, or nationalist and authoritarian? Will it represent a persuasive alternative to Russian-style autocracy? One cannot answer these questions adequately without the freedom to discuss history. At the same time, the state should declare what it stands for.
Therefore, Ukraine should revise and refine – not scrap – the decommunization laws.