KYIV – There have been several notable developments recently connected with the long-standing efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the Russian war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas.
Although it is still early to predict their impact, the cumulative initial effect has been to provide new impetus to a problematic process that often appears stalled or even moribund. And on this occasion, Kyiv has publicly assumed the initiative and thrown the ball back in Moscow’s court.
The changing of the guard at the end of July in the Ukrainian delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), consisting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia and Ukraine and based in Minsk – with former President Leonid Kravchuk, age 86, replacing another former president, Leonid Kuchma, 82 – has received most attention.
There has been considerable discussion on whether the crafty political veteran will make a difference, or, if in view of his advanced age, will simply serve as a symbolic figurehead maintaining the high level of Ukraine’s representation in the TCG.
While Mr. Kravchuk’s appointment by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to this position is certainly intriguing, it should not overshadow other related developments affecting the context, especially the critical agreement on a general ceasefire and its implementation.
More than 13,000 people have been killed since fighting broke out in 2014, despite the peace accords signed in Minsk late 2014 and 2015 on which the TCG bases itself.
The need for a general ceasefire as a prerequisite for other peace-building measures was acknowledged and agreed to by the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine at their Normandy Four summit in Paris last December. But, as on previous occasions, the ceasefire was not implemented.
The lack of progress in following up on the agreements reached in Paris meant that the next Normandy Four summit, which was supposed to have been held in the spring, did not happen. Firing and shelling continued, resulting in more casualties, suffering and destruction.
From the outset, Russia has officially maintained the pretense that it is not a party to the conflict in the Donbas and is merely a moderator in the TCG. It insists that Ukraine deal directly with its proxies in the occupied areas around Donetsk and Luhansk. Both under President Petro Poroshenko and his successor, Mr. Zelenskyy, Kyiv has refused to do so.
Russia has also pressured Ukraine to recognize a special status for the occupied areas and agree to local elections being held there. But on July 15, Moscow’s strategy was dealt a severe blow when the Ukrainian Parliament fixed October 25 as the date for local elections only on the territory under the control of Kyiv.
The Verkhovna Rada thereby affirmed that, under the present conditions, democratic elections in accordance with Ukrainian law and international norms are not possible in the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk.
This setback appears to have caused some disarray in Moscow. And mixed signals have been emerging from it.
Surprisingly, on July 21 a TCG meeting held by video conferencing, produced what the Presidential Office of Ukraine called a “breakthrough.” The representatives of the OSCE, Ukraine and Russia, with the latter unofficially including representatives of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” under its wing, agreed on a “full, comprehensive ceasefire” effective July 27.
The Presidential Office issued a statement expressing the basic preconditions for holding elections in Donbas. “Elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are only possible after a comprehensive de-escalation; withdrawal of foreign military units and equipment, disarmament of illegal armed formations; restoration of control by the Ukrainian government over the Ukrainian-Russian border,” it read.
On the eve of the ceasefire, July 26, President Zelenskyy held a phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Afterwards, he confirmed that the ceasefire was welcomed by both sides and that the two leaders had discussed the implementation of the agreements reached during the Normandy Four summit in Paris.
The ceasefire came into effect at the agreed-upon time. Although the Ukrainian side has noted sporadic minor violations since then, it appears that, over all, the ceasefire has been observed – certainly more effectively and for longer than on previous occasions.
Against this encouraging background, two other events occurred.
Unexpectedly, in the last week of July, the deputy head of the Administration of the President of Russia, Dmitry Kozak, sent letters to advisers of the Normandy format leaders, allegedly calling the talks on the Donbas at the level of advisers “meaningless” and suggested abandoning them. This move created confusion, and the Kremlin hurriedly clarified that Russia did not intend to withdraw from the Normandy process.
The head of Mr. Zelenskyy’s Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, who has been tapped by the Ukrainian leader as his principal negotiator with Russia, told Interfax-Ukraine on July 31 that the negotiation process has been “qualitatively reformatted” and that “Ukraine has taken a proactive and tougher position.” In his opinion, Mr. Kozak’s letter was “rather about a subtle diplomatic game, when one of the parties to the negotiations wants to strengthen its positions and seize the initiative.”
At this time, it became known that Mr. Kuchma was relinquishing his role as head of the Ukrainian delegation in the TCG – a position to which he had been appointed by President Petro Poroshenko. No explanation was provided, and most commentators assumed he had grown weary of what often seemed to be a thankless task. President Zelenskyy thanked Mr. Kuchma for his contribution to the peace process.
In fact, the real head of the Ukrainian delegation in the TCG for some time now has been the capable legal specialist Oleskii Reznikov, who is also deputy prime minister and minister for reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, When asked on July 29 who would replace Mr. Kuchma in the TCG, the president named Messrs. Reznikov and Kravchuk as the leading candidates.
President Zelenskyy elaborated: “We need to find a balance, a person whom Russia talks to, a person who, most importantly, is respected in Ukraine, a person who can dominate the negotiating table, a person who can react, who will not betray Ukraine in difficult moments, in challenging moments. A person with experience and a person who is neither right nor left, is a centrist, he maintains a balance, is respected by most Ukraine’s population, both in the east and in the west”
The following day, President Zelenskyy confirmed his choice appointing the first president of post-Soviet independent Ukraine, Mr. Kravchuk, to the position. The 86-year-old politician and statesman responded that, at a time of war, “when our young boys and girls are dying, defending our land… and sovereignty,” he could not refuse. “I have made my decision… I want to do something to speed up the attainment of peace in the Donbas. I will do it to my last breath,” he said in a video commentary.
Since then, Messrs. Kravchuk and Reznikov have begun to work in tandem and have produced some proposals, which, if not entirely new, are being skillfully updated and repackaged by them. They are talking about the need to develop an economic strategy for the re-development of this war-torn, destroyed and plundered region. Mr. Kravchuk has also invited his former prime minister, 87-year-old Vitold Fokin, a native of the Donbas, to help.
Within his first week in his new position, Mr. Kravchuk was not afraid to give a video interview to a scandalous Russian TV propagandist in order to get the Ukrainian position across to a Russian audience. He also voiced his preliminary ideas on how he sees the way forward.
Mr. Kravchuk has spoken about the need for dialogue and compromises, but has been careful to stress that he does not mean speaking directly with Moscow’s proxies and thereby legitimizing them, nor conceding on matters of principle as regards Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Instead of a “special status” for the Donbas, he proposes negotiating a compromise “special system of governance.” He wants the United States to be involved in the Donbas peace process and to invite representatives of the occupied Donbas to formulate their views of the region’s future.
In short, there is finally some movement in this delicate sphere. Although it is still premature to confirm that a breakthrough has been made and can be sustained, suddenly the situation seems more promising than in the first half of this year.