Twenty years ago, on June 4, 1997, nearly 100 people attended a daylong conference, “After NATO Expands: Consequences for Ukraine and the Baltics,” that was co-hosted by Freedom House and the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York.
Panelists included: Victoria Nuland, U.S. State Department fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Alexander Motyl, associate director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University; Riina Kionka, counselor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia; and Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United States Yuri Shcherbak. Adrian Karatnycky, president of Freedom House, served as moderator, and the keynote address was delivered by Carlos Pascual, director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council.
Each panelist was asked to respond to the potential security vacuum that could be created after NATO expansion, how NATO expansion affects intra-regional relations in Central and Eastern Europe, the effect of NATO expansion on Russia’s behavior, and the vulnerability of Ukraine and the Baltic states to Russian hegemony.
Ms. Nuland, citing the May 1997 report “Russia, Its Neighbors and An Enlarging NATO,” underscored the report’s recommendation that NATO expansion is necessary to increase stability in Europe, as NATO promotes members to find mutual solutions to old problems, including agreements signed by Ukraine, Russian Poland and Romania.
Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor, stated in the report that “…NATO should not be the vehicle for building a greater Europe. It is a special-purpose organization and should be kept that way. The proper foundation for Euro-Atlantic building is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, not NATO.”
Dr. Motyl also voiced skepticism of NATO expansion, as the expansion tended to benefit the West and the U.S., rather than Ukraine and the Baltic states. Dr. Motyl warned that a security issue may arise that will make documents and charters obsolete, delineating “between those that are in and those that are out of NATO.” Those that are out, he explained, would be vulnerable to Russian hegemony, not necessarily only in a military sense.
Given the choices of complete expansion, no expansion at all or to expand partially, Dr. Motyl said that the decision by NATO to expand partially does not address the threat to Europe from Russia. Incorporating countries that are not ready to join NATO and ill-prepared to fend off Russian influence does not improve the security situation of these countries that are forced to pursue multi-vector policies. Russia, Dr. Motyl added, will see NATO expansion as the West’s intrusion into its sphere of influence, and Russia should be expected to retaliate.
Mr. Pascual supported NATO expansion as a guarantee of a peaceful, stable and undivided Europe, and said that the latest countries to be admitted at the NATO summit in Madrid would not be the last. Mr. Pascual noted the U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership and the establishment of the U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission, as well as the NATO-Ukraine Charter that was signed earlier in May 1997. At the time, Ukraine voiced its stance that nuclear weapons should not be based on the territories of new NATO members. Also notable: earlier that year, Ukraine and Russia had signed key points of an agreement on the basing of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.
Source: “Conference explores consequences of NATO expansion,” by Irene Jarosewich, The Ukrainian Weekly, June 15, 1997.