KYIV – Earlier this month, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unexpectedly fired two-thirds of the Ukrainian government and the country’s prosecutor general.
Both domestic and foreign observers agree that the changes of senior officials were rash and mishandled from a PR point of view. But they remain divided on what was behind them. Do they reflect the impulsiveness and inexperience of a political newcomer determined to achieve prompt results? Or do they signify a capitulation to the forces from the past, a new Faustian deal with a reshuffled pack of hegemonic oligarchs?
Meanwhile, other critical questions have been re-opened alongside these concerning how the Zelenskyy administration is handling its approach towards Russia and the war in the Donbas.
Is the Zelenskyy administration preparing to deal directly with Moscow’s puppet enclaves in the Donbas? Why has a senior official – an advisor to the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Serhiy Syvokho – been allowed to call the war in the east an internal Ukrainian conflict? Would Kyiv be prepared to trade renewing water supplies to occupied Crimea in return for concessions from the Kremlin, as initially implied by the country’s new prime minister, Denys Shmyhal?
Last, but not least, why have the president and the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Dmytro Razumkov, remained silent about a visit on March 10 to Moscow by the leader of Russia’s fifth column in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk, at the head of a delegation of deputies from the Opposition Platform – For Life?
In short, the main topic of the month has been what do President Zelenskyy’s actions mean for Ukraine’s proclaimed course both at home and abroad?
Mr. Zelenskyy himself says that he made the changes to ensure a more credible performance from his team – concrete results, not just talk and gearing up. Some adjustments were probably called for, especially replacing enthusiasm with experience.
But the changes have raised doubts, rather than hopes.
The new prime minister, 44-year-old Mr. Shmyhal, was a former governor of the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast and also worked for a time for oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.
The new minister of finance, Ihor Usmansky, replaced the respected Oksana Makarova. A former deputy minister, he has been accused of being involved in corruption, including helping the Yanukovych family and having been a favorite of former president Petro Poroshenko’s shady associate Ihor Kononenko.
And this week Ihor Petrashko was appointed minister of economic development, trade and agriculture. He previously worked for a Russian state-owned bank and more recently as deputy CEO of an agro-industrial complex belonging to a fugitive oligarch accused of embezzlement, Oleg Bakhmatyuk.
The controversial minister of internal affairs, Arsen Avakov, was among the ministers who were retained, indicating his powerful influence and role as a perceived guarantor of protection for the Zelenskyy administration. Significantly, his protege Vladyslav Kryklii was also kept on as minister of infrastructure.
In the foreign policy sphere, the previous minister, Vadym Prystaiko, was redeployed as vice prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration and was replaced as foreign affairs minister by the articulate Dmytro Kuleba, who has been an equally capable representative of Ukraine’s interests in Euro-Atlantic structures.
The position of Prosecutor General was filled on March 17 by Iryna Venediktova, 41, a legal specialist from Kharkiv, who recently had a short spell heading the State Bureau of Investigation. She became the first woman to head this key law-enforcement institution. In her address to the Ukrainian Parliament she promised honesty and no-nonsense. There is no political persecution in Ukraine, she declared, and thieves should be behind bars. Since she has been a key figure in the Servant of the People party, concern has been voiced about her political engagement.
But why were the changes done in such an abrupt way that undermined the country’s top managerial team which the president himself had appointed? Mr. Zelenskyy has demonstrated that he is impatient and indicated that he wants more tangible signs of accelerated movement forward.
Some of the ministerial changes do suggest improvement. For example, in the critical defense sector, at a time of war, a professional with a military background, Andriy Taran, has replaced a civilian. A retired lieutenant-general, he headed the presidential campaign of Ihor Smeshko. Similarly, in the health sector, Illia Yemets, a cardiologist with international experience who has already been a minister in this sphere, has been brought back.
Nevertheless, Mr. Zelenskyy’s critics suspect that, for all his talk of a new start, he has caved in to the oligarchs. Either to Ihor Kolomoisky, who is fighting to maintain his financial and political clout, or the more discreet but in fact pre-eminent oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. Some also worry that pro-Russian forces are gaining the upper hand.
Given the enduring realities inherited from the Yanukovych and the Poroshenko eras, it is naive to think that a new reformist president can simply extricate himself from the restrictive political and economic system engendered by his predecessors and the oligarchic setup. Behind-the-scenes trade-offs and shifting alliances of convenience remain a necessity of political life. Thus, internal adjustments and political reconfiguration are only to be expected.
Some also worry that pro-Russian forces are gaining the upper hand. Here the question of the objectives and impact of Mr. Zelenskyy’s new right-hand man Andriy Yermak, who is suspected of being pro-Russian, will be important to monitor carefully. It might yet turn out to be a case of better the devil you knew – Mr. Zelenskyy’s former unpopular main adviser Andriy Bohdan – than the one you don’t know, his slicker and possibly more devious successor, Mr. Yermak.
And there is even noticeable disarray within Mr. Zelenskyy’s ruling party – Servant of the People – itself. Over 50 lawmakers within it have condemned the administration and its chief of staff, Mr. Yermak, for having agreed to create a so-called advisory council that would include representatives of both Ukraine and the Russian-led militants occupying parts of the Donbas region. And some are now reported to be forming a group called Democratic Platform to support Mr. Zelenskyy’s reformist course but block the interference of Mr. Kolomoisky and other external factors.
Will what has happened change Ukraine’s trajectories at home and abroad? The signs suggest neither a volte face, nor a calamitous tumble into the abyss.
Mr. Zelenskyy himself has been saying that the latest changes are meant to reinforce the movement forward. He and his new prime minister have stressed their undeviating commitment to reform and cooperation on this regard with Ukraine’s allies and creditors. They have signaled their resolve to meet the International Monetary Fund’s conditions in order for Ukraine to receive a vital new tranche of financial support that has been on hold for a lengthy period.
Observers say there is no reason to suspect that Mr. Zelenskyy is shifting away from the country’s pro-European course and the goal of integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. He has been, and remains, firmer with Russia and its aggression than all had expected.
Mr. Zelenskyy’s tactics, and lack of tact, deservedly invite questioning, as do some of his latest appointments. But it would be premature to question his commitment to his proclaimed goals and longer-term strategy. The jury is still out, at least for a while longer. Meanwhile, the need to take emergency measures against the coronavirus and its devastating financial consequences has gravely complicated matters and dramatically increased the challenges facing Ukraine and its government.