KYIV – The language issue has recently flared up again in Ukraine. What is behind it and how seriously should it be taken?
Certainly, scenes from the middle of July of hundreds of protesters, gathered outside the Verkhovna Rada to defend the Ukrainian language against alleged attempts to weaken its official position, suggested that another major battle over this perennially sensitive issue is under way.
On the other hand, reassuring statements from the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and other key figures in his administration have indicated that the fears are exaggerated and there is no need for patriotic forces to over-react.
One thing remains clear, almost 30 years after Ukraine achieved its independence, the issue of the role and status of the Ukrainian language, although seemingly buttressed by law, remains a powerful tool with which to manipulate public opinion and sow disunity.
Pro-Russian forces do not hesitate to promote Moscow’s narrative about the supposed discrimination against Russian speakers in Ukraine and about them as an allegedly oppressed minority.
For their part, the more radical nationalist forces have tended to show an impatience bordering on insensitivity in demanding from their fellow citizens that they switch over to Ukrainian from Russian, or other minority languages, and by questioning implicitly, or explicitly, the level of their patriotism.
In the most recent instance of this enduring tension, supporters of the former president, Petro Poroshenko, and their allies have taken up the cry that “anti-Ukrainian” elements are out to undo the breakthrough achieved during the final stages of his administration in getting Ukrainian recognized as the country’s only official language and boosting Ukrainianization measures.
Undoubtedly, the law adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on April 25, 2019, was historic. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Stalin had reversed the policy of controlled Ukrainianization and replaced it with terror and Russification.
Only when the Soviet Union began faltering under Mikhail Gorbachev were Ukrainians able to begin undoing the damage and bolster the status of their native language. In October 1989, the Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada of Soviet Ukraine adopted a groundbreaking law designating Ukrainian as the state language of the republic. The deputies of that time realized that securing this recognition for the Ukrainian language was a vital underpinning for proclaiming the sovereignty and, eventually, the independence of the republic.
Surprisingly, during the almost three decades of independent statehood after 1991, there were no other major advances with Ukrainianization and enhancement of the role of the Ukrainian language. Presidents came and went, switching to Ukrainian as was expected of them, but the status quo endured. If anything – especially during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – the Ukrainian language lost ground again.
After the Revolution of Dignity that ousted Mr. Yanukovych in early 2014 and Russia’s subsequent aggression against Ukraine, many hoped that a more active Ukrainianization policy would be officially pursued. But Mr. Poroshenko for some reason waited until his final year in office before addressing this task. Adopting the mantle of a staunch patriot, he went into the presidential election with the slogans: “Army, Language and Faith.”
The relevant bill was approved in its first reading in October 2018 but generated thousands of amendments from opponents determined to block it. After months of delaying tactics, the “Law on Guaranteeing the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language” was finally adopted on April 25, 2019. With hundreds of demonstrators outside urging them on, 278 national deputies voted in favor.
The law stated that the only official language in Ukraine is Ukrainian and, therefore, “any attempts to implement multilingualism in Ukraine” are against the Ukrainian Constitution and seen as “provoking a language schism in the country, as well as ethnic strife aimed at a forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order.”
Furthermore, every Ukrainian citizen should know Ukrainian. High-level state and law enforcement officials must use the language. The use of Ukrainian is also mandatory for deputies (at all levels), court judges, lawyers, educational institution directors and medical care workers, among others. The law stipulates the pre-eminence to be given Ukrainian in the service sector, media, publishing and on websites.
A special ombudsman would be appointed by Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers to protect and promote the development of the Ukrainian language, according to the law
The Kremlin and domestic opponents in Ukraine still hoped that the law would be torpedoed as it was still subject to the new president’s “thorough analysis,” as well as endorsement by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission.
President-elect Zelenskyy announced he would ensure that “the constitutional rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens are respected.” He added, “My position is that the state should contribute to the development of the Ukrainian language by establishing incentives and positive examples, and not by pursuing bans and punishments, complicating bureaucratic procedures and multiplying the number of officials instead of reducing it.”
Mr. Zelenskyy also noted that Mr. Poroshenko had pushed the law through during the election period and that this made it “a hostage of political rhetoric.” The law, he added, had been passed without a sufficiently broad discussion with the public.
The law came into force on July 16, 2019. When in office, President Zelenskyy did not publicly challenge it, and himself switched to using Ukrainian in public life. But within his diverse mono-party majority, Servant of the People, it was clear that there were both supporters and strong opponents of the law.
The Council of Europe’s constitutional experts eventually criticized some aspects of the controversial law. Its Venice Commission on December 6, 2019, noted the extremely short transition period for the conversion of Russian-language schools into Ukrainian-language institutions. The commission also said it considers quotas for minority languages in radio and TV programs to be unbalanced.
The law was sent to Ukraine’s Constitutional Court for its opinion.
President Zelenskyy clarified his position on the language question at a press conference on May 20. He told journalists there was no language issue on the agenda, acknowledging “This issue is very artificial.” He added that the language rights of national minorities needed to be protected, but it was normal that they should know Ukrainian. He admitted that this issue was a source of dispute between Hungary and Ukraine, and expressed confidence that it would be resolved.
But during the early summer, the divergences within the Servant of the People faction on the language law surfaced and quickly generated concerns and protests from the Poroshenko camp.
At the end of May, Verkhovna Rada Chairman Dmytro Razumkov said that the law on ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language needed to be changed. He confirmed that bills had been registered in Parliament but had not yet been included on the agenda of plenary meetings.
Mr. Razumkov also acknowledged that the Servant of the People party did not have a united position on the matter. “There are deputies who are too radical in defending the Ukrainian language, and there are those who will adopt a completely opposite position… But it seems to me that the greater part will adhere to the centrist position, in this matter as well,” he commented.
The amendment attracting the most attention was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada by Servant of the People National Deputy Maksym Buzhansky. He has suggested postponing the transition of schoolchildren who are currently studying in Russian to the Ukrainian language. His bill also wants to abolish the rule that at least 80 percent of the educational process must be in Ukrainian.
Interestingly, his bill was rejected by another member of his faction who heads one of the parliamentary committees, Mykola Poturayev, while yet another party colleague, the deputy head of the same faction, Oleksandr Kornienko, managed to get it placed on the Rada’s agenda. It was expected to be considered on July 16 and drew public protests. But its discussion was postponed.
At the beginning of July, an unexpected and seemingly authoritative view was voiced by a top official in the current administration. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov told Ukrayinska Pravda: “The issue of language is very important and fundamental for the state. We cannot have a second language, like Russian, not because it does not need to be studied or known. If we are talking about Ukraine, there must be the only state language – Ukrainian.”
“Should there be a second language in Ukraine? Of course, there should be. But it should be English, which will be studied from kindergarten. All citizens of Ukraine, if we want to live in a civilized world, should know and use English. This is a mandatory thing,” Mr. Danilov noted.
So, as things stand, it still is unclear if Mr. Buzhansky’s bill will be considered before the end of the summer, though Mr. Razumkov suggests it will, and what chance it will stand of getting through. Senior officials have been saying that, in any case, it will be out of date by that time because the school year will have started. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has now begun its consideration of the 2019 Language Law. And finally, the government has just appointed a Language Ombudsman, Taras Kremin, whose nomination was approved without controversy.
Most commentators agree that the latest perceived threat to the Ukrainian language is probably not as serious right now as it is made out to be. They are inclined to believe that the president and his Servant of the People party are in fact preparing for the local elections in October and are anxious to retain their support in the south and east of the country, where Russian speakers predominate. Hence this tactic of mixed signals.