Seven years ago, on March 19, 2008, 10 NATO member-countries wrote to the alliance’s Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, urging that Georgia and Ukraine be granted Membership Action Plans at the NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008. Canada was joined by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia in signing the document.
Noticeably absent was Hungary, whose Socialist government “conducts a Hungarian mini-version of Ostpolitik with Russia,” wrote Vladimir Socor of the Eurasian Daily Monitor. Other doubters included Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.
Mr. Socor noted: “…Real differences over the Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs could have been resolved in the course of existing NATO consultation processes, without public confrontation among allies. However, the German government and Chancellor Angela Merkel personally short-circuited those consultation processes, which were set to continue after the March 6 Brussels meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of NATO countries. Instead, Ms. Merkel held talks two days later with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to establish a common front against the Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs.”
President George W. Bush said during Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s March 19-20, 2008, visit to Washington, “I believe that NATO would benefit from Georgian membership.” The U.S. was set to press for a political decision regarding Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs that would have been adopted at the Bucharest summit.
The letter’s signatories argued that it is in NATO’s interest and to the benefit of Euro-Atlantic security and stability to integrate Georgia and Ukraine further. Each round of NATO enlargement has strengthened the alliance, despite initial doubts, they added.
A negative response to Georgia and Ukraine would generate doubts about NATO’s continuation of its open-door policy, would deprive Ukraine and Georgia of a chance to choose their place in the European security architecture, and would leave the impression that outside factors were able to exert influence on the alliance’s decision-making.
The signatories also underscored the value of MAPs as a tool in promoting internal reforms in the aspirant countries and stimulating them to improve relations with neighboring countries. Ukraine and Georgia compared favorably with the situation in current MAP countries that were at the beginning of their first MAP cycles.
The document also warned that the MAP debate was testing NATO’s adherence to its own principles and procedures, and urged inviting Ukraine and Georgia to participate in MAPs at the Bucharest summit.
Moscow suggested that the Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs were essentially a U.S. project that would spoil European relations with Russia. These “newcomers” to the alliance were portrayed by Moscow as an erosion of Germany’s and France’s influence.
The document was denounced by Moscow as a Washington-directed move to divide Germany and France from other countries in the alliance, as stated by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, who is now deputy prime minister of Russia.
Source: “NATO members stating the case for Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs,” by Vladimir Socor (Eurasia Daily Monitor), The Ukrainian Weekly, March 30, 2008.