On February 12, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany reached an agreement in Minsk, Belarus, on a new ceasefire in Ukraine (The Ukrainian Weekly, February 15). The 13-point document replaces the Minsk agreement of September 5, 2014, which it resembles. Among other things, it calls for the removal of heavy weapons. The crucial monitoring of the Russian-Ukrainian border, however, depends on a political settlement acceptable to Russia, and in any case will not be possible at least until next year. The Crimea is not even mentioned. Skeptics view this as just another Russian tactical maneuver.
Did U.S. plans to ship arms to Ukraine prompt Russia to talk? The bipartisan Ukraine Freedom Support Act, passed by both houses of Congress and signed by President Barack Obama last December 18, calls for lethal defensive military aid to Ukraine. This is more than the non-lethal aid promised earlier, such as rations, night-vision goggles and bulletproof vests – only about half of which has been delivered. It would include essential items like surveillance drones, radar systems that can spot the sources of rocket and artillery attacks, secure communications systems, and anti-tank weapons like the Javelin that could stand up to Russian armor.
Yet as the issue of U.S. military aid to Ukraine came to a head in Washington in early February, opponents advanced several arguments. Katrina van den Heuvel outlined some in The Washington Post (February 10). Ishaan Tharoor advanced others in the same publication the following day. In a February 19 debate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Eugene Rumer and Jeremy Shapiro set forth more arguments against U.S. military aid to Ukraine (ably countered by former U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine John Herbst and Steven Pifer). The silliest of all these is that military aid to Ukraine might provoke Russia – as if a Russia at war with Ukraine for nearly a year needed provoking. The strongest, to my mind, are that military aid (1) could never suffice for Ukraine to defeat Russia, and (2) would only escalate the conflict, prompting Russia to inflict a crushing defeat on Ukraine. Mr. Rumer feels that military aid could eventually result in the U.S. sending troops, with disastrous consequences. While Russia sees Ukraine as a core interest, which it will pursue at almost any cost, the U.S. does not.
That an all-out assault by Russia – even against a Ukraine armed to the teeth with U.S. weapons – would ultimately succeed, is indisputable. Russia’s army is several times larger and much better funded than Ukraine’s. But such an assault would be costly. Ukraine may not be able to push Russian forces out of its territory, but given adequate armaments, it could make a continued occupation unaffordable for a country already weakened by economic sanctions. No one is advocating sending U.S. troops. But if the U.S. has no vital interest in Ukraine, it has no interest in Europe. As for Russia’s “core interest” in Ukraine – that is negotiable. After all, didn’t Russia once have a “core interest” in a divided Germany?
Should the aid only be defensive? That kind of technology would have been useful before Russia invaded the Crimea. When one is defending the remainder of one’s country from attacks launched on enemy-occupied territory, does the distinction make sense? Defensive weapons can only hold the current line. But as long as Russian forces remain on its territory, Ukraine will remain in danger of new attacks. With part of its land occupied and used as a staging area for overt or covert operations, Ukraine will not be able to function as a free country. To stop further invasion, Ukraine needs to clear Russian troops from its land. That requires offensive weapons.
Is Russia in fact interested in peace? At Minsk last September 5, the Trilateral Contact Group, upon the initiatives of Presidents Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, issued the Minsk Protocol. http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true (Russian version, from the OSCE website). Of the 12 points of the protocol, some, like OSCE monitoring and verification of a security zone along the Russian-Ukrainian border (Point 4), were rendered impossible by continued war. Others were simply ignored. The rebels repeatedly violated the ceasefire (Point 1). The humanitarian situation in the separatist-controlled Donbas deteriorated to a catastrophic level (despite Point 8). The release of all hostages and illegally detained persons such as Lt. Nadiya Savchenko, required by Point 5, did not occur. Russia did not remove the illegal armed formations it is sponsoring in Ukraine, nor the military technology, troops or mercenaries it has sent there (Point 10). In fact, the separatists made new offensives, gaining over 200 square miles of territory. Moreover, Russia has reportedly supplied the rebels with new tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers and multiple rocket launchers. The debacle of Debaltseve shows it is unlikely that Minsk 2 will succeed where Minsk 1 failed.
There is, of course, a threshold ethical question. Is it right to supply even non-lethal defensive military equipment to Ukraine? For a strict pacifist, no. Many of us have a moral revulsion to supplying instruments of death. But if a nation has the right to defend itself against aggression, a fellow nation has the right to help it. But if lethal defensive arms are acceptable, what is the moral distinction between defensive and offensive ones? Ukraine needs to recover territory, not invade Russia.
But isn’t it hypocritical, or at least illogical, to advocate arms for the purpose of peace? Hardly. It is simplistic – and demonstrably false – to think that pacifism guarantees peace. A credible deterrent, on the other hand, can persuade an aggressor to back off. My grandfather, who lived through two world wars and fought in Ukraine’s war for independence, used to cite the Roman maxim “Si vis pacem – para bellum.” If you want peace, prepare for war. Combined with stronger economic sanctions targeting Russia’s war-making capacity as well as tough diplomacy, such a policy could conceivably succeed. Nothing else, apparently, will.