Informal discussions are sputtering along between Washington and Moscow over implementation of the Minsk armistice in Ukraine. This bilateral process originated in May 2015 as an accompaniment to the Obama administration’s decision to seek Russia’s “help” on Syria. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland has been tasked to conduct the unofficial discussions with Moscow about Ukraine, initially with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Grigory Karasin after May 2015 and continuing with top presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov since January of this year. Each side has its own understanding of what the implementation of the ceasefire, and particularly “full implementation,” means.
Unlike the multilateral Normandy format (Germany, France, Ukraine, Russia) and its Minsk Contact Group appendage (Ukraine, Russia, the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the bilateral Washington-Moscow channel is not designed for any systematic or comprehensive negotiations. Instead, it pursues what Obama administration officials would call “creative solutions,” or face-saving quick fixes, interim compromises that might look like progress.
According to Assistant Secretary Nuland, on her latest visit in Moscow (Interfax, May 18), this bilateral channel operates “in parallel with” and as a “reinforcement of” the Normandy format, “by agreement with its participants.” However, the Normandy format (for all its flaws) is partly transparent, politically accountable to some extent and operating on the authority of state leaders. By contrast, the bilateral Washington-Moscow channel is wholly non-transparent, and the higher political authority behind it may be presumed but remains invisible. While the Normandy format deals with “the Ukraine crisis” only, the bilateral Washington-Moscow channel seems at times to deal with both Ukraine and Syria, generating speculation about some “package” solutions in this opaque process.
The political priority in all negotiating formats at this stage is to hold elections in the Russian-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” (DPR, LPR), in accordance with the Minsk armistice and OSCE standards. Ms. Nuland has been urging Kyiv to go along with such elections, on the assumption that Moscow would allow the ceasefire to take hold. Last month in Kyiv, Ms. Nuland called for those elections to be held by July, which would demonstrate Ukrainian compliance with the Minsk armistice and persuade the West collectively to prolong the sanctions on Russia. State Department spokesman Mark Toner corroborated this, describing the July voting date as desirable, though not rigid (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, April 26). In return, Ms. Nuland promised (as on her previous visits) that Washington would press for the withdrawal of Russian forces and the restoration of Ukraine’s control along the DPR-LPR-controlled border with Russia, once those elections are held (Ukrayinska Pravda, April 25–27).
This chronological sequence is that of the Minsk ceasefire, but the obligations weigh on Ukraine only. Even if Ukraine assents to those elections, Russia has no obligation to follow up by withdrawing its forces or allowing Ukraine to regain control of the border.
According to some insiders to this process, the Surkov-Nuland meeting on January 15 near Kaliningrad had discussed creative solutions that might ease Kyiv’s assent to DPR-LPR elections. For example, Russian heavy weaponry would be assembled at certain designated points, under OSCE oversight, in the occupied territory (rather than being withdrawn to Russia). And DPR-LPR personnel would be assigned to serve with Ukrainian border troops in that territory (rather than Ukraine regaining sovereign control of the border) after those elections would have been held. Ironically, those two scenarios could result in Russian heavy weaponry and crews being re-flagged as DPR-LPR (to eschew withdrawal to Russia), and DPR-LPR personnel in the border troops being re-flagged as Ukrainian (to claim Russian compliance with the Minsk armistice, once Ukraine will have recognized those elections).
All this would in fact be consistent with the letter of the Minsk armistice. That document does not even mention the Russian forces in Ukraine’s east; and it envisages that Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk would negotiate (share) control of the Ukrainian side of the Ukraine-Russia border after those local elections. These are cautionary signs to Ukraine. Even if Kyiv accepts the proposed elections to legitimize the DPR-LPR, and enshrines their constitutional status, no one can guarantee that Russia would reciprocate by withdrawing its forces or allowing Ukraine to regain control of the border.
Ms. Nuland met with Mr. Surkov and, separately, with Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Ryabkov, on May 17-18 in Moscow. Her visit followed up on the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, held two days earlier in Vienna, where they discussed Ukraine and Syria. In Moscow, Mr. Surkov is responsible for overseeing the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” reporting directly to President Vladimir Putin; while Mr. Ryabkov is known to handle the Syria dossier.
In both meetings, Ms. Nuland confirmed on President Barack Obama’s authority that “if and when Minsk is fully implemented, sanctions [on Russia] can be rolled back” (Interfax, May 16, 18).
However, all the sides involved differ in their interpretations of the armistice and what may constitute partial or full implementation. In the short term, Ukraine is being urged to accept elections in the Russian-controlled territory, thus implementing a major phase of the armistice unilaterally. Kyiv is calling, in almost desperate tones, for an OSCE armed police mission to provide security both for the OSCE’s own ceasefire monitors and for the proposed elections (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 20, May 20). However, the United States has yet to speak its word on this matter.
According to the United States government’s official account of the May 17-18 meeting between Ms. Nuland and Mr. Surkov, the talks focused on improving security “in the Donbas” as well as increasing access to this region for the OSCE preparatory to elections there (The Moscow Times, May 19).
Ms. Nuland evidenced a sense of urgency about “elections” to be staged in the Donbas under the Minsk armistice (reached in February 2015): “We want to see Minsk implemented as soon as possible. It is now time to really step on the gas and see this implemented.” Ms. Nuland referenced those elections (as she regularly does) as a Ukrainian “obligation”; but this time she did not mention the withdrawal of Russian forces or the handover of control along the border as a Russian quid-pro-quo (if not obligation). She appealed to “Donbas” authorities not to stage elections unilaterally, outside the Minsk framework; instead, “we would respectfully encourage them to focus on Minsk-compliant elections” (i.e., elections that could be validated to “implement Minsk”). Ms. Nuland characterized her talks with Mr. Surkov as “very thorough” and “very constructive” (U.S. Embassy Moscow press release, May 18).
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, however, poured cold water on Ms. Nuland’s account of the meeting with Mr. Surkov: “This was not supposed to produce any results, it was only a brief exchange of views” (Interfax, May 19).
In Washington, Secretary of State Kerry marked the release of Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko from Russian captivity (she had been abducted in 2014 from Ukrainian territory) with a statement that lowered the bar for elections to be held in Russian-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” (DPR-LPR). Mr. Kerry set minimal prerequisites to staging those elections, to wit: a durable ceasefire, full access by the OSCE to the entire territory and election observation by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to determine compatibility with its standards (State Department press release, May 25).
Mr. Kerry’s assent to elections being held “under Ukrainian electoral law” is a coded phrase. “Ukrainian law” in this case means a new, “hybridized” law that Kyiv is supposed to negotiate with the leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” as the Minsk armistice prescribes. Staging elections under such a law would disqualify such elections a priori. Once those elections have been held with Ukraine’s assent, Mr. Kerry promised, the withdrawal of “foreign forces” could follow; but no one can guarantee or enforce this (hence the euphemism “foreign”) even at the cost of Ukraine’s legalizing the DPR-LPR through elections.
The “return to Ukraine of full control over its international border [with Russia]” is another coded phrase. Under the Minsk armistice, Kyiv is supposed to negotiate with the DPR-LPR authorities about sharing control of that border. Mr. Kerry’s sequence of steps reproduces that in the Minsk armistice (from which Kyiv is trying hard to extricate itself) and ignores Ukraine’s multiple legal and democratic safeguards in place against sham DPR-LPR elections (see EDM, April 20, May 20).
The Kremlin may calculate that certain figures in the Obama administration are preoccupied with legacy issues, striving to show at least some interim result in implementing the Minsk ceasefire before the administration’s time in office runs out. Seasoned commentators in the Russian press speculate on that legacy factor, probably reflecting what they hear from Russian officials on that account (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 19). A similar logic may soon apply to the Normandy format, all of whose Western protagonists will face elections along with legacy issues next year. The OSCE’s 2016 year-end conference is also a deadline for the German chairmanship to claim some achievement, which is possible only with Russia’s cooperation in this organization.
In that context, Russia will likely aim for some interim agreements under the guise of “implementing Minsk,” ideally through the proposed elections, but also through smaller steps attainable during the months ahead. The goal would be to elicit de facto acceptance of the DPR-LPR as participants in multilateral negotiations and signatories to interim agreements. This could elevate the DPR-LPR to the same level of de facto acceptance as Transnistria for example, with or without valid local elections. For now, Moscow seems to string along its German and U.S. interlocutors in order to increase its own leverage. Hence it downplays its talks on Ukraine with Washington at this stage as inconsequential, which Mr. Peskov did in contradicting Ms. Nuland’s upbeat account. Apparently, the Kremlin would want its Western interlocutors to try again, and harder, to come to terms with it on Ukraine.
The article above is reprinted from Eurasia Daily Monitor with permission from its publisher, the Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org.