U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland completed another round of shuttle diplomacy in Kyiv and Moscow (June 22-24), following up on her visits to the two capitals in April and May, on direct instructions from the White House. This effort will undoubtedly continue after the time out necessitated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) summit in Warsaw (July 8-9).
For Washington, the ambition is to work out with Moscow the basic premises of a political compromise between the Ukrainian government and the de facto authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk: in effect, “freezing” this crisis by U.S.-Russia consensus, perhaps with some joint document to show.
Such a result, if achieved, might create the semblance of U.S.-Russia cooperation on this and other crisis fronts, book-ending Barack Obama’s presidency with a second reset – a counterpart to the original Obama-Hillary Clinton reset of relations with Russia. The United States, however, is negotiating under time pressure, seeking results before the November presidential election.
At least some Kremlin consultants recommend an interim deal while the lame-duck Obama administration is still in office. Thus, according to Dmitry Suslov (The Valdai Papers, No. 49, June 2016), any new U.S. president “will likely adopt a more ideologically based, more aggressive, stronger attitude toward Russia, at least rhetorically, than the Obama administration has. Moreover, if the Minsk agreements are not implemented by that time, Washington will find it difficult to resist calls for supplying Kyiv with lethal weapons.” Consequently, Moscow should cooperate in “partially implementing the Minsk agreements… so as to show some movement in the conflict-settlement process, reducing the risk of its derailment with the arrival of a new U.S. administration.” But, in parallel, Moscow should work with European governments to generate “serious pressures on Kyiv and Washington to fulfill those points of the Minsk agreement that apply to Ukraine, partially implementing Minsk and partially lifting the European Union’s sanctions by the end of this year,” Mr. Suslov argues.
At this stage, Moscow’s minimal requirements are that Ukraine adopt a constitutional amendment on the special status of the Russian-controlled territory, an amnesty of the crimes of Russia’s armed proxies, and a special law on elections in that territory – all in a package with local “elections” to be held there. That would amount to the first stage in Ukraine’s “fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk agreements.” This would pave the way for the next stage of Moscow’s agenda, with direct negotiations between Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk on the terms of the latter’s quasi-sovereignty.
Beyond the Minsk text itself – as Dmitry Simes, the president of the U.S. Center for the National Interest and a credible communicator of Kremlin perspectives in Washington, suggests – “Moscow clearly wants to interpret the Minsk agreements in a way that not only provides the Donbas [Donetsk-Luhansk ‘people’s republics’] with meaningful autonomy, but also allows regional governments in eastern Ukraine to prevent the country from joining NATO… Does America even intend to permit Ukraine to join NATO? If not, why create the impression in Russia that this may be Washington’s long-term objective?” (The National Interest, June 26).
Russia’s short-term objectives
At the present stage, however, Russia’s short-term objectives necessitate accelerating the political negotiations in the Normandy format and the Minsk Contact Group. As President Vladimir Putin told the conference of Russia’s ambassadors accredited abroad, which was just held in Moscow, “good-neighborly relations” between Russia and Ukraine “necessitate that Kyiv at long last comprehend the inevitability of a direct dialogue with Donetsk and Luhansk, in fulfillment of its Minsk obligations” (Interfax, June 30).
To pressure Ukraine into that kind of political process, Russia is resorting to attrition warfare through its proxies in Donetsk-Luhansk. This tactic, however, turns Russia into a systematic violator of the ceasefire, thus blocking the political process that Moscow itself aims to accelerate. Ukraine is citing those ceasefire breaches as precluding any political negotiations with Russia’s proxies. To some Western diplomats, however, the fighting and its possible escalation by Russia are arguments for defusing the situation at the cost of piecemeal concessions by Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine is being asked to start implementing the political clauses of Minsk if Russia respects the ceasefire for two months continuously, as a test of good faith. That would supposedly fulfill the main prerequisite to the start of the political process toward legitimizing the Donetsk-Luhansk authorities.
Outside the legal-political framework – were it to be negotiated and agreed – the Donetsk and Luhansk proto-states, with their Russian-led military forces, would undoubtedly continue to exist de facto. The Minsk armistice – whose “full implementation” all sides theoretically seek – allows those two Moscow-supported statelets to exist as they are, with or without Ukraine’s consent. The armistice establishes certain procedures for Kyiv’s consent, but it also gives Donetsk and Luhansk the latitude to retain and develop their existing structures de facto without Ukraine’s consent.
The Kremlin can be expected to offer a partial, interim deal that would compromise Ukraine’s position in all future negotiations – e.g., Kyiv legalizing Donetsk-Luhansk as Russian protectorates in exchange for a lasting ceasefire and a political “freeze” on the unresolved conflict. Moscow may well consider the timing of such a proposal in relation to the U.S. presidential campaign.
Two contradictory goals
President Obama’s administration seems to pursue two contradictory goals: supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and security in general terms but, at the same time, seeking a short-term compromise that might satisfy Russia in Ukraine’s east. Preoccupied with “legacy” issues in foreign policy as Mr. Obama’s second and final term comes to a close, administration officials apparently aim to show some results in their crisis-management efforts – Ukraine’s east being an easier case than Syria, for example – before November’s presidential election. The administration has switched from the rhetoric of “isolating” Moscow to direct engagement with the Kremlin on Ukraine.
Although the United States government had declined to participate in negotiating the Minsk armistice, and never joined the follow-up Minsk process directly, it now aims for a quick agreement bilaterally with Russia on the basis laid down in Minsk.
According to the U.S. president’s national security advisor, Susan Rice, a significant start toward implementing Minsk “is something that could get done between now and the end of the administration, if the Russians in particular exhibit sufficient political will… We are hopeful, if the Russians want to resolve this – and we have some reason to believe they might.” Ms. Rice, who was speaking at a Washington Post event, acknowledged at the same time that the Ukrainian Parliament might not adopt the legislative package required of Ukraine by the Minsk armistice (UNIAN, June 10).
That legislation is what the Obama administration seeks yet again to “get done” in Kyiv, provided that Moscow stops breaching the ceasefire. Washington’s previous attempts to ensure the legislation is passed (e.g., in May and August 2015), however, backfired politically in Kyiv and went unrewarded by Moscow.
The U.S. ambassador-designate to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, has outlined the current policy in her Senate confirmation hearing: “The United States works for full implementation of the Minsk agreement, until which time sanctions on Russia will continue.” She added, “A sustained improvement in security [along the military demarcation lines] will allow Ukraine to pass a Donbas [DPR-LPR] election law, hold local elections in portions of eastern Ukraine, and implement special status and amnesty. These steps should lead to Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine and restoration of Ukraine’s control over its side of the international border [with Russia]” (Ukraine.usembassy.gov, June 21).
The term “should,” noncommittal and hortatory, basically aspirational, is also revealing in this context. Indeed, the Minsk armistice does not require Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine’s territory; it does not even mention Russia in that context. Nor does Minsk stipulate the restoration of Ukraine’s control over its side of the 400-kilometer section of the Ukraine-Russia border, now controlled by Russian and proxy forces. The armistice only stipulates that Kyiv can negotiate with Donetsk-Luhansk about sharing control of that border, and only after Kyiv legalizes Russia’s proxy authorities there. The armistice allows Donetsk-Luhansk to maintain their armed forces (dubbed “irregular” on paper, but Russian-led and amply equipped with armor and artillery) as part of a would-be “special status” of these enclaves (UNIAN, osce.org, February 12, 2015).
Concessions without trade-offs
This armistice demands Ukrainian concessions to Donetsk and Luhansk in the constitutional and legal field, without Russian reciprocation in the military and security field. No such trade-off exists in this armistice. Instead, it casts Russia as arbiter of an inner-Ukrainian conflict, in line with Russia’s definitions of its role and of that conflict. Ukraine’s concessions, if made, would be gratis. Moscow’s demands for legal and constitutional changes in Ukraine are actually in full conformity with the text of the Minsk armistice (UNIAN, Osce.org, February 12, 2015).
The United States had no hand in that armistice and has declined to join any negotiations format, such as the Normandy quartet (Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia), charged with implementing the Minsk armistice. Nevertheless the U.S. helped enshrine the Minsk document promptly in a United Nations Security Council resolution (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 23, 2015), which Moscow is fond of continually referencing as having the force of international law.
Those armistice stipulations and its loopholes, all in Russia’s favor, are worth recalling when U.S. or European officials call for the implementation of that document. For example, State Department spokesman John Kirby, introducing Assistant Secretary Nuland’s latest mission, declared, with a sense of urgency: “As we’ve said many times, we want to see Minsk fully implemented, as soon as possible. It will be good for peace and security in Ukraine, good for relations between Russia and Ukraine, good for relations between the U.S. and our allies and Russia” (State.gov, June 22). Similarly, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, John Tefft, referencing President Obama’s instructions, explained that the situation in U.S.-Russia relations would significantly change if the Minsk document’s implementation proceeds before the U.S. presidential election (Interfax, June 20, 27).
Such statements evince a growing sense of urgency to deal with this problem under the time constraints of the U.S. presidential election calendar. They also show a rethinking of the overall policy toward Russia, viewing the situation in Ukraine’s east increasingly through the prism of U.S.-Russia relations. A similar shift is proceeding even faster in Europe. The West’s collective setbacks on multiple international fronts generate the perception that Russia can help mitigate those crises, even as Russia in fact exploits and exacerbates those conflicts.
The article above is reprinted from Eurasia Daily Monitor with permission from its publisher, the Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org.