As final counting of the votes continued in the U.S. presidential election, by November 7 it had become clear that whether or not the incumbent, Donald Trump, accepted the result, the victor in the presidential election was Joe Biden.
While the U.S. and international media have focused on what his victory would mean for the U.S. and global politics generally, both in Kyiv and in the U.S. itself there was also immediate recognition that Mr. Trump’s replacement by Mr. Biden will have significant implications for East-West relations and Ukraine in particular (and in the present context, probably also Belarus).
In Ukraine, there has largely been relief and a newfound, if still somewhat temporarily guarded, sense of inspiration. Ukrainian politicians, particularly senior ones, seem to have learned the lesson from the previous U.S. presidential election in 2016, when Mr. Trump defeated Democratic Party candidate Hilary Clinton, that it is not wise to show preference for one candidate over another with so much riding on the outcome in these situations.
And in Ukraine there were additional complications.
During the last few years, the Ukrainian political snake pit was exploited by external and domestic forces to influence the U.S. political process. The aim was to besmirch Mr. Biden on purported charges of impropriety regarding his son’s business dealings with Ukraine, and thereby strengthen Mr. Trump’s position and at the same time give Ukraine a bad name. But the entire matter hinging on the “Ukrainian connection” got so serious that in December 2019 the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Trump, who was subsequently saved by the Senate, with its Republican majority.
So the first casualty of the Biden victory is this campaign pursued by the likes of Rudy Giuliani in Washington with the help of an array of discredited or suspect characters in Ukraine ranging from former prosecutors general, Viktor Shokin and his successor Yuriy Lutsenko, to a national deputy, Andrei Derkach, who has since been branded by Washington as a Russian agent. It has also included proxies of anti-Western rogue oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, such as National Deputy Oleksandr Dubinsky.
It is not purely coincidental that on November 11 a representative of Ukraine’s Procurator General’s Office only now announced that charges of impropriety levelled against Mr. Biden by Mr. Shokin and a senior judge suspected of corruption, Serhiy Vovk, had been dropped as far back as September 23.
Commentators agree that at least this ugly factor complicating U.S.-Ukrainian relations will be removed and no longer serves as an embarrassing distraction.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who as a newcomer to politics inherited this unpleasant situation from his predecessor’s administration, judiciously bided his time and was careful to show no preference for the either of the candidates vying for the stewardship of a state of such vital importance for Ukraine.
On November 3, his ambassador in Washington, Volodymyr Yelchenko, echoed this tactful line, hedging the bets. “Any of my comments ‘against’ or ‘for’ would sound like interference in the U.S. elections. But, in principle, the real military, lethal, strategic aid came precisely under Trump. …It was under Trump that sanctions were introduced against those constructing the Nord Stream [2],” the diplomat said.
But Ambassador Yelchenko noted that the position of the Democratic Party in relation to Russia “is sharper and tougher. Besides, in Biden’s circle, in the circle of incumbent lawmakers and those who could be elected, there are much more people who at the expert level understand the essence of problems around Ukraine, and therefore I’m absolutely sure that sanctions against Russia will be strengthening and military assistance will be increasing.”
Mr. Yelchenko also emphasized an important point that other observers have been reiterating in Kyiv: it is important that Ukraine continues to enjoy bipartisan support in the United States.
On November 7, when it finally seemed that Mr. Biden had won the presidential election, Mr. Zelenskyy was among the first foreign leaders to acknowledge this. “Congratulations to Joe Biden and Kamala Harris! Ukraine is optimistic about the future of the strategic partnership with the United States,” he tweeted.
Former Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko had commented that Ukraine is fortunate in that, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election, the U.S. will not be able to make a U-turn in relations with Ukraine. “The change of the country’s course depends not only on the president (despite his special and important powers in the field of foreign policy), but also on other players who influence the development of American foreign policy.”
“Even under Trump, however a problematic figure he was, U.S. support for Ukraine continued,” Mr. Ohrysko added. Mr. Biden, “who is far more deeply familiar with Ukrainian affairs” and “knows our weak spots,” can be expected to continue backing Ukraine, but insisting that it deliver on combatting corruption and reforms.
Commentator and investment banker Serhiy Fursa stated in his column for the respected Kyiv publication Novoye Vremya that the latest U.S. presidential contest was “the most important election in the world in the last 30-40 years.” Not only is the U.S. “the world’s leading state” but also Ukraine’s “main ally in the war against Russia.” It is also “the main force pushing Ukraine in the direction of reform.” The election, Mr. Fursa argued, was a choice between “values and friendship with Putin,” “chaos and order” and tolerance and intolerance.
A number of Western observers and experts have expanded on these themes and provided additional insights. The Atlantic Council’s expert and veteran Ukraine watcher Anders Aslund is confident that a Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine, if it stays true to the reformist and pro-European course it has embarked on.
“Few countries are likely to benefit more from a Joe Biden presidency than Ukraine,” he writes. “Biden knows Ukraine very well, having been responsible for U.S. policy on Ukraine as vice-president. He is committed both to its defense against Russia and to the country’s domestic reforms.”
Dr. Aslund notes that, “As vice-president, Biden visited Ukraine no less than five times. As a result of this intensive engagement, he also has an excellent staff that know Ukraine very well. …Biden fought hard for the rule of law in Ukraine. He is bound to do so all the more forcefully as president. This is bad news for the many different forces in today’s Ukraine who are seeking to reverse anti-corruption initiatives or block judicial reform.”
David L. Stern voiced a similar opinion in The Washington Post, quoting several specialists to back him up. “Biden’s efforts to reform Ukraine won him praise – and enemies,” he wrote. And Mr. Stern himself led off with the words: “The post-election message from Ukraine’s leaders to their allies in Washington is a simple one: Leave us out of your partisan battles, please.”
Internal U.S. politics is one thing, but what matters most is that Ukraine can continue to rely on bipartisan U.S. support in standing up to Russia and continuing its democratic transformation. That seems to be the general feeling in the Ukrainian capital.
As the vote count continued in the U.S. and bolstered Mr. Biden’s margin of victory, by mid-week there was further encouragement for Mr. Biden’s Ukrainian aficionados. In his first calls abroad, to the leaders of France and Britain, Ukraine was reported to have figured in the discussion. As several of Ukraine’s leading commentators have pointed out, Mr. Biden does not need to be told what Ukraine is about: he needs his hand strengthened by Ukraine not letting him or itself down.