PART II
Post-Maidan: 2014-2018
Not surprisingly, Congress began to pay even more attention to Ukraine during the Euro-Maidan Revolution of Dignity, with several high-profile visits by senators to the Maidan and with the passage of resolutions both in the House and Senate in early 2014. These resolutions supported the Ukrainian people’s aspirations for freedom and democracy, and called for consideration of sanctions against those responsible for the use of force against peaceful demonstrators.
Congress’s focus on Ukraine expanded further following Russia’s flagrant violation of international norms with the illegal occupation of Crimea and aggression in the Donbas. Congressional efforts have centered on three main pillars: military/security assistance, both lethal and non-lethal; sanctions against Russia and its Ukrainian colluders; and economic and technical assistance for Ukraine. This activity was especially intensive in 2014-2015.
How has Congressional activity manifested itself since Russia’s invasion? Never have we seen more statements, press releases, letters to administration officials, hearings, briefings and meetings with visiting Ukrainian officials than since the beginning of 2014. Never have so many members of Congress, especially senators, visited Ukraine, especially in 2014 and 2015 – during the most acute phase of the war. Never have there been so many public hearings on Ukraine, especially in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which plays an especially key role in U.S. policy towards Ukraine. Never have there been as many media appearances by senators and representatives about Ukraine, in this case regarding Russian aggression. Never has there been as much interaction between members of Congress (by which I mean both the Senate and House of Representatives) and the executive branch on Ukraine and congressional pressure on the administration for a more assertive U.S. policy to counter Russia’s aggression.
And let us recall President Petro Poroshenko’s address to a joint session of Congress in September 2014 – a relatively rare occurrence by a foreign leader and one that was extremely favorably received by Congress. Also noteworthy is that this was the second appearance by a Ukrainian president before Congress within a decade, the earlier one being President Victor Yushchenko’s in April 2005. In this, Ukraine joins a very small, select group of America’s friends and allies who have had more than one leader speak, much less within a decade.
With the war, a greater number of congressional institutions began paying more serious attention to Ukraine. Before 2014, it had been the Helsinki Commission and the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus that had historically displayed the greatest level of activity with respect to Ukraine, albeit in different ways, reflecting their different structures and mandates. The House and Senate Appropriations Committee subcommittees that were responsible for financial assistance to Ukraine also played an essential role. With the Russian occupation of Crimea, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular and the House Foreign Affairs Committee stepped up their level of activity on Ukraine to an unprecedented degree, both reflecting and encouraging Ukraine’s ascent as one of the top U.S. foreign policy priorities.
Because of Russia’s military aggression, other committees such as the Senate and House Armed Services committees also greatly increased their engagement on Ukraine. At the same time, the Helsinki Commission and the House Ukrainian Caucus remained active. In February 2015, a Senate Ukraine Caucus chaired by Senators Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) was inaugurated. This caucus has remained actively engaged with respect to Ukraine, especially on military/security issues. An important point to keep in mind is that members of the Helsinki Commission and the House and Senate Ukraine Caucuses are often also key members of other committees that focus on Ukraine, which has often helped enhance their work in those committees.
Congressional involvement has also manifested itself in the international arena, for instance, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly or the 56-country OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). To cite one example, at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting held in Baku in 2014, a resolution was introduced by Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) on Russia’s violation of international commitments by its annexation of Crimea and direct support of armed conflict in Ukraine. It was adopted by a 3-1 margin, despite fierce Russian opposition. The U.S. has strongly supported subsequent resolutions by Canada and Ukraine following up on and expanding the original 2014 resolution. It should also be noted that members of Congress, and especially Helsinki Commission staff, have observed virtually every national election in Ukraine since 1990, most often as members of the OSCE PA missions.
The most concrete manifestation of congressional activity on Ukraine has been legislation, most notably the two public laws signed by the president in 2014 – both received strong bipartisan support, something that has not been the norm in recent years given the highly charged partisan environment.
On April 3, 2014, soon after Russia’s invasion, President Barack Obama signed into law the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014. This legislation authorized aid to help Ukraine carry out reforms; authorized security assistance to Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries; and required the president to impose visa bans and asset seizures against persons in Ukraine and Russia responsible for violence or undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He also signed into law a bill requiring Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty and Voice of America to increase broadcasting to eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
Nine months later, on December 18, 2014, President Obama signed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, permitting the president to impose sanctions on Russian defense, energy and other firms and foreign persons. The act also authorized increased military, economic, energy and democracy assistance for Ukraine as well as increased funding for U.S. Russian-language broadcasting to the region.
It is an exceedingly rare occurrence in the U.S. Congress to have two major pieces of legislation devoted to just one country within nine months. One point of context for those not familiar with the workings of Congress: the vast majority of legislation that is introduced never becomes law. That which does often takes months and years to wind its way through the legislative process. Legislation first must pass both chambers of Congress, the House and the Senate, in order to be signed into law by the president.
The passage of the aforementioned two bills – both of which were initiated in the Senate – was an impressive and relatively rare display of bipartisanship in both the House and Senate. It was a strong manifestation of the support of the American people, through their elected representatives, for Ukraine. Furthermore, there have been numerous resolutions (which express the sense of the Congress on an issue) supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are also examples of bills on Ukraine that have passed one chamber of Congress but not the other. This is not because one chamber is necessarily more pro-Ukrainian than the other, but rather it is the function of the complexities of the legislative process. Passing legislation in any democracy is not a straightforward process and becomes even more challenging when there is a bicameral legislature, as there is in the U.S. Congress. One example of this was the Stand for Ukraine Act of 2016, which passed the House but not the Senate.
Having legislation enacted into law by it passing both houses of Congress and being signed by the president is very significant, but it is not always enough. The executive branch has to execute the laws. There have been times and reasons why administrations have not fully or enthusiastically enforced laws, including on occasion those enacted in support of Ukraine. Nevertheless – and critically, in Ukraine’s case – members of Congress have continued to press administrations for actions, to execute the laws fully.
While the vast majority of legislation introduced doesn’t become law, the mere introduction of a bill or resolution often is of value. Indeed, every kind of congressional activity matters – hearings, briefings, statements in the Congressional Record, press releases and press conferences, congressional appearances in the media or at public events, meetings, letters to the White House/administration. They have numbered in the many, many hundreds since 2014. All are vehicles in conveying congressional interest and concern to involved parties. They are also essential in underscoring Congress’s interest in Ukraine with the executive branch. Indeed, the interaction between Congress and the executive branch on Ukraine has helped to inform and encourage the administration to take more robust policies in support of Ukraine. While this has been a pattern over the course of the last century, it has been especially evident in the last four years – whether it be Congress pressing President Obama on lethal weapons or President Donald Trump on sanctions.
Language from bills or resolutions that are introduced often finds its way into larger legislation, including as part of larger bills that authorize or appropriate assistance. One example is the inclusion of specific language on Ukraine in the massive National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). For 2019, it authorizes the allocation to the Defense Department of $250 million for security assistance to Ukraine, including $50 million for lethal weapons. This NDAA also includes major clauses from the Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act, which passed the House earlier this year. There has often been language on Ukraine in much more massive, comprehensive bills that fund the entire U.S. government budget. U.S. bilateral assistance to Ukraine alone, of all kinds – including military/security, economic, democracy building, health and environment – has totaled an estimated $8 billion since 1991.
Perhaps the most significant non-funding bill on Ukraine in the last couple of years has been the Countering American Adversaries’ Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This legislation was overwhelmingly adopted on a bipartisan basis and signed, albeit reluctantly, by President Trump in August 2017. Much of CAATSA is targeted at sanctioning Russia for its election interference and other attempts to undermine American democracy. But it also includes a very strong Ukraine component with many references to Ukraine. It codifies six executive orders signed by President Obama in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, many of which had been called for but not mandated in Congress via previous legislation. These provisions targeted Russia’s financial services, and energy, defense and other sectors, thereby preventing any president from revoking them without congressional consent. Among other things, CAATSA also authorizes energy security and other assistance to Ukraine and asserts a policy of non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Much of the language in CAATSA on Ukraine had been in other proposed legislation authored by Sens. Ben Cardin and John McCain (R-Ariz.) but was folded into this more comprehensive legislation.
Informing Congress and outside advocacy
An important, though far from sole, factor encouraging congressional interest in Ukraine, has been advocacy by the Ukrainian American community and other numerous friends of Ukraine, particularly in Washington.
Congress is the branch of government closest to the people. In contrast with the pre-independence era, when the Ukrainian American community was almost exclusively the outside driver of Congressional support, since independence, there are many NGOs with involvement in Ukraine that encourage congressional support for Ukraine’s security, democracy and the rule of law. Indeed, a whole network of authoritative, pro-Ukrainian NGOs, think-tanks and former government officials exists that is respected and listened to by members of Congress and their staffs.
Among the most consistently active of these over the years have been Washington-based NGOs such as the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Many prominent Washington think-tanks have also been involved with Ukraine over the decades – at times more intensively, at times less so. The Atlantic Council has been especially dynamic since 2014.
Nevertheless, the role of the Ukrainian American community remains crucial. Advocacy work on behalf of Ukraine in Congress has also expanded since 2013. This advocacy has ebbed and flowed. It previously peaked in the decade leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union – with its focus on human rights, political prisoners and calls for independence. It continued for a few years following independence, with a focus on concrete assistance to the new Ukrainian state. The heavy lifting of Ukrainian American advocacy during this time had been done by the highly politicized post-World Was II (Third Wave) emigration and their children. Since 2014, however, the new and previously largely politically inactive post-independence (Fourth Wave) emigration has come out of the woodwork and become considerably more engaged in advocacy.
In recent years, there have been many more advocacy events, notably those organized by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America’s Washington office, the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS). During Ukrainian Days, held several times per year, American citizens meet with Congressional offices in Washington. There have also been many efforts on both the national, and state and local levels, by Ukrainian American organizations and individual activists to reach out to senators and congressmen who represent them through social media, the more traditional e-mail and phone calls, and direct person-to-person contacts.
Following Russia’s invasion, the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation initiated a Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN), which includes a number of former U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine as well as to other countries and international organizations and other former officials from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Defense Department and Congress. It also includes experts from think-tanks and representatives of key NGOs involved with Ukraine. FOUN came up with recommendations for sanctions shortly after the invasion of the Donbas and advocated for their implementation with Congress and the White House.
In 2017, separate FOUN task forces came up with policy recommendations for U.S. assistance to Ukraine in four areas: national security, economy and energy, humanitarian issues, and democracy and civil society. These task forces – especially the national security task force – interacted with key congressional offices to help ensure concrete support for Ukraine. This past March, the FOUN issued “An appeal for decisive action in Ukraine’s fight against corruption” to the Ukrainian government and Verkhovna Rada.
Another feature of outside activity has been the engagement of organizations and individuals also concerned with the implications of Russia’s flagrant violations on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, such as American organizations representing Central and Eastern European groups, notably the Baltic community. American Jewish organizations have also actively encouraged stronger U.S-Ukraine relations.
In addition to U.S. citizen advocacy, Ukrainian officials and Verkhovna Rada members often also interact with Senate and House members – primarily in Washington, Kyiv or at multilateral fora. Ukraine’s Embassy to the United States has also interacted often with members of Congress throughout the years of independence – not only the ambassador, but also other Embassy diplomats frequently meet and exchange information with Congressional staff.
Indeed, given how busy members of Congress are, meetings, exchanges of information and advocacy efforts, in general, have often been directed at congressional staff. As anyone who has familiarity with how Washington works knows, staffs play a crucial role – especially staffs of key committees – in preparing resolutions, hearings, statements, press releases and memos. Many of these professional staffers have also had a history of interest in and support for Ukraine.
Conclusion
Why so much Congressional interest in Ukraine over the last century? Yes, there was constituent politics, as congressmen and senators responded to Ukrainian American voters – something that U.S. legislators tend to take seriously. But there have also been many senators and House members who had hardly any Ukrainian American voters, yet, for various reasons, believed in the idea of an independent, free, democratic Ukraine in which human rights were respected, especially in light of Ukraine’s tragic 20th century history. There are more even now who are outraged by Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the ongoing manufactured war in the Donbas that so grossly has flouted the rules-based international order.
The hyper-partisan U.S. Congress has not agreed on much in recent years, but there has been a broad consensus when it comes to Ukraine. With few exceptions, both Republicans and Democrats in both the Senate and the House have been supporters of an independent, democratic Ukraine. And this follows the trend of broad bipartisanship on Ukraine that has existed over the course of the last century. This bipartisanship is nothing new. While one can argue that during the Soviet era, Republicans tended to be more anti-Communist/anti-Soviet, there was always a strong current within the Democratic Party that understood the Soviet threat and supported Ukraine as well. And, of course, both parties these days well recognize the threat to Ukraine and to the international order posed by Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
The over-arching theme of congressional activity can be boiled down to one word: freedom. National rights, human rights, human dignity, democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity – all of these issues which Congress has addressed in one form or another over the course of the last century are intimately linked. What lies at their core is the notion of freedom.
Whether it be freedom for captive nations; freedom for religious institutions such as the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches; individual freedoms, including the myriad activity on behalf of Ukrainian political prisoners; or legislation and resolutions on the genocidal Holodomor – focusing as they did on this most cruel deprivation of freedom – death by starvation, congress has spoken out. This also applies to NATO legislation – designed to enhance Ukraine’s security freedom; or Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) – aimed at strengthening economic freedoms; or the numerous hearings, briefings, statements on the state of democracy, human rights and rule of law – all these efforts are all about expanding the scope of freedom, about enhancing the rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian people.
From the Captive Nations resolution and commemorations of Ukraine’s 1918 independence in Congress prior to the renewal of independence of 1991, to, most significantly, the multitude of congressional legislation and other efforts in recent years to help Ukraine counter Russia’s aggression and preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in all of these congressional actions, freedom lies at the core. An independent, sovereign, democratic Ukraine, after all, is a free Ukraine.
The U.S. Congress over the course of the last century has been in the forefront of defending and promoting both freedom for Ukraine and freedom in Ukraine. Congress can take great pride in its strong, bipartisan support of Ukraine. But there is still much work ahead to assist Ukraine in continuing to fend off Russian aggression and to support the prosperous, democratic European future that Ukrainians have freely chosen.
Orest Deychakiwsky worked at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the U.S. Helsinki Commission), a U.S. government agency composed mostly of U.S. senators and House members, from 1981-2017. His many responsibilities throughout his more than 35 years of service included Ukraine. He served as a member of numerous official U.S. delegations to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (and its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and was an OSCE election observer in Ukraine and other countries.