I suspect most Ukrainian Americans, including myself, grew up in the United States not giving much thought to Belarus, Ukraine’s closest ethnic and linguistic kin. Perhaps one reason for this was that relations between the two historically have been peaceful, in contrast to just about all of Ukraine’s other neighbors that had invaded and occupied parts of Ukraine at one time or another. Both Ukraine and Belarus trace their heritage to Kyivan Rus’, and Belarus and much of Ukraine were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Both were called Ruthenians, notwithstanding some differences. Indeed, the (Old) Ruthenian language, the predecessor of modern Belarusian and Ukrainian, was an official language of the Grand Duchy and Commonwealth. Both have much more in common with each other from a historical, cultural and linguistic perspective than either does with Russia.
I’ve never had a problem communicating with Belarusian-speakers when speaking Ukrainian. Several years ago, after observing Belarusian elections for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), I was asked to do an interview at the Radio Liberty studios in Minsk. When I said I don’t speak Belarusian, my interviewer simply told me to speak Ukrainian, as Belarusian-language listeners would understand me. Despite the commonalities, the Belarusians and Ukrainians are distinct peoples, and each has its own proud culture, beautiful language and complex history.
It was only in 1994, when Belarus was added to my country responsibilities at the U.S. Helsinki Commission, that I began to delve into that country’s history. Until then, I had assumed that Belarusians historically were mostly Orthodox. But I was surprised to learn that the Belarusian population was mostly Greek-Catholic (“Uniate”) following the 1596 Union of Brest, when Ruthenian Orthodox Church eparchies in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth broke relations with the Orthodox Church and entered into communion with Rome. Having attended St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic grade school in Parma, Ohio, back in the 1960s, I was further surprised that the school’s namesake spent much of his time in Belarus, where he was a bishop and eventually murdered. Belarus ceased to be Eastern-rite Catholic when, along with much of right-bank Ukraine, it came under Russian domination in the late 1700s. This was when Russian Empress Catherine the Great began the process of forcible conversions that led eventually to the complete suppression of the Uniate Church in 1839.
Today, most Belarusians are Orthodox, at least nominally, and most are linguistically Russified. One rarely hears Belarusian spoken in the large cities. Ironically, the Russifier-in-Chief has been none other than independent Belarus’s president for all but the first three years of its independence, the dictatorial Alyaksandr Lukashenka. He has cultivated a largely Soviet Belarusian identity, downplaying and even persecuting manifestations of genuine Belarusian cultural, linguistic and historical identity. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an understandably nervous Mr. Lukashenka has loosened up a bit, allowing more expression of Belarusian identity. Notwithstanding his wariness of Russia, Mr. Lukashenka has nobody to blame but himself, as it is his profound lack of political and economic reforms (in what some refer to as a “Soviet-lite” economy) over the last quarter century that has made his country seriously vulnerable to Russia and weakened Belarus’s independence.
Since his election as president in 1994, Mr. Lukashenka has consolidated his rule over all institutions and undermined the rule of law through authoritarian means. He has routinely violated human rights and democratic freedoms, repressed civil society and the media. No election under his rule has been free and fair. At times he has been more repressive; at other times, including in the last few years, a little bit less so, in part due to Western pressure and sanctions. Not surprisingly, Mr. Lukashenka’s relations with the U.S. (as well as with the European Union) have been strained.
From the beginning, the Helsinki Commission was in the forefront of U.S. efforts in calling attention to the Lukashenka regime’s human rights violations, curtailment of political and civil rights. Among its efforts, the commission called for a full accounting of the 1999-2000 disappearances of opposition leaders and a journalist, the release of political prisoners and an end to attacks against civil society. As the commission policy advisor whose responsibilities included Belarus, I organized hearings, public briefings, meetings with Belarusian officials, as well as members of the democratic opposition and civil society, and drafted resolutions, statements and other communications. Pro-democracy activists in Belarus and the Belarusian American community welcomed and supported our efforts. The Lukashenka regime did not.
The regime was especially unhappy with three public laws on Belarus in 2004, 2006 and 2011 (the only laws specifically on that country in U.S. history), each sponsored by then-Commission Chairman Rep. Chris Smith. The three Belarus Democracy Acts provided financial assistance to the beleaguered democratic political opposition, NGOs and independent media, supported radio, TV and Internet broadcasting into Belarus, and called for targeted sanctions, including visa denials and the blocking the assets of senior officials and their cronies, and even some major state-owned enterprises.
As a concrete expression of displeasure at our role in drafting these laws, which continue to guide U.S. policy towards Belarus, my Helsinki Commission colleague Ron McNamara and I were denied visas to observe the Belarusian presidential elections in 2006. Our having diplomatic passports and intercessions with the Belarusian government by both the State Department and the OSCE did not help. In subsequent years we were let back into the country to observe elections in what one senior Belarusian official quietly but half-jokingly told me was “a sign of our liberalization.”
The U.S. approach towards Belarus, also reflected in language in the Belarus Democracy Acts, has been to leave the door open to better relations should the Belarusian government take steps toward democracy and respect for human rights. Indeed, there has been a partial waiver of some sanctions as Belarus has taken some minor positive steps, such as releases of political prisoners (putting aside the fact that they should never have been imprisoned in the first place). Having said that, it is highly doubtful that Mr. Lukashenka will change his stripes and become anything even nearly approaching a full-fledged democrat or engage in meaningful political or economic reforms.
Nevertheless, it is important for the West to keep encouraging even small steps towards positive change in Belarus and support those brave Belarusians struggling for freedom, democracy and a European future. A genuinely independent, secure, democratic Belarus that is true to its Belarusian identity and where the rule of law and human rights are respected is most assuredly not in Moscow’s interests. However, it is in U.S. and the West’s interests. And it is very much in the interests of Belarus’s closest kin – Ukraine.