The Ukrainian diaspora, East and West: an analysis
by Askold S. Lozynskyj
PART I
The Ukrainian diaspora as a clearly defined phenomenon has been in existence since the early 18th century after the battle of Poltava, although emigration to foreign lands began even earlier. However, numbers have been very difficult to estimate in the past. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, and, in particular, the demise of the USSR, as well as the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, the diaspora has become much more viable as a separate entity and certainly, much easier to define.
Today, Ukrainians residing outside of Ukraine by relatively conservative estimates number more than 18 million people, with approximately 10 million within the Russian Federation alone. Its most striking characteristics are its lack of homogeneity and the fact that it truly encompasses the entire globe.
Aside from the Russian Federation large numbers of Ukrainians populate Belarus - 1.5 million, the United States of America - 1 million, Canada - 1 million, Kazakstan - 700,000, Moldova/Trandniester - 650,000, Brazil - 500,000, Poland - 400,000, Argentina - 300,000, Uzbekistan - 300,000, and Portugal/Spain - 300,000.
The remainder are found in Western Europe (the United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, France, Scandinavia, the Benelux countries), Eastern Europe (Romania, Slovakia, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia), Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and Australia.
The lack of homogeneity is illustrated best, perhaps, within the Russian Federation. The federation is quite diverse and its Ukrainian element is a result of immigrations, forced settlements and dislocations varied in time and cause.
A glaring example in this respect are the three Siberian oblasts of Omsk, Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Some of the earliest Ukrainians settled there some time after the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654. Most recently, a number of émigrés arrived following Ukrainian independence, since Siberia with its vast resources and a vibrant economy offers economic opportunities. In between are descendants of economic opportunities in the latter half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th, as well as heirs of political enemies of the USSR from the 1930s through the 1950s sent to Siberia for punishment and rehabilitation.
National awareness
National awareness is often a result of these two variables - time and cause of emigration. For example, many descendants of the earliest economic settlers call themselves "khahly," a term that we deem derogatory but which seems acceptable to them. They define it as a term which merely means little Russian or Ukrainian, different from a great Russian within the context of a brotherhood of peoples who trace their roots to Kyivan Rus'. On the other hand, descendants of political settlers and new immigrants erect community structures, establish lines of communication with government officials and attempt to avail themselves of democratic processes, e.g., raising national awareness for the October 2002 census in the Russia Federation.
The city of Moscow is a phenomenon unto itself. It is not possible to compare living conditions of people who reside in the capital with those almost anywhere else in Russia, especially in villages.
Some 75 percent of Russia's wealth is located in Moscow. Ukrainians in Moscow tend to be better off economically, more nationally astute and even politically connected, with access to Russian ministries and Ukraine's diplomatic missions. A Ukrainian cultural center funded by the government of Ukraine is a prominent edifice in the center of Moscow on the old Arbat street, as well as a bookstore and restaurant. Additionally, the community boasts a library and now a modest Ukrainian language class at the Linguistics Lyceum.
Indigenous vs. émigré
Another distinction in diaspora communities deals with the indigenous versus émigré phenomena. The Russian Federation, Belarus, Slovakia and Romania today include lands considered by Ukrainians, at least, ethnographically Ukrainian. Thus, a Ukrainian in Kuban, Russian Federation, is indigenous, while one in Siberia is an émigré. Similarly, a Ukrainian in Brest, Belarus, is indigenous, while one in Miensk is an émigré. A Ukrainian in southern Bukovyna, Romania, is indigenous while one in Bucharest in an émigré. A Ukrainian in Przezow, Slovakia, is indigenous, while one in Bratislava is an émigré. A Ukrainian in Przemysl, Poland, is indigenous while one in Warsaw is an émigré. Aside from a higher concentration in the case of the indigenous populations, this distinction is becoming largely irrelevant given the world community's recognition of existing borders as almost every country includes lands formerly belonging to another.
The differences between the various Ukrainian diaspora communities are even more palpable in terms of economic deficiencies. This is true particularly, with communities in the Eastern diaspora, and more in the former USSR than the satellites.
Ukrainians in Kazakstan are at the bottom of the economic ladder. The average income for pensioners there is somewhere between $15 and $20 per month. This may appear surprising, given Kazakstan's potential energy and other natural resources. Unfortunately, potential is overwhelmed by government corruption at the highest levels. The demise of socialism and the introduction of a market economy has resulted in an oligarchic society with little attention paid to the needs of the masses.
While Ukraine has received much criticism in the West for being corrupt, Ukraine's oligarchs are benign by comparison with many of the Central Asian republics. Additionally, Ukraine does possess an anti-corruption program, however ineffective it may be. Historically, corruption has inhibited real progress over the long term.
South America, despite its potential and even long-term democratic institutions, has failed to achieve economic prosperity because of corruption. In Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela, South American countries inhabited by Ukrainians, one finds some very rich people, including Ukrainians, but there is little middle class. Thus, even Ukrainians in the Western diaspora (South America) seek rather than offer assistance.
Cultural deficiences
Cultural deficiencies are next in terms of needs that require attention. Again, Russia is a glaring example. Despite the large number of Ukrainians, the Russian government does not fund a single full-time Ukrainian-language primary school. Compare that with 3,500 Russian-language full-time primary schools funded by the Ukrainian government in Ukraine. Russian law allows for Ukrainian language classes in Russian schools where 25 parents sign a petition. As a result, several Ukrainian language classes have sprouted in the Russian Federation, e.g., in Moscow, Tomsk, etc. Unfortunately, that law is not promulgated widely and, therefore, Ukrainian communities do not avail themselves of this option.
In any event, learning Ukrainian seems to be a dead end, as higher education in Ukrainian is not possible in Russia, and, continuing studies at higher education institutions in Ukraine itself is not an alternative given Ukraine's economic malaise, its own struggle to develop Ukrainian scholarship and the lack of programs for foreign students of Ukrainian ethnicity.
Similar problems exist in other countries where no funding is available and Ukrainian is not an attractive option. Even in Poland, which has manifested a strong resolve to become democratic and despite the overwhelming support of President Aleksander Kwasniewski, being Ukrainian is not an avenue towards career enhancement. In Belarus, government policies are stifling and Ukrainians are viewed negatively as potential separatists. In the Slovak Republic the government attempts to play the Ukrainian/Rusyn dichotomy in order to weaken both, assimilate the people and eliminate any potential separatism involving the Priashivschyna region, although that is hardly a consideration for the Ukrainian or the Rusyn element.
Askold Lozynskyj, a New York attorney, has been president of the Ukrainian World Congress since 1998. Prior to that he was president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.
PART I
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 18, 2002, No. 33, Vol. LXX
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