The Ukrainian diaspora, East and West: an analysis
by Askold Lozynskyj
CONCLUSION
The Eastern diaspora's freedom of religion as a human right and an element of cultural development suffers as well. Religious persecution is so apparent in Russia's law on religion that it has been criticized widely by the world community. The Russian Federation's law on religion in theory recognizes four denominations: Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. In practice, regional administrations register other denominations such as Protestant, Roman Catholic, etc. However, Ukrainian Orthodoxy or Ukrainian Catholicism is not tolerated. In certain instances Ukrainians worship as Russian Orthodox or Roman Catholics.
An attempt to register a Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate in Noginsk, Russia, was met by violent repression from the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian government officials refused to intervene, disingenuously explaining their restraint by citing Church-state separation arguments. Ukrainian Catholics in Omsk Oblast are registered as a German Roman Catholic church.
Less egregious, but still persecutory, are Poland and Slovakia. Both try to "Latinize" Ukrainian Catholicism. Restitution of community and church property to Ukrainians is a laborious and often abortive process. Compare that with Ukraine, where some 8,500 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate operate freely with government sanction and support.
Finally, assimilation is a problem in the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Australia. Demographic studies have shown that in these countries less than 20 percent of the Ukrainian population speaks Ukrainian fluently. This has been ameliorated somewhat by a tremendous influx of new immigrants from Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine itself, where the population has fallen below 49 million. This influx, however, has not resulted in an appreciable increase in activity by the Western diaspora, since the "old guard" is in decline and its children are nowhere. Baby boomers in the West have distinguished themselves with little except self-gratification.
Perhaps, the problem stems from relevance - to what degree is being Ukrainian relevant to one's existence, and, in addition, how important is it to speak and write Ukrainian. The establishment of an independent Ukraine - even with all its deficiencies, but with geostrategic importance - has done much to foster a national awareness within the Western diaspora. Ukraine's future as either a significant democratic market or a "banana republic without bananas" will determine the level of enthusiasm within its Western diaspora.
The Ukrainian diaspora indeed stretches across the globe. Ukrainians reside from Anchorage, Alaska to Vladivostok the Russian Federation or Melbourne, Australia. Locations previously unknown as Ukrainian enclaves, albeit small ones, such as Zurich, Tokyo, Beijing, have sprouted. To date, these enclaves lack structures. Nevertheless, representatives of these communities participate often in all-Ukrainian events such as the most recent Third World Forum of Ukrainians held in Kyiv in August 2001. The significance of this phenomenon is that demographics are dynamic and require constant attention.
Unfortunately, Ukraine's relationship with its diaspora has been erratic at best. With independence, the government of Ukraine initiated the formation of a hybrid governmental/non-governmental organization, the World Ukrainian Coordinating Council (WUCC). The WUCC has been ineffective. One theory suggests that this structure was instituted in order to provide the government with some measure of control over the diaspora. The leadership put in place was chosen for its malleability, rather than competency. Others have suggested that the WUCC was instituted strictly to create a perception of concern with no regard as to efficacy.
Equally disappointing has been Ukraine's juggling of ministries, state committees and now the Foreign Affairs Ministry in order to deal with the diaspora. A program for the diaspora ending in 2000 was never implemented. So, in September 2001 a more ambitious new program earmarked until 2005 was introduced - bereft, however, of budgetary allocations. A bill on the rights and privileges of Ukrainians residing outside Ukraine has been introduced in the Verkhovna Rada and has stalled there.
The most significant deficiency has been Ukraine's apparent lack of concern for the diaspora - particularly the Eastern segment. The Western diaspora has offered a measure of financial and political support to the government of Ukraine, and the government upon occasion has availed itself of that support. It is important to note that, even in efforts of mutual concern and cooperation, the respective representatives of Ukraine and the Western diaspora proceed most gingerly, not trusting the other side fully.
The Eastern diaspora offers Ukraine neither political clout nor financial resources. Altruism or national awareness and concern are not the mantra of today's leadership in Ukraine. Ukraine shies away from intervention with other governments on behalf of its diaspora, e.g., those in the Russian Federation, Belarus, Poland or Slovakia, citing "internal affairs," "good neighbor diplomacy" and even ignorance. Ironically, both Russian presidents to date have been significantly less squeamish, diplomatic or ignorant when speaking out for their diaspora. This example is not a result simply of Russian arrogance. The Bulgarian government, for example, voices its concern about some 250,000 Bulgarians residing in Ukraine. Germany and Poland offer assistance to its brethren residing in foreign countries. Ukraine's leadership simply fails to recognize one of its roles as a Ukrainian government.
In 1967 Ukrainians from the United States, Canada, South America, Western Europe and Australia established a global Ukrainian coordinating body, naming it the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the USSR, that world body, now known as the Ukrainian World Congress, has expanded its role to reach out to less fortunate Ukrainians in the East. The support offered by the UWC has been mostly contact and intervention.
In addition to existing Western communities, UWC representatives have visited Ukrainian communities in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belarus (Miensk and Brest), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (Moscow, Bashkortostan, Tyumen, Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk), Armenia and Georgia.
The UWC has communicated with the Slovak government regarding its policy of dividing Ukrainians and Rusyns; the Polish government regarding compensation of concentration camp inmates, condemnation of "Akcja Wisla," and community property restitution; the Belarusian government regarding registration of Ukrainian non-governmental organizations; and the Russian government regarding Ukrainian religious freedom and Ukrainian language schools.
Some minimal humanitarian aid, as well as other financial support, has been given, for example, to flood victims in Romania, support for the elderly, construction of a school and a church in Kazakstan, and support for Ukrainian-language publications in Belarus and Russia.
Most significant, however, has been the inclusion of the Eastern diaspora within the membership roll of the UWC. The UWC has established systematic communication via newsletters and bulletins, telephone and e-mail, as well as visits. Belonging to the UWC has strengthened the psychological make-up and political position of the Eastern diaspora communities. UWC representatives have made a point of meeting with government officials during their visits to the Eastern diaspora, underlining their concern with the Ukrainian community's well-being.
Remaining communities on the UWC's Eastern diaspora agenda include Azerbaijan and the Kuban and Vladivostok regions of the Russian Federation. Additionally, the UWC is reaching out to sprouting Ukrainian diaspora communities in Europe, most recently in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece, and communities of some duration in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Finally, the UWC has established communications with Ukrainian communities in Israel and New Zealand. What lies ahead is difficult to foretell since the globalization process affects the Ukrainian people as it does other nations worldwide.
Askold Lozynskyj, a New York attorney, has been president of the Ukrainian World Congress since 1998. Prior to that he was president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.
CONCLUSION
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 25, 2002, No. 34, Vol. LXX
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